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CONDITIONAL, EXPERIMENTAL AND SUBSTITUTIONAL RELIEF
Robert Allen Sedler*
The purpose of this article is to explore the process by which a court,
while administering specific or declaratory relief, adequately protects
the legitimate interests of all parties by either conditioning relief upon
the performance of some act by the party seeking such relief,' by issu-
ing a decree with flexible terms, or by granting relief different in kind
than that which was sought. Since historically all specific and declara-
tory relief, with the exception of ejectment, replevin and extraordinary
legal remedies such as mandamus, was administered by the former
courts of chancery,2 such relief can be designated as equitable relief.3
Throughout this article equitable relief means only that and is not
used to refer to substantive principles considered "equitable," such as
estoppel or restitution. We will also discuss the application of this proc-
ess to those forms of specific relief denominated as "legal," since his-
torically administered by the common law courts.
The employment of conditional, experimental or substitutional re-
lief recognizes that often neither party is wholly "in the right" or "in
the wrong." Where both parties have legitimate interests to be pro-
tected, the court should not refuse to recognize one, because it cannot
protect the other, nor extend protection to only one at the expense of
* Assistant Professor of Law, Saint Louis University.
I. Throughout the article the party affirmatively seeking relief will be referred
to as the plaintiff for sake of convenience. He may be the formal defendant, but is
seeking affirmative relief.
2. We will assume that we are operating under a merged system of law and
equity. At present only four states have separate courts of law and equity. The
majority have but one "side," though some have separate sides for law and equity.
If properly administered, separate sides are matters of convenient division rather
than remnants of separate systems. For a complete report on the merger in each
state see the Appendices to Joiner & Geddes, The Union of Law and Equity, 55
MICH. L. Rzv. 1059 (1957).
3. A great body of substantive law was formerly administered by the courts of
chancery, e.g., trusts, domestic relations. Equitable relief as used throughout the
article refers only to the specific and declaratory remedies formerly administered
by the courts of chancery.
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the other, without first making an attempt at adjustment, ultimately
recognizing both. By its very nature equitable relief lends itself to ap-
portioning loss or advantage, which damages often cannot do.4 Where
a transaction in some respects interferes with policies the court or legis-
lature has chosen to protect, the public interest in the implementation
of those policies can in many instances still be protected, though some
relief is given. The contrary is found in damages actions, where the
court often must decide whether an award of damages in a certain case
would be in the public interest and must refuse relief if it finds it
would not. So too, when an award of damages involving a close ques-
tion of that sort is decided in favor of the plaintiff, the public interest
may be left unprotected. 5
Because of the court's discretion in granting equitable relief, the
terms under which the relief is given may be determinative of which
party "won" the case rather than the court's holding as to liability and
defenses.6 I will consider the availability of each of the three types of
relief, the circumstances under which the court will refuse to grant it
due to the effect such relief would have on conflicting policies, and the
types of situations in which such relief can be extended. A number of
suggested changes will be made. I will further consider the effect that
vestiges of the historical distinction between law and equity have on the
granting of this relief. The emphasis will be on the result that accrues
when the relief is given or refused; it is a basic proposition of this writ-
ing that except as required by statutory or constitutional provisions,
-.g., the question of trial by jury, the result with respect to the relief
4. Consider, for example, the rule that "where one of two innocent parties must
suffer for the acts of a third, the loss must be borne by the one who put the wrong-
doer in a position to perpetrate the wrong." The court decides who that party is
and makes no attempt to apportion the loss. Comparative negligence statutes do
represent an attempt to apportion the loss resulting from an act, but the common
law rule of contributory negligence as an absolute bar is in accord with the ap-
proach generally taken by the courts when administering damages remedies.
5. This always occurs when a court must decide whether to enforce a contract
tainted with some illegality. When it enforces such a contract, it can do nothing
to protect against the conduct which it finds improper but not sufficiently so as to
refuse enforcement.
6. Consider, for example, the result in Warner & Co. v. Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526
(1924). The plaintiff sought to enjoin the defendant's use of chocolate in its medi-
cal preparation on the ground that this constituted unfair competition, since the
public thought that the product was manufactured by the plaintiff, who was the
only other manufacturer using chocolate, and the defendant did nothing to counter-
act this impression. The Court found unfair competition, but the decree merely
ordered the defendant to use a different label on its product to distinguish it from
the plaintiff's. Obviously, the plaintiff wanted to force the defendant to cease using
chocolate completely and thus eliminate competition. The plaintiff got all the re-
lief to which he was entitled, but it may be asked whether the plaintiff "won" the
case, even though the Court did find unfair competition. The same question may
be asked when a jury finds negligence and returns a verdict for $iooo in a case
where medical bills exceeded $3ooo. The defendant's lawyer would not consider
that he "lost" that case.
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sought should not be dependent on whether the relief was historically
denominated as legal or equitable.
I. CONDITIONAL RELIEF
A. General Considerations
The types of conditional relief that the courts impose fall into two
basic categories. The first is the performance of agreed conditions or
the restoration of the status quo. For example, when the plaintiff seeks
specific performance, he must as a condition to the decree, conform to
the arrangements for payment of the purchase price.7 Further, when a
party seeks recission of a transaction, 8 unless excused by policy reasons
or other defenses, he must return the consideration and otherwise re-
store the situation existing prior to consummation. Were an action for
damages or restitutionary relief brought, this performance would have
been a condition precedent to suit. The discussion here is focused on
when this condition is excused due to its conflict with policies the state
is trying to implement or because of other defenses to conditional re-
lief. The second, and more interesting type, is the imposition of addi-
tional conditions, because, under the circumstances, it would be unfair
to the opposing party or injurious to the public interest to permit the
relief sought without the imposition of those conditions. These condi-
tions do not constitute an affirmative decree against the plaintiff, and
the defendant cannot enforce them against him unless he has counter-
claimed for the relief represented by those conditions.9 Upon the plain-
tiff's failure to accede, the complaint will be dismissed.
It is unfortunate that many courts consider that their power to grant
conditional relief is dependent on the maxim, "he who seeks equity
must do equity." As a result, these courts have refused to impose any
conditions on a party asserting a defense, even though the effect of the
decree is to give him exactly what would have accrued to him had he
been the party affirmatively seeking relief, at which time these condi-
tions would have been imposed. 10 Moreover, this restrictive view as to
the basis of the court's power has prevented the granting of conditional
relief to the defendant, because the theory of the action was replevin
or ejectment, though the relief would have been given if the theory of
the action was "equitable." Professor McClintock has pointed out that
"the statement that equity jurisprudence has been developed from these
7. See Fullman v. Steel City Elec. Co., 2 F.2d 4 (3 d Cir. 1924).
8. Recission may be sought either in an independent action or as a defense to
an action brought on the contract. Where recission is granted, the decree declares
that the contract is abrogated, and the parties are left to their restitutionary rather
than expectancy remedies.
9. Farwell v. Harding, 96 Ill. 32 (i88o); Tramonte v. Colarusso, 256 Mass. 299,
152 N.E. 90 (1926). See also the discussion in Nicosia v. Sher, 239 F.2d 456, 457-58
(ioth Cir. 1956).
1o. See the discussion at notes 44-58 infra and accompanying text.
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maxims is historically inaccurate." 11 He also has observed that the prin-
ciples under which equitable relief would be given were developed
long prior to the use of maxims, and that the maxims have little if any
utility in themselves. 12 The basic power of any court to administer
justice would give it the power to award conditional relief if that is
necessary to effectuate a just result. The power to administer justice
and not the existence of a maxim justifies the imposition of conditional
relief in a proper case. A court having an accurate understanding of
the real basis of that power can eliminate many of the undesirable and
unsound results that occur in this area.
Although as previously indicated, such relief is particularly appro-
priate where the remedy sought is of a specific or declaratory nature,
the principle is also a part of substantive areas of law which were origi-
nally administered by the chancery courts, such as bankruptcy 13 and
domestic relations. 14 It is available for the benefit of any party against
whom equitable relief is sought. Although an individual defendant
may be barred because of his conduct in the particular transaction, a
class of defendants is not barred, though their conduct would prevent
their obtaining relief in an independent transaction. For example,
where a corporate defendant has not complied with the requirements
of the doing business statute, which disables it from bringing a suit,
it may, nonetheless, have the benefit of conditional relief if the suit is
brought against it.15
However, the power to grant legal relief is subject to other principles
of law. One is that it cannot be used to destroy express contractual
rights. For example, in one case 1 the parties entered into a lease un-
der which it was provided that improvements were to become the prop-
erty of the lessor at the end of the term. At that time they renewed the
lease, which contained the same provisions as to future improvements.
In the lessor's action to rescind on grounds of incompetency, the lessee
was entitled to be reimbursed for improvements made after the second
lease was commenced, but not for those made under the former lease.
The lessor's right to those became vested at the end of the term, since
the former lease was not rescinded. Even though it might have been
equitable under the circumstances to require reimbursement for them
also, the power to grant conditional relief could not be employed to
11. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY 53 (2d ed. 1948).
12. Id. at 52-53.
13. Larson v. First State Bank, 21 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1927).
14. McEntire v. McEntire, 107 Ohio St. 510, 14o N.E. 328 (1923). The right of
a tenant in partition proceedings to recover for the reasonable and necessary im-
provements is also based on this power. Kubina v. Nichols, 241 Wis. 644, 6 N.W.2d
657 (1942).
15. Lasswell Land & Lumber Co. v. Lee Wilson & Co., 236 Fed. 322 (8th Cir.
1916), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 652 (1917); Coburn v. Coke, 193 Ala. 364, 69 So. 574
(1915); Blake v. American Trust Co., 293 Mich. 618, 292 N.W. 504 (1940).
x6. Christian v. Waialua Agriculture Co., 94 F.2d 8o6 (gth Cir. 1938).
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destroy a vested right. However, a so-called "negative right" under a
contract-that the plaintiff only promised to do specific things and not
others-is subject to the principle, and the plaintiff may be required
to do something other than that which he has expressly promised.1 7
Nor will the power be used to force the plaintiff to relinquish a gift.
On this basis, it was held by a California court 18 that a plaintiff in
whose favor a constructive trust arose was not required to reimburse his
uncle's administrator for the plaintiff's share of the expenditures made
by the uncle for the land, since the evidence did not rebut the pre-
sumption that the uncle intended those expenditures as a gift.
Another qualifying principle is that the court cannot disregard res
judicata when granting conditional relief. A res judicata determination
will bar a relitigation, although conditional relief would have been
proper in the absence of the prior adjudication. In Phelps v. City of
Chicago,19 the plaintiff sued to remove the clouds created by tax deeds.
The city demanded that as a condition to the decree he pay the taxes
actually due, which ordinarily is a requirement of such relief. But in a
prior ejectment suit against the city, which claimed under the tax deed,
judgment was for the plaintiff, and it was a substantive requirement
that judgment could not be entered against the holder of tax deeds un-
less the taxes had been paid. The city could not collaterally attack that
judgment under the guise of seeking conditional relief. A similar situ-
ation occurred in Alexander v. Temple,20 where a municipality sought
to enjoin the defendant from interfering with its use of land that it
claimed by eminent domain. The defendant demanded that as a con-
dition to the decree the city pay him for the land so condemned. The
court held that he was bound by prior condemnation proceedings in
which an award had been made. It was immaterial that the award had
not been paid, since the determination in the prior proceedings pre-
vented its relitigation, and the award would have to be enforced under
the former decree. Moreover, the defendant may be barred by the elec-
tion of remedies aspect of res judicata. This was involved in Weyer-
haeuser Timber Co. v. Skaglund,21 where the plaintiff sued to en-
join the defendant from interfering with his use of a right of way. The
defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract damages, contending
that the plaintiff agreed to pay a specified sum for logs transported over
the right of way. The counterclaim was dismissed. The defendant then
argued that the decree should be conditioned on the plaintiff's paying
a reasonable sum for the logs transported. The court held that since the
17. See Van Scoten v. Albright, 5 N.J. Eq. 467 (Ch. 1845).
18. Steinberger v. Steinberger, 6o Cal. App.2d i16, 140 P.2d 31 (Dist. Ct. App.
1943).
19. 33, Ill. 80, 162 N.E. 119 (1928).
20. 172 Ark. 611, 290 S.W. 63 (1927).
21. 16 Wash.2d 29, 132 P.2d 724 (1942).
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defendant chose to base his claim upon a contract, which was rejected,
he could not raise the same issue again via a request for conditional re-
lief.
Another limitation on the court's power to grant conditional relief
is that it cannot perform a non-judicial function in doing so. In Cent.
Ky. Co. v. Comm'n22 a public utility brought suit against state officials
to set aside as confiscatory a prescribed rate for the sale of natural gas.
The court found the rate of $.45 per hundred feet confiscatory but con-
ditioned the injunction against enforcement upon plaintiff's accepting
a rate of $.50 per hundred feet. Upon the plaintiff's refusal to comply
with that condition, the injunction was denied.
The Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the injunction on the
ground that since rate-making was a legislative function, the court did
not have the power to determine rates and could not impose as a con-
dition the performance of an act which it did not have the power to
order. The final decree, of course, was without prejudice to the power
of the commission to fix new rates. The Court observed:
District courts may set aside a confiscatory rate prescribed by state au-
thority because forbidden by the Fourteenth Amendment, but they are
without authority to prescribe rates, both because that is a function re-
served to the state and because it is not one within the judicial power
conferred upon them by the Constitution ...
The practical effect of a denial of relief unless the plaintiff will sub-
mit to a rate, the reasonableness of which he challenges, is to make the
surrender of the right to invoke a distinctively state legislative function
the price of justice in the federal courts. . . . Such interference with
the legislative function is not a proper exercise of the discretionary pow-
ers of a federal court of equity.23
Also, the court must consider the effect of a foreign element in de-
ciding whether to grant conditional relief. As it must consider whether
it is practical to issue an affirmative decree affecting foreign interests,24
so too must it consider the advisability of imposing a condition affect-
ing the same interests, even though the defendant would be entitled
22. 290 U.S. 264 (1933).
23. Id. at 271-72.
24. The problem is well discussed in Muller v. Dows, 94 U.S. 444 (1876). Some
of the factors the court considers in determining whether specific relief should be
issued despite the presence of the foreign element are as follows: (i) the extent to
which all necessary acts can be done in the forum; (2) the extent to which the
decree can be enforced against the defendant, e.g., a non-resident having no prop-
erty in the forum; (3) economic and practical considerations, i.e., is the plaintiff
likely to obtain relief in the forum; (4) the likelihood of recognition by other
states; (5) the nature of the defendant's obligation, i.e., is it pre-existing; and (6)
the extent to which the court must directly act in another state. See also Massie v.
Watts, io U.S. (6 Cranch) 148 (18io); Amey v. Colebrook Guar. Sav. Bank,
92 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1937); Alexander v. Tolleston Club, iio Ill. 65 (188,1); St.
Louis Smelting & Refining Co. v. Hoban, 357 Mo. 436, 209 S.W.2d 119 (1948);
Marquis v. Marquis, 121 N.J. Eq. 288, 189 At. 388 (E.8cA. 1937); Kempson v.
Kempson, 58 N.J. Eq. 94, 43 At. 97 (Ch. 1899); Wimer v. Wimer, 82 Va. 890(1886); Alaska Airlines v. Molitor. 43 Wash.2d 657, 263 P.2d 276 (1953).
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to conditional relief if the foreign element were not present. Thus,
where a son sought specific performance of a contract by which the
father agreed to convey land situate in the forum, the court would not
require the son, as a condition to the decree, to quitclaim his interests
in other lands of the deceased father situate elsewhere, as the decedent's
will disposing of those lands, was being probated at the situs.
25
Finally, the court must give effect to legislation limiting its discre-
tion to grant conditional relief. In an action to set aside a release given
for a claim under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 26 the court may
not condition the relief upon a return of the consideration, since the
act has been interpreted as allowing the plaintiff to set aside the release
without returning the consideration.27 Also, if the legislature has pro-
vided another remedy for the relief sought to be imposed, which is con-
strued as being exclusive, the court may not grant conditional relief
unless the defendant brings his case within the statutory remedy. Talia-
ferro v. Colasso'2 8 involved an action to quiet title where the defendant
sought reimbursement for improvements as a condition to the decree,
which ordinarily is imposed. The court found that the exclusive remedy
for the recovery of improvements was furnished by the "betterment
act" 29 and since the defendant's claim did not come within the statute,
the court could not require reimbursement.
3 0
However, the court is not prohibited from granting conditional re-
lief, simply because such relief could not be given to the defendant if
he instituted affirmative proceedings.31 In another case involving an
action to quiet title, the court granted a lien to secure repayment of
money that the defendant advanced to the plaintiff, his son, to help the
latter pay for improvements. The fact that the son had made improve-
ments permitted him to enforce the oral contract, avoiding the bar
of the Statute of Frauds. The relief was given the defendant, though
there was no contract between the parties, and the father would not
have been able to secure such a lien in an independent action.3 2 Also,
in New Jersey the court has held that in a suit by a municipality to
cancel bonds, it would have to return the consideration received as a
condition to relief, though it might have a defense if the bondholders
25. Nickerson v. Nickerson, 209 Mich. 134, 176 N.W. 456 (192o).
26. 35 Stat. 65 (1908), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1958).
27. Irish v. Central Vt. Ry., 164 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1947). But cf., Graham
v. Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry., 176 F.2d 819 (9 th Cir. 1949). The interpretation of Irish
was followed in Marshall v. New York Cent. R.R., 218 F.2d 9oo (7th Cir. 1955).
28. 139 Cal. App.2d 903, 294 P.2d 774 (Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
29. These statutes permit recovery in certain instances where under the common
law rule they could not be recovered in an ejectment action by the disseised owner.
This problem is discussed more fully at notes 339-49 infra and accompanying text.
3o.The statute was limited to good faith improvers and the defendant was a
wilful trespasser.
31. This is best demonstrated in the case of the non-complying foreign corpora-
tion. See the discussion at note 15 supra and accompanying text.
32. Lindell v. Lindell, 150 Minn. 295, 185 N.W. 929 (1921).
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had sued to enforce payment.8 3 This principle is also present when-
ever defenses to conditional relief such as the statute of limitations or
usury are asserted, and it will be discussed in that context.8 4 Merely
note that the fact that the defendant's claim could not be affirmatively
enforced does not, in and of itself, affect the power of the court to make
satisfaction of that claim a condition to relief.
It is a requirement that the matter as to which conditional relief is
given must form part of the transaction as to which the plaintiff is
seeking relief.8 5 The court will not employ this power to settle every
dispute the plaintiff and the defendant might have or to serve the pur-
pose of a general counterclaim. Thus, it has been held that in a suit to
establish a resulting trust in real property conveyed to the defendant,
the plaintiff would not be required to pay other debts owed to the de-
fendant, unrelated to the property.3 6 What constitutes a collateral
transaction, rendering conditional relief inapplicable, must be viewed
in light of the type of relief the plaintiff is seeking. In one case,3 7 an
illiterate plaintiff sued to cancel a deed on the ground that the de-
fendant, his son, had represented that the instrument was a will. Since
the deed was analytically void and the relief sought was merely judicial
affirmation of this fact, it was held that any payment of outstanding
loans on the property by the defendant involved collateral transactions
and reimbursement was not required as a condition to relief.
The nature of the remedy sought was also involved in another case, 8
where suit was brought to reform a deed to exclude land included by
mistake. The defendant did not counterclaim for damages due to mis-
representation but sought conditional relief which would require the
plaintiff to compensate him for the land that would now be excluded
from his grant. The court refused such relief on the ground that the
subject matter of the suit was reformation and that the defendant's
claim was not related to the remedy of reformation. The defendant
would have had the same claim even if the deed had been correctly
drawn.
Further difficulty arises in situations where additional action was
taken in reliance on the transaction as to which relief is later sought.
In Mahoney v. Bostwick,"9 the plaintiff sued to have a deed absolute
declared a mortgage. Following the giving of the instrument, the plain-
33. Lodi Township v. Little Ferry Nat'l Bank, 121 N.J. Eq. 213, 189 Atl. 58
(Ch- 1937).
34. See the discussion at notes 253-68 infra and accompanying text.
35. The same requirement is present when the court applies the clean hands
doctrine. Where the unclean hands are with respect to a "collateral transaction,"
the court will not refuse relief on that account. MOCLINTOCK, op. cit. supra note
11, at 63. See Harris v. Harris, 2o8 Ala. 20, 93 So. 841 (1922).
36. Heflin v. Heflin, 216 Ala. 519, i13 So. 535 (1927).37. Jackson v. Jackson, 202 Ga. 634, 44 S.E.2d 250 (1947).
38. Malcolm v. Talley, 89 W.Va. 531, iog S.E. 613 (1921).
39. 96 Cal. 53, 30 Pac. 1020 (1892).
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tiff had given a mortgage on future crops as additional security for the
loan secured by what plaintiff claimed was a mortgage. It was held that
the defendant was not entitled to reimbursement for expenditures and
advancements made in reliance on the additional security, since the
subject of the suit was only the first instrument.
The question of what constitutes a collateral transaction becomes
compounded whenever the interest of a third party is involved. This
problem was presented in a recent Georgia case where an incompetent
grantor sued to set aside the deed given from his grantee to the defend-
ant.40 It was held that the grantor was not required, as a condition to
the decree, to reimburse the defendant for the consideration paid to his
grantor. The court admitted that the grantor would have had to re-
turn the consideration to his grantee if he were the defendant, but held
that the absence of a prior relationship between the plaintiff and this
defendant relegated the relief sought to that involving a collateral mat-
ter. Although the decision may be analytically correct insofar as it char-
acterizes the transaction as collateral, it is submitted that since the
plaintiff would now have to return the consideration to his grantee, the
defendant should have been subrogated to the latter's rights. Requir-
ing payment of the plaintiff then would avoid circuity of action, since
under the court's approach the defendant would have to recover the
consideration from his grantor, who in turn, would have to proceed
against the plaintiff.
On the other hand, where foreclosure of a mortgage was sought, the
court looked to the entire transaction, of which the mortgage was the
base, in determining the collateral character of the matter as to which
the defendant sought relief. In City Investing Co. v. Davis,41 the plain-
tiff sued to foreclose a chattel mortgage under which the corporate de-
fendant pledged all its stock as security for a loan. The loan was also
to be secured by a mortgage on land, which was to be jointly developed
and the proceeds credited toward satisfaction of the debt. The land was
sold when the venture proved unproductive. It was held that as a con-
dition to foreclosing the chattel mortgage the plaintiff would have to
credit the proceeds received from the sale of the land and also credit
the defendant with its payment of a first mortgage on the land pursu-
ant to agreement, as well as the expenses of maintenance and sale. The
court found that all the activities were part of a single transaction.
A very close question of similar import was presented in a suit to
foreclose brought by the personal representative of the deceased mort-
gagee.42 The mortgagor was a physician, who had been a close personal
friend of the mortgagee. Over the years the mortgagor had never
charged the decedent for medical services, and any claim for these serv-
40. Tate v. Potter, 216 Ga. 750, 119 S.E.2d 547 (1961).
41. 334 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. 196o).
42. Anderson v. Purvis, 211 S.C. 255, 44 S.E.2d 611 (1947).
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ices would have been barred by the statute of limitations. The court
held that the defendant had failed to prove that the decedent agreed
to accept medical services in satisfaction of the debt.4 However, it did
condition the granting of foreclosure upon payment for those services,
saying that the defendant had "an adverse equity arising out of the
transaction before the court."
Although the result may seem a far extension of the concept of the
"same transaction," in actuality it is justifiable. What the court was
really doing was relieving against a unilateral mistake. The defendant
probably did think that the services were in satisfaction of the debt.
Though the proof was insufficient to show that the decedent had
agreed, the court realized that had the decedent lived, he probably
would not have foreclosed against his friend of long standing. The
result comports with what the decedent probably would have wanted
-if the physician could not keep the land in exchange for the services,
then he would have wanted him to have been paid for the services.
What constitutes the same transaction is necessarily a difficult ques-
tion to determine and no general principle can be stated. However, it
does appear that to the extent the plaintiff seeks a narrow remedy such
as reformation or declaration of the status of an instrument, the court
is less likely to examine the broader aspects of the transaction and
award conditional relief. When the remedy sought would terminate the
transaction, as foreclosure, then the court is more likely to explore the
ramifications and attempt to settle the conflicting interests created by
the original transaction. The court should always be careful to avoid
using its power to condition relief as a substitute for counterclaims and
should not attempt to settle all the aspects of a controversy when only
a portion is before it.
At this juncture it is incumbent to consider the availability of condi-
tional relief against a party defendant who is not seeking affirmative
relief. Courts who base their power upon the "he who seeks equity"
maxim are particularly prone to ignore the realistic effects of drawing
the affirmative-defensive relief distinction, with the result that a party
may actually obtain relief, but avoid compliance with fair conditions
simply by waiting to be sued.
An extreme demonstration of the fallacy inherent in such an ap-
proach occurred in Connecticut General Life Ins. Co. v. Benedict.44
The insurer instituted an interpleader action against the prior desig-
nated and substituted beneficiaries, both of whom claimed the pro-
ceeds. The prior beneficiary argued that the assignment of the policies
and the change of beneficiary were void, since they were to furnish
43. The court apparently did not consider whether the defendant was barred
because of an election of remedies. Cf., Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Skaglund,
supra note 21.
44. 88 F.2d 43 6 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, lot U.S. 694 (1937).
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security for a usurious loan. The court agreed with this contention and
held that the prior beneficiary was entitled to the proceeds. However,
it refused to require him to repay the loan given to the insured, even
though had he instituted independent proceedings for cancellation,45
he would have been required, according to the court, to do so. Under
the substantive law he succeeded to the liabilities as well as the rights
of the insured. 46 The court said that since the prior beneficiary did not
seek affirmative relief, conditions would not be imposed-since he did
not apply for cancellation, he would not have to "do equity."
However, the prior beneficiary received the same benefits as if he
had sued for cancellation. It should be immaterial that he "defended
his title," since when a party asserts a right to rescind as a defense to
an action on the contract, he is required to return the consideration
under the same circumstances as when he brings affirmative proceed-
ings.4 7 It is no answer to say that there he is getting the "affirmative
relief" of rescission, since the same result is obtained in the interpleader
proceedings. The court also observed that where the plaintiff is a stake-
holder the claims are "legal" instead of "equitable." By making an
adverse claim, thereby forcing the insurer to bring interpleader pro-
ceedings in order to protect itself, the prior beneficiary can effect cancel-
lation of the change (though it is not called such) without reimbursing
the substituted beneficiary, though otherwise he could not avoid this
condition. Whether a party should be able to obtain the proceeds of
an insurance policy without reimbursing the substituted beneficiary
whose claim he has defeated should not depend on whether the theory
of the claim is "legal" or "equitable" or whether he is seeking "affirm-
ative" or only "defensive" relief. The power of the court to impose fair
conditions on the granting of relief should not depend on the theory
of the claim where the claimant obtains the same benefits under either
theory.
There are other situations where a court actually grants relief to the
defendant without requiring performance of conditions which it would
require if he sued to obtain the same relief. In First Trust & Sav. Bank
v. Iowa-Wisconsin Bridge Co.,48 suit was brought to foreclose a trust
deed securing corporate bonds, and the corporation defended on
grounds of fraud. The court denied foreclosure on those grounds but
refused to require the corporation to return the consideration it had
45. He could have done so, since he was adversely affected by the change of
beneficiary. This standing is recognized apparently, even though the prior bene-
ficiary gave no consideration for the designation.
46. See Wheelock v. Lee, 64 N.Y. 242, 246 (1876); Brown v. Robinson, 224 N.Y.
301, 12o N.E. 694 (ig98). The court was applying New York law.
47. Note that a party against whom a contract is sought to be enforced can
counterclaim for a decree of rescission; it is then as if he instituted an affirmative
action.
48. 98 F.2d 416 (8th Cir. i93 8), cert. denied, 305 U.S. 650 (1938).
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received from the bondholders as a condition to the decree. Since the
decree did not order the deed rescinded, the defendant obtained no
affirmative relief as such. But declaring the security interest unenforce-
able on grounds of fraud has the same result as cancelling it. We see
then that the result again depends on whether the obligor waited to
be sued-in which case he does not have to return the consideration
in order to avoid enforcement-or brought independent proceedings.
Such a distinction is absurd since the obligor obtains, in effect, identi-
cal relief. Since the obligation is substantively unenforceable, it is as if
it were cancelled; all that is lacking is a formal decree of cancellation.
Moreover, the bondholders could recover the consideration in a sepa-
rate proceeding-two suits are necessary to accomplish what could be
done in one were the court not bent on preserving the distinction be-
tween affirmative and negative relief and laboring under a mistaken
view as to the nature of its power to impose conditions. Such an ap-
proach is of no utility under a merged system of law and equity.
In Bavisoto v. United States,49 the court permitted the insurer to de-
fend a suit for monthly payments due to total disability on grounds of
fraud without requiring return of the premiums paid. Assuming that
the premiums were not forfeited due to the fraud, '0 the decision again
effectively permits cancellation, as the policy is now unenforceable, and
requires a second action to recover the premiums. And in Mortgage
Sec. Corp. v. Levy, 51 the court refused to enforce a usurious mortgage
without requiring payment of the debt and lawful interest as a con-
dition, though it would have required such payment if the mortgagor
brought suit for cancellation.52 The mortgagor did counterclaim for
cancellation, which claim the court denied, and in doing so (this may
have been its intention) actually benefited him. Again, the result is as
if the mortgage had been cancelled, since it is unenforceable. The
court effects cancellation without a formal decree and relieves the mort-
gagor from satisfying a requirement it would have imposed if he had
received such a decree.
On the other hand, it is not contended that conditional relief be im-
posed in order to permit the assertion of a defense where the result of
allowing the defense is not the same as it would be if the defendant
sought affirmative relief. This distinction is evidenced in suits to quiet
title to land. Thus, where plaintiff claimed title by virtue of a tax deed,
and the defense was that the deed was invalid due to noncompliance
with statutory requirements, the court did not require the defendant
to pay the taxes owed in order to question the deed's validity.5 3 The
49. 18 F. Supp. 355 (W.D.N.Y. 1937).
50. This is generally not permitted by state insurance laws.
51 11 F.2d 270 (5th Cir. 1926).
52. As to whether this is required in order to assert a homestead defense, see the
discussion at notes 271-82 infra and accompanying text.
53. Messer v. Henlein, 72 N.D. 63, 4 N.W.2d 587 (1942).
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court emphasized that the defendant would not be entitled to a judg-
ment decreeing title in him due to the invalidity of the deed without
paying such taxes, and that he was not getting such relief. Here the ac-
tion to quiet title was a quasi in rem proceeding, and the question was
whether the plaintiff had good title as against the defendant. The ef-
fect of the decree was to hold that the plaintiff did not have a good title
against the defendant; it did not hold the converse, that the defendant
had a good title against the plaintiff. The matter remained in status
quo. If the defendant would want title declared in him, he would have
to pay the taxes, which the court should not require him to do until
such time, if ever, as he wants this declaration. But in another case
where the residuary legatee sued to set aside a deed from the testator,
and the court upheld the validity of the deed, the decree effectively
quieted the defendant's title against the plaintiff, so that the court im-
posed certain conditions upon the defendant.54 The defense was such
that it could not be recognized without holding that the property did
not pass under the residuary clause of the will. This meant that the
plaintiff could not take it, and the defendant's title was good as against
him.
Another case where conditions properly were not imposed upon the
assertion of a defense was Estes v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.55 In that
case the mortgagee sued for declaratory relief that the instrument was
a mortgage and also sought to set aside a prior sale. As a defense the
mortgagor asserted that the security was given on homestead property
and claimed the homestead exemption. Under the statutory procedure,
when such a claim was made, the court would order a sale, deduct the
amount of the exemption, and the remainder would be paid to the
creditor. The court held that the defendant could obtain the exemp-
tion without paying the mortgage debt, although if he had sued to can-
cel the mortgage, because given on homestead property, he would have
had to comply with that condition.
Although the court talked in terms of the defendant's not "being
the actor in equity," closer scrutiny indicates that this was not the real
basis of the decision. The mortgagor did not obtain the same result as
he would have upon cancellation. Where a mortgage on homestead was
issued without compliance with the statute, the mortgagor had an
election. He could obtain cancellation or give up the property by per-
mitting enforcement of the mortgage subject to the statutory exemp-
tion. He chose the latter course here but could have accomplished the
same result by filing a petition in an independent action or at any
time that the mortgagee sought enforcement. In neither instance would
the mortgagor have to pay the debt in order to obtain the exemption.
54. Kanauske v. Clark, 388 Ill. 357, 57 N.E.2d 89o (1940). See the subsequent
discussion of the case at notes 216-17 infra and accompanying text.
55. 232 Ala. 656, 169 So. V6 (1936).
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Upon cancellation it is proper that he return the consideration-as-
suming that the state's policy does not militate against the return in
such a case 56-since the mortgagee then loses his security. However,
when the exemption is obtained, the mortgagee receives the proceeds
of the sale after deduction of the exemption. Payment of the debt
should not have been required here because actually the mortgagor
was not obtaining cancellation; this is the real reason for not requir-
ing payment, not that the mortgagor was not the party seeking affirma-
tive relief.57
It is submitted that the court should look to the practical effect of
the decision in determining whether conditional relief should be re-
quired rather than to the formal position of the party against whom
such conditions are sought to be imposed. Where the party obtains the
same actual relief by asserting a defense as he would if he brought an
independent action, the same conditions should be imposed upon him
as would be in the independent action. So too, when the plaintiff's suit
is dismissed due to the defendant's defense, and the plaintiff could re-
cover the relief he seeks in an independent proceeding, the court should
impose such relief as a condition to dismissal in order to avoid circuity
of action even absent a counterclaim. 58 It is the result that the court
accomplishes by its action rather than the position of the parties that
should determine whether conditional relief is proper. It is hoped that
the courts will apply the same approach employed in the quieting title
cases to those where the effect of the decision is to accomplish cancel-
lation, even though no formal decree is entered, and to the other in-
stances where the defendant obtains the same result by asserting the
defense as he would if he had instituted independent proceedings.
Before considering the substantive doctrine of conditional relief, it
is necessary to make a few observations about procedural matters. In
the first place, such relief can be granted, even though the defendant
does not ask for it in his pleadings, since the court is exercising an in-
herent power.5 9 The next question is when must the plaintiff actually
make a tender of money into the court, where the condition involves
such payment? In suits to enjoin the collection of taxes, in which it is
a condition that plaintiff pay taxes admittedly due,60 the plaintiff must
have either paid the taxes or tender the money as a condition precedent
56. See discussion at notes 271-82 infra and accompanying text.
57. See also Federal Discount Corp. v. Rush, 269 Mich. 612, 257 N.W. 897 ('934),
where as a matter of substantive law refusal of a valid tender destroyed the lien,
so the mortgagor could resist foreclosure on that ground. There too, it was im-
material that the mortgagor did not seek affirmative relief, because the same result
should accrue if he had done so.
58. Or it could permit amendment of the pleadings to hear the claim for relief.
59. Garcia v. Venegas, io6 Cal. App.2d 364, 235 P.2d 89 (Dist. Ct. App. 1951);
Duggan v. Platz, 263 N.Y. 5o5, 189 N.E. 566 (1934).
6o. For when this is required, see the discussion at notes 116-25 infra and ac-
companying text.
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to suit.61 Because of the interference with the governmental process
that is involved the court will not hear the claim absent such tender.
The requirement of an actual tender also exists where a party is re-
quired to return the consideration in order to set aside a release. 62
Where an amount may be owing, but it cannot be determined until
trial, of course, no tender can be required. Where a liquidated amount
is owing, such as on a security instrument, and payment would be re-
quired as a condition to relief, the general rule is that an actual tender
is not required prior to the court's hearing the case. 3 Research has dis-
closed only the Georgia courts as requiring a tender in that situation,64
and even this may not be required if there is an attempt to set off.65
Some courts do, however, require that the pleadings contain an offer
to "do equity," 66 while others dispense with even this requirement.67
Moreover, amendments are generally permitted where such an offer is
required, since the offer is not considered a condition precedent to
suit. 8 Plaintiff's counsel should always offer to "do equity" whenever
equitable relief is sought, in order to avoid procedural questions which
may delay the trial.
B. Substantive Application
i. Avoiding the effect of improper conduct
In one area the existence of the doctrine rebounds to the benefit
of the plaintiff, since it enables him to avoid the bar of a defense aris-
ing from his improper conduct. In the absence of its power to condi-
tion relief, the court would have to recognize the defense and deny any
relief. In the first place, conditional relief can be used to repair a
breach of contract, where the breach would otherwise bar the action.
61. City and County of Denver v. Hallett, 45 Colo. 132, 1oo Pac. 408 (1909);
Irwin v. Pearson, 204 Ga. 635, 51 S.E.2d 420 (1949).
62. See the substantive discussion at notes 156-87 infra and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., Tyler v. Morgan, 214 Ark. 667, 217 S.W.2d 6o6 (1949).
64. Harpe v. Stone, 212 Ga. 341, 92 S.E.2d 522 (1956); Auld v. Cobb Exch. Bank,
204 Ga. 729, 51 S.E.2d 635 (1949); Harton v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia, 187
Ga. 700, 2 S.E.2d 62 (1939); Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Collins, 179 Ga. 444, 176
S.E. 39 (1934).
65. Compare Dumas v. Dumas, 2o6 Ga. 767, 58 S.E.2d 83o (1950), with Snell v.
Spalding Foundry Co., 18o Ga. 582, i8o S.E. 218 (1935).
66. Rector v. United States, 2o F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1927); Dean v. Coosa County
Lumber Co., 232 Ala. 177, 167 So. 566 (1936); Williams v. Smith, 127 Cal. App.2d
607, 274 P.2d 204 (Dist. Ct. App. 1954); Carlton v. Hulett, 49 Minn. 3o8, 51 N.W.
1053 (1892); semble: Dean v. Robertson, 64 Miss. 195, 1 So. 159 (1887); Frisbee v.
Coburn, 1O1 Mont. 58, 52 P.2d 882 (1935); Kenalos v. H. V. Greene Co., 81 N.H.
418, 128 Atl. 335 (1925); Keefer v. McGinnis, 365 Pa. 6ol, 76 A.2d 410 (1950);
West Tex. Loan Co. v. Beckham, 291 S.W. 582 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
67. Logar v. O'Brien, 339 Ill. 628, 171 N.E. 629 (1930); DeBlouw v. Ramm & Co.,
284 Mich. 589, 279 N.W. 919 (1938); semble: Dieterich v. Rice, 124 Wash. 613, 215
Pac. 65 (1923); Harney v. Montgomery, 29 Wyo. 362, 213 Pac. 378 (1923).
68. Coburn v. Coke, 193 Ala. 364, 69 So. 574 (1915); Oceanic Villas v. Godson,
148 Fla. 454, 4 So.2d 689 (1941).
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By granting conditional relief the court can enforce a contract and pro-
tect the interests of both parties; otherwise the contract would fail. In
Burlington Sav. Bank v. Rockwell,69 the plaintiff sued to foreclose on
certain collateral security. The defendant answered that the note for
which the security was given was executed as part of an agreement un-
der which plaintiff was to obtain title to certain lands by foreclosure
and escrow the land as security for the payment of the defendant's debt,
which he failed to do. The intention was that the obligation would be
repaid from the profits of the land during the period of the obligation.
Since the plaintiff had failed to put the lands into escrow, the court
held that he could not foreclose and entered a decree cancelling the
pledge.
The appellate court reversed and ordered the plaintiff to escrow the
land as he agreed to do and to account. On the accounting the plain-
tiff would be credited with the amount of its decree against the
escrowed property, the cost of foreclosure, payment of taxes and the
expense of maintenance. He would be charged with whatever he had
received from the sale of a portion of the land and the income. The
decree also ordered sale of the land and the collateral, which was the
relief the plaintiff originally sought. First, the surplus arising from the
sale of the land was to be applied to satisfaction of the indebtedness
and then the proceeds from the sale of the collateral. The result of the
decision was to fully enforce the contract as originally made instead of
refusing enforcement and leaving the parties to their restitutionary
remedies. 7
In New Jersey Title Guar. & Trust Co. v. Croydon Holding Corp.,71
the court set aside a void foreclosure sale, even though it was due to
the plaintiff's improper conduct that the sheriff had the opportunity to
conduct the sale. The plaintiff was the highest bidder at the first fore-
closure sale, which was properly conducted, but did not pay the bid.
The sheriff then resold the land, which was improper under the cir-
cumstances. When the bidder sued to have the second sale set aside, it
69. 31 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1929).
7o . The same approach was taken in Valley Smokeless Coal Co. v. Manufacturers
Water Co., 302 Pa. 232, 153 At. 327 (1930), where the grantor sued to compel the
grantee to remove a pipe line on the ground that the latter did not furnish lateral
support as required by the contract. In the alternative he sought to require such
support. The defense was that the grantor breached his part of the agreement to
maintain support at existing levels by engaging in excessive cutting. The court
found that the cutting was not intentional and gave relief conditional on the
grantor's repairing the damage. The decree gave the grantee the option of furnish-
ing support, conditional on the grantor's repairing the damage or removing the pipe
line. Thus, the decree adequately protected the interests of. both parties by en forc.
ing the contract instead of "leaving the guilty parties where it found them." Assum-
ing it to be in the public interest to enforce all contracts not tainted by illegality,
then the result is more desirable than refusing relief because of the plaintiff's
breach.
71. 138 N.J. Eq. 263, 46 A.2d 564 (Ch. 1946).
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was argued that he was barred, since his conduct made the second sale
necessary. The court voided the second sale and ordered the property
re-advertised conditional on the plaintiff's making an initial bid equiva-
lent to its bid at the first sale and furnishing security to cover the costs
of both sales. Again the interests of both the plaintiff and the public
were fully protected by the decree.
The area in which this power can most profitably be used is that of
the clean hands doctrine. The plaintiff may be barred by unclean
hands due to conduct with respect to the transaction which was either
improper as to the defendant or which injured the public. Many courts
simply refuse to grant any relief on the ground of unclean hands with-
out considering whether the improper conduct can be remedied and
the relief then given.72 The court is "punishing" the plaintiff for his
improper conduct by refusing him relief to which he would otherwise
be entitled. Some courts, however, have recognized that the interests of
all parties and the public can be better protected by granting relief
conditional on the plaintiff's eliminating the improper conduct where
it is not too late to remedy the injury.
The Pennsylvania courts have been particularly astute in this res-
pect, granting relief both where the improper conduct affected the de-
fendant and where it injured the public. In Comstock v. Thompson,7 3
the plaintiff sued to recover his interest in land held by the defendant,
which the plaintiff managed. The defense was that the plaintiff was
barred by unclean hands, since he had improperly diverted a sum of
money involving the land, which, however, was small in comparison
with his interest. The court did not dismiss the complaint, but instead
ordered the plaintiff to produce within a specified time all papers re-
lating to the management of the land and to make restitution of the
improperly diverted funds. If this were done, the court would then
hear the case on the merits. The decree protected the interests of both
parties.
The leading case involving the use of conditional relief to prevent
the operation of the clean hands doctrine is considered to be Hartman
v. Cohn.74. In an action to enjoin the use of the plaintiff's trade name
the defense was that the plaintiff had engaged in false advertising with
respect to the business protected by the trade name. The plaintiff re-
ferred to the business as "Dundee Woolen Mills" and advertised that
72. See, e.g., Memphis Keeley Inst. v. Leslie E. Keeley Co., 155 Fed. 964 (6th
Cir. 1907); Ilo Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co., 174 Ind. 635, 92 N.E. 1
(191o). In Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942), the Court
indicated that after the plaintiff eliminated the improper conduct, he could then
obtain relief in another suit. Cf., Standard Oil Co. v. Clark, 163 F.2d 917 (2d Cir.
1947). In some instances the nature of the plaintiff's conduct is such that he cannot
repair the harm. See, e.g., Carmen v. Fox Film Corp., 269 Fed. 928 (2d Cir. 1920).
See generally CHAFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 23 (1950).
73. 286 Pa. 457, 133 At. 638 (1926).
74. 350 Pa. 41, 38 A.2d 22 (1944).
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there were "no middleman's profits." The plaintiff did not represent
any woolen mill, and that statement about the middleman was unjusti-
fied. The court granted relief prohibiting the appropriation of the
plaintiff's trade name conditional upon the plaintiff's eliminating the
word, "mills," from its advertising and ceasing to use the slogan, "no
middleman's profits." Here the public interest in fair advertising and
that of the defendant in fair competition were protected by the decree,
and the defendant's improper conduct was ordered discontinued.
An interesting approach was taken in a New Jersey case 75where the
plaintiff, seeking to restrain the use of a secret formula and trademark
infringement, was guilty of mislabelling. The label listed ingredients
that the product did not contain. These ingredients did not have medi-
cal properties and were inserted by the plaintiff's predecessor; the
plaintiff had not re-examined the product. 'The court said that under
the circumstances the plaintiff was not barred by unclean hands. How-
ever, it then said that it could not permit misbranding and granted re-
lief only on condition that the plaintiff eliminate the misbranding.
The court here used its power to protect the public, even though the
plaintiff would not have been barred from such relief absent the im-
position of the condition. The court's observations are applicable to
any situation where improper conduct on the part of the plaintiff is
found:
On the contrary it [defendant's position that plaintiff should be barred]
would simply result in dismissal of the proceeding without correction
of the mislabelling and permit the defendants to go scot-free despite
their established appropriation of the plaintiff's property. 6 We fail to
see how this result would serve to protect the public or satisfy the true
ends of equity. . . . The conditional injunction will here furnish, as
a practical matter, adequate protection to the public, rightly hold the
defendants fully accountable for their now disputed wrongdoing and
afford to the plaintiff the measure of relief to which it appears justly
entitled. 77
The use of the conditional decree can be particularly effective in en-
forcement of fair-trade agreements where the manufacturer has been
lax in enforcement against other violators. This technique was em-
ployed to enforce such an agreement in General Elec. Co. v. R. H.
Macy & Co.7 Macy's had been observing fair-trade prices even while the
75. Medical Fabrics Co. v. D. C. McLintock Co., 12 N.J. Super. 177, 79 A.2d 313
(App. Div. 1951).
76. This statement is not strictly true, since the plaintiff could recover damages if
he could prove them. Also, since equitable relief was affirmatively proper, the court
could have awarded damages without a jury. See West Pub. Co. v. Edward Thomp-
son Co., 176 Fed. 833 (2d Cir. 191o), where the plaintiff was barred by laches, but
the court awarded partial damages in lieu of an accounting for total loss of profits.
77. Medical Fabrics Co. v. D. C. McClintock Co., supra note 75, at 181-82, 79
A.2d at 315-16.
78. 199 Misc. 87, 1o3 N.Y.S.2d 440 (Sup. Ct. 1951).
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discount houses were selling at prices below the fair-trade minimum.
Eventually it attempted to meet the prices of the discount houses. At
this time General Electric began to enforce the agreements as to ap-
pliances and sued to enjoin Macy's from selling below the prescribed
price. The defense was unclean hands on the ground that G.E. had
been guilty of sporadic and lax enforcement against others, particularly
the discount houses, and allowed a subsidiary to retail such products
at lower than the fair-trade price. The court granted the injunction
conditional on G.E.'s vigorous enforcement against others who sold be-
low fair-trade prices. 79 Under the terms of the decree the following
conditions were imposed upon G.E.:
(1) It was to keep itself informed of price-cutting activities by re-
tailers.
79. The court stated:
The question is whether the early lapse by General Electric from vigorous
enforcement should act as a forfeit and bar it for all time from enforcing its
Fair Trade agreements. The adoption of such a principle would not carry out
the purpose of the Legislature, but would make the maintenance of Fair Trade
price structures extremely difficult. Nor would such a decision serve the best
interests of the parties in this action. The preservation of the Fair Trade price
structure in this case, provided it is reasonably and diligently enforced, would
carry out the legislative policy and preserve the rights of General Electric in
protecting its good will, while at the same time not prejudicing the rights of
Macy in any way. Macy did not object to the maintenance of Fair Trade
prices; on the contrary, the evidence shows it maintained such prices scrupu-
lously for a long period of time, even when the discount houses were cutting
prices. What Macy did object to was the ineffective enforcement which allowed
the less conscientious discount houses to cut prices and thus put Macy at a
competitive disadvantage. The evidence shows that even the price cutting by
Macy was not an attempt to destroy the Fair Trade price structure but, rather,
to require General Electric to enforce this structure effectively or abandon it.
There is no doubt that Macy suffered a real economic disadvantage and made
the decision to force the issue by cutting prices in complete good faith. General
Electric has responded with a vigorous enforcement program which leaves no
doubt as to its will to enforce its Fair Trade prices against all violators. The
question in this case, therefore, is not primarily a question of right or wrong.
Neither of the parties has engaged in any unconscionable activities. The ques-
tion is, rather, one of working out an equitable adjustment of a business re-
lationship.
To refuse an injunction in this case would result in irreparable injury to
General Electric, since it would in effect render all of its existing Fair Trade
Agreements unenforceable and would result in the collapse of its existing price
structure. To grant an injunction, providing the Fair Trade Agreements are
fairly and effectively enforced, would work no hardship on Macy. In the in-
terest of an equitable solution, therefore, an injunction will be granted to the
plaintiff, conditioned on the continuation by it of its present vigorous enforce-
ment activities. This condition is intended to give Macy the greatest possible
protection against any further detriment resulting from a future lapse by Gen-
eral Electric. The conditioning of an injunction on future behavior of the
plaintiff has been employed by the courts as an effective and advisable way of
giving the plaintiff relief while at the same time protecting the defendant
against any future lapses in conduct by the plaintiff.
Id. at 97, 1o3 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
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(2) It was also to keep close scrutiny on prior violators and take
appropriate action.
(3) It was to investigate and follow up every complaint vigorously.
(4) It was to take legal action if necessary and generally insure con-
tinued and sustained enforcement.
It is interesting to note that following such decree G.E. moved to va-
cate the judgment and dismiss the complaint, which motion the court
granted. 0
By issuing such a decree the court protects a manufacturer who has
failed to enforce the fair-trade agreements in the past but who now de-
sires to do so. At the same time, it insures the defendant that if the
decree is to be enforced against it, it will be enforced against all other
retailers, and the defendant will not suffer price-cutting competition,
which it is prohibited from meeting by lowering its price. Indeed,
every decree in the fair-trade area should be conditional upon the
plaintiff's continued enforcement against other violators. In the main
case, either G.E. worked out a settlement with Macy's or it decided that
it did not want to be burdened with enforcement against others. What
it really may have been trying to do was to protect its reputation in the
department stores and at the same time permit discount houses and
the like to sell appliances at prices lower than the department stores.
Such conduct should not be permitted by the court, and a conditional
decree prevents this possibility.
Conditional relief has also been used to settle rights of persons with
respect to the use of the same or adjoining property where each has
been guilty of some misconduct with respect to the property. In Tehan
v. Sec. Nat'l Bank of Springfield,8s the plaintiff had an easement of
passage over a right of way abutting the defendant's property. The de-
fendant operated a drive-in bank, and a window protruded about six
feet over the right of way, rendering it very difficult to use. However,
the plaintiff's fire escape on its adjoining property also blocked the
right of way. The plaintiff had offered to remove the obstruction, but
the lower court held that its presence was a bar to the plaintiff's claim.
The decision was reversed, and the injunction was granted conditional
upon the plaintiff's removal of that portion of the fire escape that was
below the usual height for vehicles. The court also held that the plain-
tiff could build a fire escape which could be raised and lowered to
permit the passage of vehicles. The decision thus seeks to obtain a prac-
tical and beneficial result and does riot penalize "guilty parties."
The same principle has been applied to adjust a dispute between
holders of upper and lower riparian rights. 82 The owner of upper
riparian rights sued to enjoin the owner of the lower estate from ob-
80. 278 App. Div. 939, 105 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1951).
81. 340 Mass. 176, 163 N.E.2d 646 (1959).
82. Stone v. Ashurst, 285 Ky. 687, 149 S.W.2d 4 (1941).
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structing the natural flow of water, causing it to back up on plaintiff's
land. Plaintiff dug ditches to drain his barnyard and to carry water
from a culvert on the highway to a natural depression on his land,
where it.then passed in increased volume to the defendant's land. The
defendant claimed that there was no difficulty until the.plaintiff dug
the ditch. The court ordered the defendant to remove the dams which
obstructed the natural flow and the plaintiff to close the ditch.83
The court will also use the conditional decree to protect a party
from the effect of foreclosure despite his breach 4-it is really giving
the old remedy of equity of redemption, so a party in default could
seek this relief as plaintiff-where it finds the breach excusable, though
still entitling the other party to foreclosure. Thus, one court permitted
the tenant who was in arrears, but who had not willfully breached, to
avoid enforcement of a judgment for repossession upon payment of the
accrued rent and rent due together with interest.85 And in another
case 86 where the vendee of land was in arrears on the purchase price
but the court found that he did not receive what it considered adequate
notice of the vendor's intention to foreclose, though no notice was re-
quired by the contract, it gave the vendee a reasonable time to pay the
balance of the debt, which had become accelerated, before ordering
foreclosure.8 7
In Whitaker & Co. v. Sewer Improvement Dist. No. 1,88 the district
sued to foreclose liens for delinquent assessments against lands of resi-
dents, which had not been redeemed within the five-year statutory
period. Creditors of the district intervened, asking that the parcels
acquired by the foreclosure be sold and applied to the debts. There
was evidence that the owners of the parcels had been led to believe that
the foreclosure proceedings were invalid, though, in fact, they were
not. The court refused to require the owners to issue deeds to the
lands, even though the prior foreclosure proceedings were valid. It told
the district to compute the delinquencies with interest, publish these
amounts and give the owners the opportunity to redeem within ninety
83. The same result could have been accomplished in Ilo Oil Co. v. Indiana
Natural Gas & Oil Co., supra note 72, but the court did not consider its power to
do so. It preferred to "leave the guilty parties where it found them." The factual
situations in these cases were quite similar.
84. It is another "maxim of equity" that "equity abhors a forfeiture." MCCLIN-
TOCK, EQUITY 52 (2d ed. 1948) does not list this as one of the maxims, but some
courts have done so. See, e.g., Johnston v. American Fin. Corp., 182 Okla. 567,
79 P.2d 242 (1938). This was apparently the way by which the court described its
power to grant equity of redemption. For a general discussion of forfeitures see
MCCLINTOCK, op. cit. supra, at 83.
85. Trans-Lux Radio City Corp. v. Service Parking Corp., 54 A.2d 144 (D.C.
Munic. App. 1947).
86. Zumstein v. Stockton, 199 Ore. 633, 264 P.2d 455 (1953).
87. Here, where the price was $36,25 o and the purchaser had paid over $20,000
in interest and principal, he was given a year to pay the balance of $2o,ooo.
88. 229 Ark. 697, 318 S.W.2d 831 (1958).
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days. The court emphasized that the creditors were not injured by the
decree-either the parcels would be redeemed and the money paid in
or the land would be sold. Under the court's approach the creditors
could be satisfied without requiring the owners to lose their land.
In summary, it can be said that the court should always see if the in-
terests of all parties and the public can be protected by a conditional
decree instead of refusing to grant any relief because of the plaintiff's
misconduct. The basic purpose of civil litigation is to compensate and
remedy rather than to make people "good" and punish them for "be-
ing bad." A remedial view of law recognizes the law's inability to
"make men angels." Often, both parties to a transaction have been
guilty of some improper conduct. Society's interest is better protected
by remedying the harm caused by that conduct than by turning a party
out of court in hopes that he will improve himself in the future. Rather
than two wrongs co-existing, e.g., trademark infringement and false ad-
vertising, the court can eliminate both by issuing a conditional decree.
The courts have been slow to recognize their power in this respect and
too often tell the plaintiff to "come back after you have reformed" or
"you are barred from any relief because you have acted improperly."
It should adjust conflicting interests in a single action and eliminate
insofar as possible any harm that may have resulted from improper
conduct. Professor Chafee's remarks as to the clean hands doctrine are
applicable to all areas of improper conduct:
The clean hands maxim might be further assimilated to the maxim,
"He who seeks equity must do equity." ) The relationship between the
two is fairly close. . . . The clean hands maxim relates to the past and
the doing equity maxim relates to the future. Still, when the plaintiff's
misconduct seems likely to continue unless stopped, we are really deal-
ing with the future here, too. Instead of dismissing A's equity suit be-
cause of the past, it might sometimes be more useful to the community
to offer him an injunction on condition of his behaving more properly
henceforth o0
2. Recovery of expenditures made by party required to surrender
property or benefits
Where the plaintiff seeks equitable relief 01 to require the defendant
to return property or surrender the benefits of a transaction, the de-
fendant is generally entitled to reimbursement for expenditures to the
extent that such expenditures have benefited the plaintiff. This is re-
quired in order to prevent unjust enrichment. The benefits to the
89. It is unfortunate that Professor Chafee chose to talk in terms of maxims. It
is that type of verbalization that can cause confusion, since courts may think that
their power to grant relief is based on what maxims they can find.
90. CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 72, at ioo.
91. See the discussion as to whether this is required when the theory of the
plaintiff's claim is "legal" at notes 339-49 infra and accompanying text.
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plaintiff can arise in a number of ways. One situation is by payments
to third parties or obligations incurred as to them. In Chance v. Geld-
reich,92 the arrangement was that the landlord was to convey the land
to the tenant, the tenant was to apply for a "G.I." loan, for which he
was eligible, and then he was to reconvey the land and remit the pro-
ceeds to the landlord. As consideration the tenant was to get a year's
free rent. The tenant, however, did not reconvey, but instead conveyed
to the defendant, who knew of the entire transaction. In a suit by the
landlord against the tenant and his grantee to have both deeds removed
as clouds on the landlord's title, the court required, as a condition to
relief, that the tenant be reimbursed for the amount he had borrowed
and be given a lien on the land for that amount.
In another case the president of a corporation was held to be a con-
structive trustee of the proceeds of common stock which he held under
a void agreement. However, since he was required under the agree-
ment to apply some of the proceeds to retiring preferred stock and had
done so, he was entitled to be reimbursed for the amount paid to the
preferred shareholders. 93 So too, where the defendant had obtained
property from the plaintiff in breach of his fiduciary obligation, he was
entitled to be reimbursed for reasonable expenses incurred in perfect-
ing title.94
The most common situation is where real property is surrendered
and the defendant is entitled to reimbursement for the making of bene-
ficial improvements to the extent they have enhanced the value of the
land: payment of taxes, reduction of outstanding encumbrances and
the like.95 Here, since the defendant will be liable for the rental value
of the land during his occupancy and any mesne profits, the question
is often as to what he can deduct on the accounting. Still, if any balance
is found owing against the plaintiff, he must pay it as a condition to
the decree. This type of adjustment is illustrated by Godzieba v. God-
zieba,96 where the husband sued to have a resulting trust in land
declared for him and his wife as tenants by the entireties. Funds be-
longing to both were used to purchase property and convey it to their
92. 337 S.W.2d 770 (Tenn. App. 1959).
93. Martin v. Luster, 85 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 667
(1937).
94. Bryant v. Vance, 33 Tenn. App. 120, 230 S.W.2d 198 (1950).
As to requirement of reimbursement for expenses in acquiring property, see also
Sykes v. Reeves, 195 Ga. 587, 24 S.E.2d 688 (1943); E. & W. Coast Serv. Corp. v.
Parpahagis, 344 Pa. 183, 25 A.2d 339 (1942).
95. Cahill v. Bryan, 184 F.2d 277 (D.C. Cir. 1950); Smith v. Smith, 167 Ga. 368,
145 S.E. 661 (1928); Bonninghausen v. Hansen, 305 Mich. 595, 9 N.W.2d 856(1943); Eckelmann v. Luecking, 344 Mo. 979, 130 S.W.2d 471 (1939); Blachowski v.
Blachowski, 135 N.J. Eq. 425, 39 A.2d 94 (Ch. 1944); Suburban Home Mortg.
Co. v. Hopwood, 83 Ohio App. 115, 81 N.E.2d 387 (1948); McIndoo v. Brown, 125
Okla. 88, 256 Pac. 743 (1927); Chance v. Geldreich, supra note 92.
96. 393 Pa. 544, 143 A.2d 344 (1958).
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son who was to hold for the benefit of both, but who wrongfully con-
veyed to the wife. As a condition to the decree, the husband had to
pay to the wife an amount equal to one-half the expenditures made by
her for taxes, mortgage and insurance payments, and necessary repairs,
plus one-half of the excess of the value added to the property by neces-
sary improvements over the value of the use made by the defendant.9 7
Reimbursement for the value of the improvements and the like is re-
quired, even though the plaintiff is not required to return the considera-
tion upon recission due to his not receiving it,98 or is not required to
pay a forfeited debt in order to quiet title to mortgaged land.99
The plaintiff is also required to reimburse the defendant for the
value of partial benefits received, even though the defendant is in
breach. Thus, in Thomas v. Brownsville, Ft. K. & Pac. R.R.,100 stock-
holders who sued to prevent foreclosure of construction bonds issued in
payment for work to be done by a contractor who defaulted, were
required to pay the bondholders the sums actually expended by the con-
struction company for the work it did; the bondholders were subro-
gated to the rights of the company.101 In Jersey Acres v. City of Pater-
son, ' 0 2 the plaintiff as a condition to a decree removing a contract for
the installation of sewers as a cloud on realty had to pay the value of
the benefits which inured due to partial installation, even though the
work was not completed. And similarly where a plaintiff seeks to cancel
an invalid mortgage, he is required to pay to the holder such amounts
97. Such adjustments have been made in other cases so that the defendant could
be reimbursed. In Parker v. Stephenson, 127 Va. 431, 104 S.E. 39 (1920), an infant
sued to set aside a deed of sale, because the proceedings were ineffective. The prop-
erty was charged with a lien to the extent of the interest of the infant as to the pur-
chase price received by him plus the enhancement in value due to improvements,
tax payments and insurance payments. Of course, the vendee was charged with the
rents and profits during the period of occupancy. See also Stanko v. Males, 390 Pa.
281, 135 A.2d 392 (1957).
98. Jahn v. Purvis, 145 Fla. 354, 199 So. 340 (1940). Plaintiffs were the heirs of
the grantor of an invalid conveyance. Since they did not receive any of the con-
sideration, they were not required to return it. But since they did receive the prop-
erty, they were required to pay for its enhanced value.
99. Swingley v. Riechoff, 112 Mont. 59, 112 P.2d 1075 (1941). Statute provided
that if the debt was not paid after a certain time, it was forfeited, and an action to
quiet title could be brought on that ground. See the discussion at notes 259-63
infra and accompanying text.
100. 109 U.S. 522 (1883).
ioi. The Court observed as follows:
In this condition of the case they [the stockholders] are amenable to the rule
that they who seek equity must do equity. It is just that they should pay a
fair price for what they have received; that this mortgage, given for the con-
struction of the road, though excessive by reason of the fraud in the contract,
should stand for the reasonable value of what the company actually received
by way of construction.
Id. at 526.
102. 122 N.J. Eq. 423, 194 Atd. 283 (Ch. 1937).
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as the mortgagee paid to satisfy a creditor who had a right of subroga-
tion on a first mortgage. 10 3
Finally, where the defendant was given benefits to the plaintiff in
reliance on void security, as a condition to avoid the effect of the se-
curity interest, the plaintiff must reimburse the defendant for those
benefits. In Dool v. First Nat'l Bank of Calexico,04 the mentally in-
competent decedent executed a deed of trust to the defendant. After
the decedent regained his competency, the defendant continued to
advance money in reliance on the trust deed, which secured future ad-
vances. When the decedent's administrator sought to quiet title to the
property and invalidate the trust deed, reimbursement for the advances
was required. The principle has also been utilized to hold that a mort-
gagee advancing money to the grantee to make improvements in re-
liance on the latter's deed, which was subsequently declared invalid in
a suit by the grantor, was entitled to be reimbursed by the grantor for
the value of the improvements as subrogee.105
However, since the requirement of reimbursement is based on the
need to prevent unjust enrichment, reimbursement is not mandatory
where the improvements have not enhanced the value of' the land. The
necessity for such a qualification was demonstrated in Bradecich v.
Rivard,")" where as a result of the encumbrances necessary to finance
the improvements made by the defendant the value of the land actually
decreased, though the improvements taken alone enhanced the value.
At the time of the original transaction the property was worth about
$6ooo. As a result of the improvements the land was worth $9ooo, but
encumbrances resulting from improvement loans totaled $49oo. The
court ordered the deed set aside due to failure of consideration without
also ordering reimbursement. Moreover, where the defendant has per-
formed services in connection with the transaction, but they involved
no real effort on his part, the plaintiff is not unjustly enriched by not
having to compensate him for those services.0 7
The right to recover for improvements and other expenditures may
be limited to those made in good faith, that is, that the defendant did
103. Nelson v. Nelson, 58 N.D. 134, 226 N.W. 476 (1929).
104. 207 Cal. 347, 278 Pac. 233 (1929).
1o5. United Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Johnson, 181 Okla. 328, 73 P.2d 846 (1937).
The giving of the mortgage to the grantee was held not to constitute a collateral
transaction. Compare Tate v. Potter, 216 Ga. 750, 119 S.E.2d 547 (1961), with City
Investing Co. v. Davis, 334 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. 196o). It was also held that the "better-
ment statute" did not furnish the exclusive remedy where a claim of subrogation
was involved. Cf., Taliaferro v. Colasso, 139 Cal. App.2d 903, 294 P.2d 774 (Dist. Ct.
App. 1956).
io6. 411 Ill. 214, 103 N.E.2d 367 (1952).
107. See Holsinger, Theis &: Co. v. Holsinger, 329 Ill. App. 46o, 69 N.E.2d 360
(1946). In an action by an insurance agency to enjoin a former employee from
using the agency's records of information on outstanding policies and from collect-
ing renewal commissions on them, the plaintiff was not required to reimburse the
defendant for his services in the collection of renewal commissions, where he merely
received the checks and indorsed them.
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not know or should not have known that his title was being challenged
at the time he made the improvements. A number of cases requiring re-
imbursement emphasized the good faith of the defendant and indi-
cated that such reimbursement would not be required in the absence
of good faith; 108 although in some cases where recovery has been per-
mitted, good faith was doubtful, at least insofar as awareness of in-
validity was concerned. 09 Some cases have expressly barred the defend-
ant where the court found that the improvements were made in bad
faith. Thus, in a suit for cancellation on grounds of undue influence
the grantee was not entitled to reimbursement for improvements made
after a prior suit had been brought challenging the grantor's power to
convey the land,"" and similarly a constructive trustee has been barred
where he made the improvements at a time when he knew of the claim
that others were beneficially entitled to the land."'
Reimbursement for benefits was also denied in Stroud v. Guffey, 112
where the owner of a gas lease sought to enjoin a continuous trespass
by the owner of an oil lease who accidently brought in a gas well and
then used the gas. It was held that the plaintiff was not required to
pay for the well or to offset the cost of production against his claim for
damages. The court emphasized that the defendant was a willful tres-
passer as to the plaintiff, and that there was no pre-existing relation-
ship. The defendant, however, was permitted to remove the casing and
equipment. It was immaterial that requiring the defendant to fill the
abandoned well constituted economic waste. Since the plaintiff did not
make use of the well, he was not required to pay for it; the court stated
that had he made use of it, payment would have been required.
There is a serious question as to the propriety of these decisions
which refuse relief due to the defendant's bad faith in making the
improvements. The fact does remain that the improvements have en-
hanced the value of the land-otherwise the defendant would not be
entitled to reimbursement in any event. Denying relief means that
the plaintiff is being unjustly enriched at the expense of the defend-
ant. Since we view the main purpose of civil relief as providing com-
pensation rather than enforcing punishment, the result seems im-
io8. Cahill v. Bryan, supra note 95; Jahn v. Purvis, supra note 98; Eckelmann v.
Luecking, supra note 95; Blachowski v. Blachowski, supra note 95; Stanko v. Males,
supra note 97.
1o9. See particularly Godzieba v. Godzieba, supra note 96. The son certainly
should have been aware that the money was from property held by the entireties.
See also Hewett v. McGaster, 272 Ala. 498, 133 So.2d 189 (1961), which involved
a finding of bad faith from the inception of the transaction. Suit was brought to
cancel a mortgage given on homestead property without the wife's consent. The
court held that since the defendant, who occupied the land and made improve-
ments, knew that the property was a homestead and that the wife had not con-
sented, he was aware of the weakness of his title and acted in bad faith.
iio. Hooks v. Brown, 348 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961).
11i. Harrison v. Miller, 124 W.Va. 550, 21 S.E.2d 674 (1942).
112. 3 S.W.2d 592 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
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proper. On the other hand, when a defendant is aware of the weakness
of his title, we must ask whether he should be permitted to improve
away the plaintiff's interest. As a practical matter, however, it is doubt-
ful that the defendant makes improvements with that intention; a
person normally will not make improvements if he thinks he will have
to give up the land in hopes of being compensated for them upon sur-
render. He will not make them either, in the hopes of preventing the
plaintiff from recovering the land due to his inability to pay for the im-
provements, since in such a case the land will be sold, the amount for
reimbursement deducted, and the balance paid to the plaintiff. Rather
the defendant must believe that he can prevail or the improvements
are vitally necessary; otherwise a reasonable person would not make
improvements. 113 And, the fact is inescapable that when the court does
not require reimbursement, the plaintiff is getting a benefit for which
he did not pay.
It is submitted that the approach the court took in Stroud v. Guf-
fey, 1 4 should be followed in all cases where the court would ordi-
narily deny relief because of bad faith. The defendant should have the
opportunity to remove the improvements if this is feasible and will not
injure the land. If this is impossible, then the plaintiff should be re-
quired to pay for the value of the improvements if he makes use of
them, assuming he has a choice, e.g., the defendant has built a house
on unimproved land. This approach is analogous to the rule that ap-
plies where a party has been sent goods he did not order-if he uses
them, he is required to pay; otherwise not. 15 If it is necessary to draw
a distinction between willful and innocent improvers-and some courts
apparently do not do so-then this should be the extent. The plaintiff
should not be able to make use of improvements without paying for
them despite the state of mind of the defendant when he made them.
Again, it must be remembered that the court is administering relief
and not punishing improper conduct.
3. Payment of taxes in order to avoid tax enforcement
Where the plaintiff seeks to enjoin the enforcement of taxes against
him, but admittedly owes some ascertained amount, the general rule
is that he must tender the amount due as a condition to relief." 6 In
this situation an actual tender is necessary before the court will hear
113. We often act, though there is a threat that we will not be able to enjoy the
fruits of the action. Much of life involves predictions, and we take the risk of pre-
dicting inaccurately; this does not mean that we cease our activities because our
prediction may turn out to be false.
114. Supra note 12 and accompanying text.
115. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 72(2) (1932).
116. See, e.g., City & County of Denver v. Hallett, 45 Colo. 132, 1oo Pac. 408
(1909). •
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the merits of his claim. 17 Tender is also required where the plaintiff
seeks to enjoin enforcement of a penalty provision."18 However, it is
not required where the claim is that the assessment itself is void. The
difficulty in this area is in determining into which category a particular
claim falls.
A number of Supreme Court cases have established the criteria for
determining the categories. In Cummings v. Nat'l Bank,119 suit was
brought to enjoin collection of taxes on the ground that the taxpayer's
property had been taxed unequally with property of the same class. The
Court held that the proper mode of relief was to first require the plain-
tiff to pay the tax that would be equal to the amount assessed on other
property of the same class, and upon such payment, which could be
made into court, the Court would enjoin the collection of any excess.
The same approach was followed by a state court in Mayor and Alder-
men of Savannah v. Fawcett, 20 where it was contended that realty was
taxed discriminatorily in comparison with personalty. The court held
that the plaintiff would have to tender the taxes that would be due if
realty had been assessed at the lowest tax base applied to personalty.
In People's Nat'l Bank v. Marye,'1' suit was brought to enjoin col-
lection of a tax upon shares of stock in the National Bank on the
ground that the statute did not provide all the deductions to which
shareholders were entitled under the federal statute permitting taxa-
tion of the shares. The amount that would be due if all the claimed
deductions were given could be ascertained. The Court held that the
shareholders would have to pay this amount in order to present their
contention. In answer to the argument that the entire assessment was
void, which if so, would render any payment unnecessary, the Court
observed: "If there were no right to assess the particular thing at all,
either because it is exempt from taxation, or because there is no law
providing for the same, an assessment under such circumstances would
be void, and, of course, no payment or tender of any amount would
be necessary before seeking an injunction, because there could be no
amount equitably due where there never had been a right to assess at
all." 122 Here, since the state did have the power to levy the tax under
the federal statute, the fact that it erroneously determined the amount
due did not render the entire assessment void.
The principal case involving a void assessment is Norwood v.
Baker,123 which recognized that where the assessment itself was void,
there was no ascertainable amount due, and the court could not decide
117. See discussion at notes 6o--61 supra and accompanying text.
118. Kohlhamer v. Smietanka, 239 Fed. 4o8 (N.D.II1. 1917).
119. 101 U.S. 153 (1879).
S2o. 186 Ga. 132, 197 S.E. 253 (1938).
121. 191 U.S. 272 (1903).
122. Id. at 281.
123. 172 U.S. 269 (1898).
[Vol. XVI
what tax the legislature would want to impose. The technique em-
ployed there is to enjoin the illegal tax and permit the legislature
to enact a proper one. 12 4 In that case it was contended that the assess-
ment upon property owners for improvements was unconstitutional,
because abutting owners had to bear the entire cost irrespective of the
benefits received. The nature of the assessment-which failed to appor-
tion the tax to the benefit-rendered the tax invalid, and the court was
unable to do the apportioning, since that was a legislative function.125
In this area then the problem is to determine when some amount is
clearly due and when the entire assessment is void. In the former situ-
ation the court can and will order payment of the ascertained amount;
in the latter it can merely enjoin the illegal assessment and give the
taxing authority the opportunity to make a proper one. This approach
is sound in view of the fact that it prevents a taxpayer from avoiding
taxes admittedly due because of the attempt to assess improper addi-
tional taxes while leaving actual assessment of taxes to the taxing au-
thority.
4. Rescission and setting aside of transactions 126
Where a transaction is rescinded or set aside, 27 it is the general rule
that unless excused on policy grounds or by other defenses, restoration
124. See Central Ky. Co. v. Comm'n, 290 U.S. 624 (1933) and text accompanying
note 22, supra.
125. The Court observed as follows, quoting from HIGH, INJUNcrIONS (3d ed.
1905)-
It is held, however, that the general rule requiring payment of tender of the
amount actually due as a condition to equitable relief against the illegal por-
tion of the tax, has no application to a case where the entire tax fails by reason
of an illegal assessment. And in such case an injunction is proper without pay-
ment or tender of any portion of the tax, since it is impossible for the court
to determine what portion is actually due, there being no valid or legal tax as-
sessed.
Norwood v. Baker, supra note 123, at 293.
The same problem was involved in Oklahoma v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 223 U.S.
298 (1912), where the plaintiff sought to enjoin a tax on gross receipts on the
ground that it included receipts from interstate commerce unapportioned to the
amount of business plaintiff did in the taxing state. The Court did not require
tender of the amount that would be due on intrastate receipts, since it was for the
state to decide whether the tax was severable.
On this basis tender was not required in Brown County Water Improvement
Dist. v. McIntosh, 164 S.W.2d 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942), where the claim was
that tax assessments were void, since they were made on the unrendered rolls con-
trary to state law. The court could not assess the property for taxation and in ab-
sence of an assessment, no taxes were due. So too, tender is not required in order
to enjoin enforcement where the assessor failed to provide the required notice and
hearing before making the assessment. City of Macon v. Ries, 179 Ga. 320, 176 S.E.
21 (1934). In absence of such notice, there simply was no tax legally due.
126. Setting aside releases will be discussed in the subsequent section, because
the underlying considerations differ.
127. Rescission is sometimes used to mean the avoidance of contracts. Setting
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of the status quo is a condition to the decree. Such restoration includes
return of the consideration, 12 any out-of-pocket loss, 1 29 the rental value
of any property that the plaintiff has occupied or used, 30 any improve-
ments made under the contract,' 3' and compensation for services ren-
dered.132 As with reimbursement for improvements, the basis of relief
is that otherwise the plaintiff will be unjustly enriched. Therefore, if
the plaintiff has received no benefit, he is not required to restore the
status quo, even though the defendant may have suffered an out-of-
pocket loss. This underlying rationale was illustrated in Wilks v. Mc-
Govern-Place Oil Co., 13 3 where the plaintiff bought land to use as a
filling station, relying on the defendant's misrepresentations, and sub-
sequently found that the land could not be used for this purpose. The
court held that plaintiff would not be required to reimburse the de-
fendant for the value of a building which was removed to make way
for the filling station. If the loss must be borne by someone and there
is no corresponding benefit to the plaintiff, then the wrongdoer is here
the proper party to bear it.
Where a party seeks to set aside a judicial sale or similar proceedings
due to irregularities or illegality, if he is a party other than the debtor
and claims the right to bid, he must offer to pay a higher price and post
security, 34 if he is the debtor, he must reimburse the purchaser for the
price paid,"35 and if the purchaser was also the judgment creditor then
the debtor must also reimburse him for the amount of the judgment. 136
The problem in this area, other than defenses on policy grounds, is to
determine what constitutes adequate restoration of the status quo and
what is necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.
aside is a generic term and covers all situations where a transaction is cancelled.
Cancellation is also a term frequently used to describe the process. It should be
noted that the party having the option to cancel can bring an independent action
except where a defense to a suit on the contract, if any, would furnish an adequate
remedy.- Compare American Life Ins. Co. v. Stewart, 3oo U.S. 203 (1937), with
Enelow v. New York Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1935). Or he can defend an action
on the contract on the grounds that he has a right to rescind, and the court will
order a decree of rescission at his behest. Since the rescinding party gets the same
relief in either instance, there is no difference as to the conditions the court will
impose based on whether he is formal plaintiff or defendant.
128. Cooper v. Peevy, 185 Ga. 8o 5 , 196 S.E. 705 (1938); National Life & Acc.
Ins. Co. v. Wigley, 96 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936). See also Texas Co. v.
State, 154 Tex. 494, 281 S.W.2d 83 (1955).
129. Lessard v. Sleeper, 96 N.H. 268, 74 A.2d 378 (1950).
13o. Rummer v. Throop, 38 Wash.2d 624, 231 P.2d 313 (1951).
131. Hooks v. Brown, supra note lio.
132. Melown v. Penn Real Estate Co., 121 Pa. Super. 209, 183 At. 669 (1936).
133. 189 Wis. 420, 207 N.W. 692 (1926).
134. Preskie v. Carroll, 178 Md. 543, 16 A.2d 291 (1940).
135. Farwell v. Harding, 96 Ill. 32 (188o); Warn v. Tucker, 236 Iowa 450, 19
N.W.2d 2O (1945); Coughlin v. City of Pierre, 66 S.D. 523, 286 N.W. 877 (1939);
Hendricks v. City of Sherman, 220 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). But cf.,
Harrison v. Hass, 25 Ind. 281 (1865), holding that payment to the purchaser had
to be made prior to suit. It is doubtful if the case would be followed today.
136. Blasingame v. Wallace, 32 Ariz. 58o, 261 Pac. 42 (1927).
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Where the plaintiff received the property jointly with another, and
the other party received the consideration, the plaintiff may rescind
on the ground that the transaction was void as to him without return-
ing the consideration received by the other party.18 7 So too, where the
party to whose rights the plaintiff has succeeded is alive and can still
be made to return the consideration, the courts will not require its
restoration as a condition to relief. This was involved in Wigley v.
Buzzard,58 where children of an incompetent grantor sued to set aside
her deed to another son and were not required to reimburse him for
the amount he paid to clear a pre-existing debt of the mother. 139 There
is a division of opinion where the plaintiff is the heir of the party to
a transaction, usually the grantor of land. In Jahn v. Purvis,140 the
heirs seeking to set aside a conveyance, were not required to return
the consideration to a good faith grantee since they had not received
the consideration,' 4' and so were not unjustly enriched. A contrary re-
sult was reached in Cooper v. Peevy, 42 where the mortgagor's heirs
sought to cancel the mortgage on grounds of fraud. They were re-
quired to return the amount of the purchase money that was applied
to the debt for which the security was given on the theory that they
"stood in the shoes of the ancestor."
The latter result is preferable. Since the heirs exercised the option
to rescind the voidable transaction, which the ancestor might not have
done, the other party should not be deprived of a right which he had
against the ancestor. The heirs are being unjustly enriched in the
sense that they are getting property they could not get absent such
cancellation. Also, since in a majority of states the same persons share
realty and personalty equally, the heirs may have actually benefited
from the consideration the ancestor received. In any event, the de-
fendant should not be deprived of the return of his consideration due
to the fortuity of the decedent's death, which could be the result if
rescission is sought after the time for filing claims against the estate had
expired. The legitimate interests of all parties are best protected by
requiring return by the heirs as a condition to relief.
The question as to what constitutes restoration of the status quo is
related to the exact relief the plaintiff will get as a result of the rescis-
137. Newton v. Erickson, 73 S.D. 228, 41 N.W.2d 545 (i95o). The plaintiff, a
minor, and his father had made the conveyance jointly, but the father had received
all the consideration. Since the father had received all the consideration, the court
also held that the defendant would have to look to him for reimbursement for
improvements.
138. 124 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Civ. App. 1939).
139. The court stated that whatever remedy the defendant had would be against
,the mother, since she received the benefits of the transaction.
140. Supra note io8.
141. But they were required to reimburse the defendant for the value of the
improvements. Supra note io8 and accompanying text.
142. Supra note 128.
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sion. In Neblett v. Macfarland,143 suit was brought to set aside a con-
veyance on grounds of fraud; the consideration was the cancellation of
a bond executed by the plaintiff. As a condition to relief the plaintiff
was only required to return the bond and not to pay the underlying
debt. The bond was all that the defendant had given up; he had given
no cash consideration. The Court would only put the defendant in
the same position he was before the transaction, as he now had his
security, which was all he had originally. The Court observed that if
the value of the security had declined, payment of the debt would have
put the defendant in a better position than he was prior to rescission.
1 4 4
This problem was also present in National Life Ins. Co. v. Hanna,1 45
where an insurance company sought to cancel a life insurance policy
on grounds of fraud. As a condition to relief it was required to return
the premiums received, but was not required to reinstate an earlier
policy which the insured surrendered in partial payment of the pre-
miums on the new policy. The insured was not required by the agree-
ment to surrender the former policy; he exercised an option to make
payments in that manner. The only issue before the court was the
validity of the second policy. Also, the plaintiff can avoid return of
the consideration by setting off a debt due from the defendant, as in
Petrey's Adm'r v. Petrey,146 where a widow was permitted to cancel a
deed of her interest in the realty of her deceased husband's estate with-
out returning the consideration, since she was entitled to receive more
than that amount as her share of the estate.
The most difficult situation is where the consideration for the trans-
action was the rendering of personal services-generally taking care of
the plaintiff or another-and some had been performed at the time of
rescission. Whether reimbursement for their value is required may de-
pend on why termination of the services occurred and why the transac-
tion was rescinded. This does not refer to the party who was technically
in breach. Where the defendant, under the circumstances, could not
reasonably continue performance, and the plaintiff seeks rescission,
then it has been held that the defendant is entitled to compensation.
But where the defendant refuses to perform the services or it is im-
possible to do so because of his improper conduct, the plaintiff has
143. 92 U.S. 101 (1875).
144. See also Page Belting Co. v. F. H. Prince & Co., 77 N.H. 3o9, 95 Atd. 961
(1914). There the bonds transferred by the defendant had to be discounted at a
loss, since the defendant had not paid for them and because of that the issuing
authority became insolvent. The plaintiff was not required to surrender the bonds,
but was permitted to retain them for whatever he could get for them-it was as if
they were awarded as damages, since the defendant was also insolvent.
We are not concerned here with whether payment should have been required
as an additional condition because of positive impairment of security. See Van
Scoten v. Albright, 5 N.J. Eq. 467 (Ch. 1845).
145. 122 W.Va. 36, 7 S.E.2d 52 (1940).
146. 262 Ky. 222, 90 S.W.2d 4 (1936).
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been permitted to avoid the transaction without paying the value of
the services. Of course, where actual money has been spent for the
plaintiff's benefit, e.g., doctor bills, the defendant is entitled to reim-
bursement in any case. 4 7 The basis of the problem is that where the
recipient of the services is still alive, and as is generally the case, the
agreement was to take care of the person as long as he lived, the re-
cipient is injured by being denied care and a home for the remainder
of his life. The agreement was to take care of the recipient for life and
not as long as the grantee wanted to hold the property. It is impossible
to set off the value of the services rendered against the loss of future
benefits to the recipient because of the rescission.
The latter consideration was present in Zuehlsdorf v. Nelson,14
where the court ordered rescission without compensation against a
grantee who had evicted his mother. The defendant had agreed to
support and house the mother for her life in exchange for a loan of
money to buy real property. After he evicted her, she sued to rescind
the transaction and recover the loan, or in the alternative, to enforce
a trust in the property. The relief was granted without the require-
ment of reimbursement for the reasonable value of the accommoda-
tions and care furnished. 149 The court observed: "To charge plaintiff
with the reasonable value would in effect change the agreement be-
tween the parties from one which assured her a place to live for life
into an agreement for only a certain period. There are no circum-
stances here to make it equitable to modify the agreement." 150 The
defendant in this case also enjoyed the benefit of the land as long as
he took care of the plaintiff. Even though we may assume that a deduc-
tion of rental value would not equal the value of the services, nonethe-
less, the defendant could have carried out the agreement and received
full benefit. Perhaps this is one area where, due to the fact that neither
party can be adequately compensated and the status quo cannot be
completely restored, the loss should fall on the party committing the
actual wrongdoing.
On the other hand, in a case such as Gabbard v. Truett,151 the award-
ing of the value of the services as a condition to relief seems most fair.
The conveyance was made from one sister to another in exchange for
the latter's taking care of their mentally ill brother. The brother was
of low intelligence, but could do menial work on the farm. He was
physically quite strong and had a violent temper. He had attacked the
defendant's young daughter, threatening to rape her and had come at
the defendant with an open knife. As a result she had the brother com-
147. Teats v. Anderson, 358 Pa. 523, 58 A. 2d 31 (1946).
148. 7 Wis.2d 596, 97 N.W.2d 489 (1959).
149. Had this been permitted, the loan would have been substantially repaid.
i5o. Zuehlsdorf v. Nelson, supra note 148, at 6o2, 97 N.W. 2d at 492.
151. 283 S.W.2d 833 (Ky. 1955).
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mitted to a mental institution. The court granted rescission at the suit
of the grantor because of failure of consideration, but as a condition
to relief required reimbursement for the value of the care furnished. 112
Here, the defendant in good faith tried to take care of the brother, but
could not do so without endangering her safety and that of her family.
In Teats v. Anderson,153 a deed of property from the mother and
father to the daughter on condition that the daughter take care of
them for life was set aside on grounds of undue influence. At the time
of suit the mother was alive, but the father was dead. It was held that
the mother would not be required to reimburse the daughter for the
value of the care she actually rendered. Here, however, the daughter
was willing to perform; also, the father was dead, so there was no
danger of his not being taken care of for the rest of his life. 54 More-
over, the plaintiff sought to rescind the transaction on grounds unre-
lated to the care furnished. Unlike the Zuehlsdorf case, the defendant
was willing to continue caring for her mother. Since the recipient of
the services had a choice-either ratify the voidable transaction and
receive the services or rescind-when she exercised the latter alterna-
tive, she should be required to restore the status quo by reimbursing
the defendant for the value of the services. Under the suggested ap-
proach there is not the danger of the grantee's furnishing the services
for as long as he seeks to hold the land. Since the grantee did not ter-
minate the services, he should be entitled to reimbursement for their
value when the grantor terminates. Also, where at the time of suit the
recipient is dead, there is no difficulty of computation. If he had re-
ceived the services until the time of death, there is no loss of future
services which can be offset against the defendant's claim. If discon-
tinued prior to death, assuming the value of the services to be rela-
tively constant, there would be a deduction of the amount given for
each day they were performed for each day they were not.155
It is submitted then that where personal services were the only con-
sideration for the transaction, the following tests should be applied.
Where the recipient is dead, irrespective of who terminated the serv-
ices, reimbursement should be required, since the value of the services
can be ascertained and there is no danger of the recipient's losing bene-
fits in the future. If they have been terminated by the defendant in the
decedent's lifetime, then it is true that theoretically we are giving the
defendant the right to perform the services for as long as he wishes to
152. The care was computed as worth $2 per day; the value of his labor was S;
per day. See also Alexander v. Andrews, 135 W.Va. 403, 64 S.E.2d 487 (1951).
153. Supra note 147.
154. Actually, he died only five days after the conveyance, so the amount to
which the defendant would have been entitled was quite small.
155. If the services were discontinued while the recipient was suffering a serious
illness or was otherwise incapacitated, then, of course, the value of the lost services
would increase sharply.
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retain the property and yet obtain reimbursement upon termination.
Conceivably, he might turn the recipient out during his last illness.
However, as a practical matter, even absent the assumption that most
people simply would not do such a thing, this danger is unrealistic. In
the first place, it can be assumed that suit for rescission would be
brought by other relatives soon after the eviction. Moreover, if the de-
cedent were seriously ill, the value of the services that should have
been performed would be materially increased, so that the deduction
would erode the amount the defendant could recover.
Where the recipient exercises his option to rescind, then like any
other party, he terminates his opportunity for future gain. And like
any other party, upon rescission he should be required to restore the
status quo. Since the courts say that the value of personal services can
be measured, there is no reason why any different rule should apply
merely because personal services are involved. Although the granting
of restitution should not ordinarily depend on the good faith of the
defendant, here, since neither party can be fully restored to the status
quo, as a matter of practical necessity, the loss should fall on the guilty
party-guilty, in the sense that his conduct caused termination of the
services. When the grantee has no choice but to terminate as in the
Gabbard case, he should be compensated, even though the recipient
does not get the care for life. But where the grantee refuses to perform,
as in Zuehlsdorf, then he should not be entitled to reimbursement,
since the recipient has suffered an unmeasurable future loss because
of the willful breach. Because of the nature of the transaction the right
to reimbursement must depend on which party was at fault in causing
termination of the services.
5. Avoidance of a release
The issue here is when a party is required to return the considera-
tion received for a release in order to avoid its effect. Generally, the
substantive grounds of avoidance will be fraud, but they may also in-
clude mistake, duress or the like. Where fraud is involved, it is neces-
sary to distinguish between fraud in the essence, i.e., the party did not
know he was signing a release or thought he was only signing a partial
release, and fraud in the inducement, i.e., the plaintiff was induced by
false representations to execute the release. In theory, fraud in the
essence renders the release void while fraud in the inducement, like
duress, mistake and similar grounds, renders it only voidable.
Avoidance of the release may be sought by two methods. It may be
avoided in an independent proceeding initiated for that purpose, as
any rescission of a transaction. Or, more often, when the defendant
pleads the release as a defense to an action on the claim, the plaintiff
may move that the defense be stricken. Where return of the considera-
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tion is not required, the amount of the release is deducted from the
final verdict; if the final verdict is less than the amount given for the
release-which is highly unlikely, considering the amounts generally
paid for releases that are sought to be set aside-the plaintiff is liable
to the defendant for the excess. Since, very often the plaintiff will have
spent the consideration for medical bills and the like and has no other
means, a requirement of prior return may prevent avoidance of the
release.
The best statement of the "rule" as to whether tender is required
was made by the court in Carroll v. Fetty,156 where it was said: "The
authorities on the necessity of tender, we find, are in hopeless con-
flict." 157 We will now proceed to examine this conflict and suggest a
solution.
In some instances return of the consideration is never required.
Where a statutory cause of action is involved and the statute, either
expressly or by implication, provides that return of the consideration is
not required in order to avoid a release, then, of course, the court will
not require it. The Federal Employers Liability Act 158 has been so
interpreted. 5 9 Another situation is where the plaintiff would be en-
titled to retain the amount given for the release irrespective of the
amount of the verdict. In these cases either the defendant is abso-
lutely liable or liability is not contested. The court generally does not
seem to consider the possibility of the defendant's being found not
liable on the merits. The following cases indicate the type of situations
where the plaintiff is excused from tender on the ground that he is en-
titled to retain what he received.
Where releases of Workmen's Compensation claims are sought to be
set aside, generally the amount paid can be retained, since it usually
covers only one item of injury and the plaintiff claims other items. 10
By the same token, where payment for the release was a lump sum,
which would be less than the amount plaintiff would be entitled to re-
ceive under periodic payments for a specified time, return of the con-
sideration was not required.' 61 The clearest case is where the release
can be set aside only on the ground that the plaintiff received less than
the full amount of compensation to which he was entitled. 62 This
theory has also caused the courts to refuse to require tender where the
plaintiff suffered personal injuries and damage to his automobile and
the release only covered "specials," that is, medical bills and the cost of
156. 121 W.Va. 215, 2 S.E.2d 521, cert. denied, 3o8 U.S. 571 (1939).
157. Id. at 222, 2 S.E.2d at 524.
158. 35 Stat. 65 (19o8), 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-59 (1958).
159. See cases cited supra note 27 and accompanying text.
16o. Whitehead v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 194 Ore. io6, 239 P.2d 226 (1951).
161. Scheel v. Superior Mfg. Co., 249 Iowa 873, 89 N.W.2d 377 (1958) (alterna-
tive holding).
162. Trokey v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 222 S.W.2d 496 (Mo. App. 1944).
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repair. 16 In the cases where the plaintiff was entitled either to retain
everything or all but a small amount, the courts have adopted a de
minimis attitude and have not required tender. Thus, where the ben-
eficiary was paid $595 for the release and was entitled to receive at least
$5oo on one policy and, if not entitled to receive $iooo on the other
policy, was entitled to some amount for the premiums paid, the court
permitted suit for the face value of the policies without requiring re-
turn of the consideration. 64 And, in Estes v. Magee,165 where the plain-
tiff received $200 for the release against the defendant, $145 of which
was paid back to the defendant, a physician, as his fee for the operation,
the plaintiff could sue for malpractice without returning the remain-
der.' "
Return of the consideration was not required when the release was
given to a co-defendant, or so the plaintiff thought, even though both
defendants had the same insurer, who actually paid the money. In Yel-
low Cab Co. v. Bradin,167 the plaintiff released the owner of the cab
in which he was riding from liability for injuries received in a colli-
sion with another cab. The insurer stated that the release would not
affect the liability of the other cab company, which it also represented.
In fact, the instrument did release the other company. The court held
that the plaintiff could avoid the release insofar as it affected its rights
against the other company without returning the consideration. The
court noted that the insurer had charged the amount paid against the
former company only. Moreover, when the money was not paid directly
to the plaintiff, but instead was paid to the doctors and hospitals 168 or
to the funeral director in a death action,' 69 return of the consideration
has not been required. Here it is recognized that the plaintiff does not
have the consideration given and may not have other funds.
Although the language in some cases where the court has required
return of the consideration would indicate that failure to return prior
to suit constitutes a waiver of any defect in the release,'170 no case has
163. Ruggles v. Selby, 25 Ill. App.2d 1, 165 N.E.2d 733 (ig6o).
164. Mutual Say. Life Ins. Co. v. Hines, 96 Ga. App. 442, oo S.E.2d 466 (1957).
165. 62 Idaho 82, 1o9 P.2d 631 (1940).
166. Plaintiff recovered over $26oo on the final verdict. See also Collins v. Hughes
& Riddle, 134 Neb. 380, 278 N.W. 888 (1938), where the court equated a small
amount, here $15, with what the plaintiff would be entitled to retain. Accord, Hub-
bard's Adm'x v. Louisville Sc N.R.R., 267 Ky. 435, 102 S.W.2d 343 (1937). In that
case the court found that the release was not for an undisputed portion of the
claim. See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 480 (1932).
167. 172 Md. 388, 191 Atl. 717 (1937).
168. Fraser v. Glass, 311 Ill. App. 336, 35 N.E.2d 953 (1941); Lucas v. Gibson,
341 Pa. 427, 19 A.2d 395 (1941); Scanlon v. Pittsburgh Rys., 319 Pa. 477, 188 Atl.
565 (1935). In the Pennsylvania cases the defendant was unaware of the payments,
but apparently he was aware of them in the Illinois case.
169. Mutual Say. Life Ins. Co. v. Hines, supra note 164.
170. See Garcia v. California Truck. Co., 183 Cal. 767, 192 Pac. 708 (1920); Frehe
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been found where the plaintiff who made a tender at the time of trial
was barred; other cases have expressly permitted tender at that time.171
It is doubtful that prior tender is a substantive requirement and that
tender cannot be made at time of suit, if required.
Where the case does not come within any of the exceptions pre-
viously discussed, that is, the ordinary situation where the plaintiff is
seeking to set aside a release either in an independent proceeding or to
avoid a defense in an action on the claim, there are at least two and
possibly three views as to whether tender is required. In addition there
may be a fourth view which is dependent on the time at which plain-
tiff seeks relief, and it is this view that is advocated here.
Some courts base the requirement on whether the grounds of attack
render the release void or voidable; since most cases involve fraud, the
distinction can be said to depend on whether there was fraud in the
essence or in the inducement. Releases voidable on other grounds such
as duress would be treated as equivalent to fraud in the inducement.
Where the release is obtained because of fraud in the essence or is
otherwise void, restoration of the consideration is not required; where
it is obtained by fraud in the inducement or is otherwise voidable, then
restoration is required. 17 2
Fraud in the inducement consists of a material misrepresentation of
fact not referring to the writing. Thus, a misrepresentation by the de-
fendant employer's physician as to the nature and extent of the em-
ployee's injuries constituted fraud in the inducement and restoration
of the consideration was required.1 73 Fraud in the essence usually re-
fers to the release itself, in that it had a different effect than the plain-
tiff was led to believe. In this area the courts are very solicitous of the
plaintiff and apparently do not hold that he is under a duty to read
the release before signing it. This represents a practical understanding
of the situation. Ordinarily a party seeking to set aside a release was
not represented by counsel when he signed it; had he been, it is doubt-
ful whether he would be suing to rescind because dissatisfied with the
amount, which is, of course, the real reason he wants to rescind. Often
v. Schildwachter, 289 N.Y. 250, 45 N.E.2d 427 (1942); Nocito v. Lanuitti, 402 Pa.
288, 167 A.2d 262 (i96i); Taylor v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., 196 S.C. 195, 12
S.E.2d 708 (1940).
171. Davis v. Whatley, 175 So. 422 (La. App. 1937); Carroll v. Fetty, supra note
156.
172. Pacific Greyhound Lines v. Zane, 16o F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1947), applying
California law, Panama Agencies Co. v. Franco, iii F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1940);
Schoeler v. Roth, 51 F. Supp. 518 (S.D.N.Y. 1942), applying New York law; Farmers
Bank & Trust Co. v. Public Serv. Co. of Ind., 13 F. Supp. 548 (W.D.Ky. 1936), ap-
plying Kentucky law; Garcia v. California Truck. Co., supra note 17o; Stewart v.
Eldred, 349 Mich. 28, 84 N.W.2d 496 (1957); State v. Shain, 339 Mo. 903, 98 S.W.2d
597 (1936); Paul v. Flannery, 128 N.J.L. 438, 26 A.2d 553 (1942); semble:
Frehe v. Schildwachter, supra note 17o; Picklesimer v. Baltimore 8c O.R.R., 151
Ohio St. 1, 84 N.E.2d 214 (1949); Carroll v. Fetty, supra note 156.
173. Picklesimer v. Baltimore & O.R.R., supra note 172.
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insurance adjustors will attempt a "quickie" settlement soon after the
accident or death. It takes no great feat of one's imagination to picture
the adjustor assuring the plaintiff in his hospital bed that "this paper
is just a matter of form so we can pay your doctor's bills," when in
fact it is a full release from all liability. In this regard the courts have
understood the factual content of the transaction. 74
Examples of situations rendering the release void include the follow-
ing: a release represented to an alien stevedore, who could not read
English, as a receipt for payment of doctor's bills; 175 an insurer repre-
sented that it was settling for the total amount of policy, and that it
would release only the company and not the individual defendant, both
of which statements were untrue, and refused to read it to plaintiff, who
could not read it because he did not have his glasses; 176 a release con-
tained different provisions than plaintiff was told it contained; 177 and
a release which purportedly covered only medical bills to date, repair
of automobile and other "specials," but was actually a full release. 78
It has also been held that a release executed by an incompetent was
void and return of consideration was not required.179
In a number of cases the courts have stated that return of considera-
tion is required whenever a release is sought to be avoided, and they
have not drawn the void-voidable distinction. 18  In none of these cases
was the void-voidable distinction discussed, but one court stated that
return of consideration is always required, 8' and another required re-
turn of the consideration where the claim was fraud in the essence,
i.e., plaintiff, who could neither read nor write was told the release was
a receipt.182 However, in the other cases voidable releases have been
174. See Stewart v. Eldred, supra note 172. Soon after the death of the plaintiff's
child the adjuster visited the plaintiff, a man of little education, and represented
that the paper was a receipt for funeral expenses, which the company said it would
pay. Actually, it was a release for wrongful death liability.
175. Panama Agencies Co. v. Franco, supra note 172.
176. Ploof v. Somers, 282 App. Div. 798, 123 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1953).
177. Jordon v. Guerra, 23 Cal.2d 469, 144 P.2d 349 (1943). The court noted that
the rule was not limited to the cases where the releasee could not understand Eng-
lish or there was a confidential relationship.
178. Wetzstein v. Thomasson, 34 Cal. App.2d 554, 93 P.2d 1028 (Dist. Ct. App.
1939).
179. Farmers Bank & Trust Co. v. Public Serv. Co. of Ind., supra note 172.
i8o. Gilbert v. Wilson, 237 Ala. 645, 188 So. 260 (1939); Roberts v. Southern Ry.,
73 Ga. App. 759, 38 S.E.2d 48 (1946); Davis v. Zaban Storage Co., 59 Ga. App. 474,
1 S.E.2d 473 (1939); McCommons v. Greene County, 53 Ga. App. 171, 184 S.E.
897 (1936); McGregor v. Mills, 280 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. 1955); Hubbard's Adm'x v.
Louisville & N.R. Co., supra note 166; Davis v. Whatley, supra note 171; Nocito v.
Lanuitti, supra note 17o; Taylor v. Palmetto State Life Ins. Co., supra note 17o;
Caledonia Sand & Gravel Co. v. Joseph A. Bass Co., 121 Vt. 161, 151 A.2d 312(1959).
181. McGregor v. Mills, supra note 18o. The language of the court did not indi-
cate that this requirement was ever excused. However, there is no doubt that it
would recognize the "entitled to retain" and similar exceptions, since there the
plaintiff actually owes nothing.
182. Davis v. Whatley, supra note 171.
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involved and these courts may accept the void-voidable distinction in
a proper case.
In still another number of cases the courts have held that the con-
sideration did not have to be returned and did not expressly distin-
guish between whether an independent action was involved 183 or
whether the release was asserted as a defense and the plaintiff sought
to avoid it at that time.8 1 These courts base their decision on the
grounds that, as a practical matter, the plaintiff may have spent the
money and the amount of the release can be deducted from the verdict.
There is the implicit assumption that the amount of the verdict will
exceed the amount of the release, which, as previously indicated, is
almost universally true. 85
It is submitted that the approach of these courts is more sound. The
plaintiff, particularly in personal injuries actions, will have used, or
will use, a good portion of the money to pay for medical expenses and
others resulting from the injury and for living expenses until the trial,
which may involve a quite lengthy period. Furthermore, the improper
conduct in obtaining releases in all too many instances is well known.
Moreover, where the release is sought to be avoided in the trial of the
underlying claim after the defendant has asserted it as a defense, which
is the more likely situation, the defendant is adequately protected. The
amount of the release can be deducted from the verdict. In the unlikely
case that the verdict is less, he will have to pay nothing and would
be entitled to a judgment against the plaintiff for the difference. The
instances where the defendant will be saddled with an "uncollectible"
judgment for the excess are far outweighed by those cases where the
requirement of tender will prevent the plaintiff's avoiding a fraudu-
lent release and recovering adequate damages. Further, the court is
spared the absurd situation of the plaintiff-if he has the consideration
-returning it at the time of trial only to be entitled to get it back
again and more a few days later when the jury renders a verdict. If
the defendant prevails on the question of the validity of the release,
then he must return the consideration that was returned to him shortly
before. The requirement of return of consideration has the primary
effect of preventing defrauded plaintiffs who have spent the considera-
tion from receiving adequate relief.
183. Scheel v. Superior Mfg. Co., Supra note 161 (alternative holding); Rase v.
Minneapolis, St. P.&S.St.M. Ry., ii8 Minn. 437, 137 N.W. 176 (1912); Pecinosky v.
Oklahoma Aid Ass'n, 131 Okla. 240, 268 Pac. 309 (1928).
184. Atchison, T.&S.F. Ry. v. Peterson, 34 Ariz. 292, 271 Pac. 4o6 (1928); Perkins
Oil Co. of Del. v. Fitzgerald, 197 Ark. 14, 121 S.W.2d 877 (1938); Serr v. Biwabik
Concrete Aggregate Co., 2o Minn. 167, 278 N.W. 355 (1938); Collins v. Hughes &
Riddle, supra note 166; semble: Paul v. Flannery, supra note 172; semble: Franklin
v. Webber, 93 Ore. 151, 182 Pac. 819 (1919).
185. What probably happens is that the releasor consults a lawyer after signing
it. We can assume that the lawyer would not advise him to try to set it aside (on a
contingent fee basis) unless substantially more could be recovered.
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However, it is submitted that where the plaintiff brings an inde-
pendent action to cancel the release and does not join his claim on
the merits, then return of the consideration should be required unless
the case falls within one of the exceptions previously discussed. Here
too, the result should not depend on whether the release is void or
voidable. To the extent that the plaintiff has a decree voiding the re-
leases and retains the consideration, he is being unjustly enriched. It
is true that the plaintiff may be bringing the action to improve his
settlement position; however, if the parties are engaged in settlement
negotiations, then the trial of the substantive claim can be delayed.
The defendant should not be burdened with a contingent liability un-
til the possible running of the statute of limitations, while the plain-
tiff retains the benefits received from the release or has expended them.
A true rescission would mean that the plaintiff has his claim and the
defendant the consideration he paid for the release. In summary, it is
submitted that return of the consideration should not be required
where the defendant asserts the release as a defense to a suit on the
claim or the plaintiff sues to rescind and joins the underlying claim,
but should be returned where the plaintiff institutes an independent
action without such joinder. Such an approach would also eliminate
void-voidable distinctions and fully protect the legitimate interests of
both parties.
The difference in result between an independent suit to cancel and
the action on the claim was recognized in Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n
v. Kennedy.l8s In that case an employee sued to cancel a compromise
settlement for a compensation claim between him and the insurer. The
court ordered cancellation; it could not award a verdict on the original
claim, since proceedings would have to be instituted before an adminis-
trative agency. However, it expressly drew the distinction between a
common law action for damages and cancellation of the release (which
would include the situation where the defendant raised the release as
a matter of defense) and an affirmative action to cancel, saying that re-
turn of the consideration was not required in the former instance, but
was required in the latter. Here, since the court believed it likely that
the agency would award an amount in excess of the consideration, and
suit had to be brought within a specified time, it found the case was
more akin to a common law action on the claim than an independent
proceeding to set aside the release. 8 7
It is submitted that such an approach fully protects the interests of
both parties and protects an improvident or impecunious plaintiff from
the effect of an invalid release. At the same time it protects the defend-
186. 135 Tex. 486, 143 S.W.2d 583 (1940).
187. The court in Collins v. Hughes & Riddle, supra note 166, also indicated
the existence of such a distinction, although in that case the amount given for the
release could be said to be de minimis.
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ant from contingent liability at some time in the future, while the
plaintiff has not returned the consideration the defendant expended
in an effort to avoid such liability. It is the realistic solution to a ques-
tion generating a plethora of conflicting views. It is hoped that courts
will require return of the consideration as the basis of the type of ac-
tion-this insures protection to the defendant-rather than the nature
of the grounds of invalidity. 188
6. Payment of mortgage or debt to obtain relief from foreclosure of
sale
It is the general rule that when a party seeks to prevent a foreclosure
or sale to satisfy indebtedness, he must, as a condition to relief, tender
any amount admittedly due at the time of suit. This is so whether the
plaintiff is moving directly against the sale on grounds of irregular-
ity 189 or is bringing an action to remove the improper sale as a cloud
on title. 90 This principle was applied to require payment of the debt
in Otis v. Gregory,'9' where a valid mortgage was cancelled and a void
mortgage given in its place. The plaintiff, a married woman, executed
a mortgage in a state where she had capacity to do so. The defendant
released the mortgage to enable the plaintiff to purchase land in the
forum, where she gave a new mortgage as security for the purchase
price. She lacked such capacity in the forum. The court held that both
mortgages involved a single transaction and that in order to avoid the
second mortgage, which was void, she had to pay the debt secured by
the first mortgage. Under the same reasoning, in Jennings v. Arnold,19 2
where the mortgagee had paid past-due taxes and exhausted her re-
sources in doing so, the mortgagor who sought relief under the mora-
torium statute was required as a condition to relief to pay such taxes
as might be necessary in order to avoid the danger of the mortgagee's
loss of security through tax liens, and also was ordered to make monthly
payments of past-due indebtedness.
However, payment is not required where the mortgagee foreclosed
prior to the time the debt was due, since it would give the mortgagee
payment at a time when he was not entitled to it under the contract. 98
Where part of the amount is due at the time of suit, the plaintiff is
required to pay that amount and relief is conditioned upon making
188. Logically, and pragmatically, the grounds of invalidity have no relation-
ship to a reason for requiring return of the consideration.
189. Blasingame v. Wallace, supra note 136; Leonard v. Bank of America, 16 Cal.
App.2d 341, 6o P.2d 325 (Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
19o. Auld v. Cobb Exch. Bank, 204 Ga. 729, 5 i S.E.2d 635 (1949); Kornhuber
v. Bosetti, 17. N.J..Super.. 146,.85 A.2d 547 (Ch. Div. 1952).
191. 111 Ind. 504, 13 N.E. 39 (1887).
192. 272 Mich. 599, 262 N.W. 419 (1935).
193. Pass v. Pass, 195 Ga. 155, 23 S.E.2d 697 (1942); Johnson v. Gore, 224 Miss.
6oo, 8o So.2d 731 (1955).
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future payments as they fall due. 9 4 Payment of the debt as a condition
to relief against foreclosure was not required where the mortgagee had
not received cash for the security he gave, but instead had discharged
other liens against the land.195 That decision recognizes that since the
mortgagor did not receive consideration that can be returned, the court
must balance the injury to the defendant arising from the plaintiff's
inability to reimburse him for the benefits received against the injury
to the plaintiff from permitting foreclosure of an invalid security inter-
est due to that inability. Under the circumstances the balance was
weighted in favor of the mortgagor.
Moreover, some cases have not required payment of the debt in
order to vacate a void judgment where the security of the creditor was
not affected by the decree. In Van Meter v. Field,96 the mortgage fore-
closure as to homestead property was void, since only one spouse had
been joined. In a proceeding by both to vacate the judgment the plain-
tiffs were not required to pay the amount of the mortgage as a condi-
tion to relief. Since the defendant did not lose his security, as he could
foreclose the mortgage by a proper proceeding, there was no need for
conditional relief. This principle worked to the advantage of the de-
fendant in another case where the conditional vendee sued to obtain
relief against improper repossession of a chattel. 9 7 It was provided that
upon improper repossession the plaintiff was relieved of all obligations
to pay the balance and was entitled to recover payments already made.
The court gave the declaratory relief and ordered return of payments,
but refused to order return of the chattel. The repossession voided the
transaction and relieved the plaintiff of all liability. Since the reposses-
sion proceedings could be separated from the chattel itself, there was
no need to order return of the chattel, as plaintiff received all the ben-
efits to which he was entitled by being relieved of the obligation.198
The question arises as to the extent to which the principle of the
Van Meter case, that payment is not required where the mortgagee's
security is not affected by the court's action, is applicable. Cases where
the defect was that realty was not levied on after personalty as required
by statute,199 or where there was an improper advertisement and in-
sufficient bids,2°° have required payment of the debt, even though the
194. Auld v. Cobb Exch. Bank, supra note 19o. Plaintiff had to make monthly pay-
ments until maturity of the note as long as the decree remained in effect.
195. Rotge v. Dunlap, 91 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
196. 195 Okla. 555, 159 P.2d 546 (1945).
197. Seebold v. Eustermann, 216 Minn. 566, 13 N.W.2d 739 (1944).
198. The test was whether the property ever belonged to the plaintiff. The court
admitted that a contrary result might occur if the plaintiff had given a chattel mort-
gage. A distinction based on the nature of the security, however, is unsound. See
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102. The test should be whether the intent of the
legislature was to relieve the plaintiff from the obligation, and if this is so, this is
all the court should do. He is not entitled to the property in either instance.
199. Blasingane v. Wallace, 32 Ariz. 58o, 261 Pac. 42 (1927).
2oo. Leonard v. Bank of America, supra note 189.
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mortgagee's security would not be affected by the decree. It is sug-
gested that in cases such as these the court weighs the injury to the pol-
icy sought to be effected by the statute against the inconvenience and
possible lower price that would result from another sale. Where the
statutory policy is particularly strong-courts are very scrupulous about
actions affecting encumbered homestead 201-the court is less likely to
require payment; this represents an in lerrorem approach to insure
compliance in the future. It is suggested that throughout this area the
conditioning of relief in the manner done by the courts is quite ap-
propriate.
7. Additional requirements unrelated to performance of obligation
It is here that the court's power to grant conditional relief can be
used most efficaciously to protect the real interests of all the parties.
The power to grant relief in the situations to be discussed stems di-
rectly from the "appeal to the conscience of the chancellor" attitude
of the former courts of chancery. Because of the basic flexibility of spe-
cific and declaratory relief, moreover, it is possible to condition that re-
lief to a much greater degree than where damages are involved, since
in the latter situation often the only issue is whether the damages
should be reduced. Here, particularly, is the recognition of the fact
that often neither party is entirely "in the right." Further, the court's
power to condition relief may be in the plaintiff's interest, since other-
wise the court might refuse any relief on grounds of hardship, unfair-
ness or the like.
One instance of such relief has been to require the plaintiff to give
the defendant the opportunity to secure the intended benefits of a
transaction or minimize his loss. 20 2 In Brooks v. Towson Realty Inc.,2
3
the vendor executed two documents by which he agreed to sell the land
in two parcels at a price of $75,000 for parcel A and $3000 for parcel B.
Prior to the contract the vendor told the vendee that he wanted to sell
the land as a unit and would only enter into negotiations on that basis.
The vendee said it would take the land, but wanted a division into two
tracts primarily for tax and subdividing purposes. The vendee sued
only to specifically enforce the contract for parcel B. If the plaintiff
would get specific performance for parcel B only, he would get the land
for about $.o6 per square foot; if the land were computed on the price
of $78,000 for both lots, the price would be about $.44 per square foot.
Although the vendor did not seek specific performance of the contract
by which the vendee agreed to take parcel A, the court held it would
201. See the discussion at note 1O3 supra, and accompanying text.
2o2. This is analogous to the doctrine of avoidable consequences in the damages
field. Where the plaintiff has not acted reasonably to minimize the loss, he cannot
recover the additional damages. See, e.g., RESTATEMANT, TORTS § 918 (1939).
203. 223 Md. 61, 162 A.2d 431 (196o).
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grant specific performance for parcel B only, conditional on the vend-
ee's also taking parcel A at the stated price. It indicated that otherwise
it would refuse specific performance on the ground of hardship and
mistake.
In Austin v. Federal Land Bank,20 4 the mortgagee sued to set aside
a sale of the mortgaged land and to foreclose his mortgage. The pur-
chaser had built a cottage on the unimproved land without actual
knowledge of the mortgage, although, since it had been recorded, he
was bound by constructive notice and could not be a bona fide pur-
chaser for value. The sale was set aside and foreclosure ordered condi-
tional on the mortgagee's giving the purchaser a reasonable time, here
six months, to remove the cottage, as this was technically feasible. The
result placed the parties in status quo and prevented unjust enrichment
of the mortgagee. It has also been held that where an adjoining land-
owner is required to remove a portion of an encroaching structure, and
the removal can be made more efficaciously working on the plaintiff's
land, the plaintiff would be required to permit the defendant to enter
upon his land, conditional upon payment of a reasonable charge to the
plaintiff.205
The court will use this power to prevent future litigation sua sponte.
In Corby v. Bean,206 where the plaintiff sought reformation of a secur-
ity given for a usurious debt, the plaintiff was required, as a condition
to relief, to rebate the usurious payment and permit the instrument to
be further reformed to eliminate the usurious provisions. Also, by
granting conditional relief, the court has compelled the plaintiff to
eliminate the conduct prompting the defendant to act wrongfully. In
Board v. Schneider,20 7 the owner of the upper riparian estate erected
a structure which to some extent increased the flow of water on the
lower estate, but which was not such an unreasonable use that the lower
riparian owner would have been entitled to enjoin it. To prevent this
flow he constructed a dam that threw back the water on the upper
estate; this conduct was enjoinable. The court granted the injunction
at the suit of the upper riparian owner, but it was conditioned upon
his restoring the land to its natural condition as reasonably as could be
done.
In Erickson v. Erickson,208 the court used this power to require per-
formance of a moral obligation in the technical sense, i.e., one which
could have been legally enforced at the proper time, but which was
204. 188 Ark. 971, 68 S.W.2d 468 (1934).
205. McNanamy v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 114 Pa. Super. 282, 173 At. 491(1934). The charge was $7.50 for each working day.
2o6. 44 Mo. 379 (1869).
207. 301 Ky. 289, 191 S.W.2d 418 (1945).
2o8. 30 Wash.2d 914, 194 P.2d 954 (1948).
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now affirmatively unenforceable. 2 9 The divorced husband obtained
modification of a support decree to relieve him from making further
payments for their daughter who had finished secondary school and
had gone to work. The decree was subject to reopening and reinstate-
ment of the support order if the daughter later decided to go to col-
lege. She did so, but the wife had never moved for restoration of the
decree and paid the full expenses. The husband subsequently sued to
compel the wife to return stock held by her as security for support pay-
ments, to which return he was entitled. The relief was conditioned on
his paying half of the expenses of the daughter's college education. In
answer to the plaintiff's argument that the court could not impose the
condition, since there was no implied agreement to pay for this under
the modified decree, the court observed: "We therefore do not predi-
cate our decision on any implied agreement. . . but on the proposition
that, before a court of equity will grant him the relief he desires, he
will be required to perform the natural duties of a father which
should be performed without compulsion and without quibbling about
whether there was or was not an implied agreement so to do." 210
The courts have imposed conditions which directly conflicted with
the obligations that plaintiff had assumed. However, the alternative
would have been to refuse any relief because of hardship or the like.
The court will not specifically enforce a contract where the perform-
ance of the plaintiff's obligation is not secured to the court's satisfac-
tion; 211 this is the present status of the "mutuality rule," which only
requires that at time of suit the defendant be assured of receiving the
agreed exchange. 212 Thus, where the plaintiff seeks specific performance
of a contract to transfer property and payment is to be made in the
future, the court will only grant relief conditional upon the plaintiff's
paying cash or giving security, though he did not agree to do so in the
contract.
213
Another example, and limited to almost the precise situation, oc-
curred in Willard v. Tayloe. 214 There the parties had entered into a
ten-year lease with an option to purchase at termination. As a result
of the Civil War the government issued "greenbacks," which were legal
tender. Payment of debts in specie and the use of specie as currency
were permitted, however, unlike the situation prevailing under the
2o9. Note the similarity to the cases where the obligation was unenforceable due
to the statute of limitations, notes 253-58 infra and accompanying text.
21o. Erickson v. Erickson, supra note 208, at 916, 194 P.2d at 957.
211. See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 220 (1932).
212. See Morad v. Silva, 331 Mass. 94, 117 N.E.2d 290 (1954); Epstein v. Gluckin,
233 N.Y. 490, 135 N.E. 861 (1922). See also RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 372 (1932).
213. Beardslee v. Grindley, 236 Mich. 453, 21o N.W. 486 (1926); Van Scoten v.
Albright, 5 N.J. Eq. 467 (Ch. 1846). This condition also has been imposed against
a state agency. See also State Highway Comm'n v. Golden, 112 N.J. Eq. 156, 163 Ad.
551 (Ch. 1933).
214. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 557 (1869).
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Gold Clause abrogation. 215 The contract said nothing about payment
in specie. The vendee tried to make payment in "greenbacks," which
the vendor refused. In the vendee's action for specific performance the
court granted relief conditioned on payment in specie despite the
vendor's claim that all relief should be refused because of hardship.
This case established the principle that relief would not be refused on
grounds of hardship where the plaintiff could eliminate that hardship.
The holding is limited to an extreme depreciation such as the one in-
volved at that time, and there is the further requirement that payment
in specie be legally possible. It is not recommended that counsel for
the defendant attempt to make specific performance conditional upon
payment of the contract price at present purchasing power. The law,
too, must live with the inflationary spiral.
The applications of conditional relief in this area are varied; in all
cases the application has effectuated a just result. Thus, in Kanauske
v. Clark,216 where a residuary legatee sued to set aside a deed of the
testator due to the grantee's fraud and the grantee sought a decree up-
holding the validity of her title, the court ruled in favor of the
grantee, but as a condition to relief, required her to protect the inter-
ests of the residuary legatee. The legatee had executed a deed of other
property to the grantee so that she would receive some compensation
for the services she had rendered the decedent; however, she later filed
a claim against the estate for those services. As a condition to the de-
cree, she was required to withdraw her claim against the estate. 217 So
too, in Brown v. Bartlett,218 a wife seeking to cancel the deceased hus-
band's change of beneficiary to the defendant on grounds of incompe-
tency, was required to restore the consideration paid by the defend-
ant.2 19 In Ross v. Rambo,22 an innocent purchaser from the defaulting
trustee, who had paid only a portion of the consideration prior to no-
tice and thus could not be a bona fide purchaser for value, was en-
titled to reimbursement for this amount in a suit to have a resulting
trust declared in the land. Finally, in Lacy v. United States,221 where
the government had constructed a transmission line across the de-
fendant's land, which constituted a public taking, but for which he had
not been compensated, as a condition to the government's enjoining
his interference with the line, it was required to pay the value of the
condemned property or institute condemnation proceedings. The court
rejected the government's argument that since this was a taking, the
defendant should have instituted proceedings for compensation.
215. See Norman v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
216. 388 Ill. 357, 57 N.E.2d 89o (1944).
217. Otherwise the decree would have been for the plaintiff.
218. 333 Mich. 713, 53 N.W.2d 592 (1952).
219. Cf., Patterson v. Patterson, note 310 infra.
220. 195 Ga. 1oo, 23 S.E.2d 687 (1942).
2-1. 216 F.2d 223 (5 th Cir. 1954).
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There are doubtless many more examples, which research has not
disclosed. In this area the court's power is used to achieve a truly just
result. It is certainly not unfair to the plaintiff to require such condi-
tions, where it is remembered that often the alternative would be to
remit him to damages because of hardship or the like, though ad-
mittedly, damages would be inadequate. Both as a result of its historical
development and its very nature, equitable relief is flexible and far
more discretionary than damages. Thus, the court can condition relief
to protect the legitimate interests of both parties. Conditional relief
represents the emergence of law into what Dean Pound has called "the
stage of maturity," 222 since it enforces rights, insuring some predict-
ability, while at the same time effecting substantive fairness. In this
stage the standard and principle replace the absolute rule; fair condi-
tions-the plaintiff shall not be unjustly enriched, for example-are
imposed despite the plaintiff's showing of a "right" to relief. The final
result is one calculated to produce substantial justice between the
parties.
C. Defenses to Conditional Relief
As with affirmative relief, even when conditional relief is ordinarily
appropriate, there may be considerations justifying the refusal to grant
such relief in a particular case. Therefore, we must concern ourselves
with defenses to conditional relief, a defense to a defense so to speak.
There may be conflicting policies justifying the refusal of conditional
relief in certain instances. This power should not be used to destroy
societal and public interests, simply because such relief appears affirma-
tively proper. In the following section we will consider applications
of this principle and inquire into their soundness. We will further sug-
gest improvements that should be made and attempt to resolve con-
flicting approaches. At the outset, it should be noted that many prob-
lems arise, because some courts still base distinctions on whether the
nature of the claim is legal or equitable.
i. Actions to recover governmental property
Where suits to recover governmental lands are brought, two issues
relating to conditional relief arise: (1) whether the defendant is en-
titled to return of any consideration paid; (2) whether he is entitled to
be reimbursed for the value of improvements and other benefits ac-
cruing to the government. As to return of the consideration, where the
government sues to rescind the sale of public lands on grounds of fraud
or other illegality in the transaction, the sale will be set aside without
requiring the return.23 The Court has emphasized that the govern-
222. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 139 (1921).
223. United States v. Trinidad Coal Co., 137 U.S. 16o (i8go); Causey v. United
States, 240 U.S. 399 (1916); United States v. Howard, 247 Fed. 455 (8th Cir. 1917).
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ment is not in the position of an ordinary seller, and that the public
interest in the restoration of the land to the public domain outweighs
the injustice of the defendant's being deprived of the consideration.
Moreover, these cases were decided at a time when payments went di-
rectly into the treasury, and the agency that sold the land would not
have a separate suspense account from which payments could be made
without congressional authorization. Therefore, the practical result of
requiring repayment would be to deny the government relief. Also, it
was assumed that Congress would appropriate the money after the land
was returned to the government. The solvency of the government is
not in question. The attitude of the court is best demonstrated by the
following language in Causey v. United States: 224
But, as this court has said, the Government in disposing of the public
lands does not assume the attitude of a mere seller of real estate at its
market value. These lands are held in trust for all the people, and in
providing for their disposal Congress has sought to advance the interests
of the whole country by opening them to entry in comparatively small
tracts under restrictions designed to accomplish their settlement, de-
velopment and utilization and when action is brought to annul a pat-
ent obtained in violation of these restrictions, the purpose is not merely
to regain the title, but also to enforce a public statute and maintain
the policy underlying it. Such a suit is not within the reason of the
ordinary rule that a vendor suing to annul a sale fraudulently induced
must offer and be ready to return the consideration received. That rule,
if applied, would tend to frustrate the policy of the public land laws;
and so it is held that the wrongdoer must restore the title and abide
the judgment of Congress as to whether the consideration paid should
be refunded.
Applying this principle, a very reluctant Court of Appeals held in
Ehrlich v. United States, 225 that a deed from the Public Housing Ad-
ministrator to ineligible parties and from them to the vendee, could
be rescinded due to fraudulent representations without requiring re-
turn of the purchase price as a condition to relief. All three judges
favored requiring restitution, but the majority believed that this was
prohibited by the Supreme Court decisions previously discussed. Judge
Wisdom contended that here the suit was not to vindicate national
policy with respect to the public lands, but that the government was in
the position of a private person selling real estate at market value. He
also noted that the policy of the statute was effectuated by criminal
prosecution and that one of the defendants had been convicted. Judge
Tuttle and Chief Judge Hutcheson concluded that the case was not dis-
tinguishable in principle from the others and held that the government
could not be required to return the consideration. Under this approach
it has been held that in a suit by taxpayers to cancel a deed given by
224. Supra note 223, at 402.
225. 252 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1958).
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a school district on the ground that the sale was not approved in a
referendum as required by statute, the school district was not required
to return the consideration as a condition to relief.
2 26
This principle has also been applied where the government has sued
to rescind deeds to land given by Indian allottees, because the statute
providing such allotments made their land inalienable. In such cases the
government has not been required to return the consideration paid to
the allottee as a condition to relief.227 As the Court observed in Heckman
v. United States: 228 "A transfer of the allotments is not simply a vio-
tion of the proprietary rights of the Indian. It violates the govern-
mental rights of the United States. If these Indians may be divested
of their lands, they will be thrown back upon the Nation, a pauperized,
discontented and possibly belligerent race." The same reasoning has
been followed when the Indians themselves were the plaintiffs, and
restoration of the consideration has not been required.22 However, in
Taylor v. Grant,23 0 where the sale had been previously set aside by the
United States and the consideration was in the hands of a conservator
bank, the vendee was permitted to recover it in an independent ac-
tion.2 31 In one case, where a government official was a party to the fraud
and apparently the defendant was innocent, the United States was re-
quired to return the consideration. 2 2
As to recovery for improvements, the result depends upon the good
faith of the improver. As a practical matter, since the government is
entitled to the rental value and any profits, the issue is whether the
defendant can offset the value of the improvements against the govern-
ment's claim for the accounting, and whether he can remove the im-
provements if this is feasible. The same considerations that justify the
failure to require return of the consideration would prevent imposi-
tion of a duty to pay money against the government if a balance were
found due the improver. Based on this distinction, where the improver
has acted in good faith, such as removing timber pursuant to a con-
tract with the entryman in ignorance of the defect in the latter's title,233
or entering onto the land under mistake of law with advice of coun-
226. Toler v. Love, 170 Miss. 252, 154 So. 711 (1934).
227. Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S. 413 (1912); Siniscal v. United States,
2o8 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 8M8 (1954).
228. Supra note 227, at 438.
229. Oates v. Freeman, 57 Okla. 449, 157 Pac. 74 (1915); Colombe v. Wilson,
29 S.D. 49, 135 N.W. 668 (1912). In the Oates case the result was considered re-
quired under federal law; in the Wilson case the transaction was treated as analyti-
cally void.
230. 204 Ore. 1o, 279 P.2d 479 (1955).
231. The federal court had refused to order return of the consideration, because
the court could not impose a lien on the land and the conservator bank was not a
party. Siniscal v. United States, supra note 227.
232. United States v. Debell, 227 Fed. 775 (8th Cir. 1915).
233. United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 2oo U.S. 321 (19o6).
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sel, 23 4 or otherwise being an innocent trespasser,23 5 he has been entitled
to offset the cost of improvements and production or to remove his
equipment.2 30 But where the property was obtained through improper
collusion with a government official, 237 or by fraudulent representa-
tions, 23 8 the defendants have been held to forfeit the value of the im-
provements and could not remove them even where feasible.
Where the improver has acted in good faith, the Court speaks of its
power to grant conditional relief against anyone, including the govern-
ment, in order to prevent unjust enrichment. As it observed in the
Detroit Lumber case: 239
The principles of equity exist independently of and anterior to all
congressional legislation and the statutes are either annunciations of
these principles or limitations upon their application. ... The Gov-
ernment has every dollar which it would have received in case of a
perfectly valid entry and has also recovered the land. Surely it is notjust for it to ask further payment, and from a party who dealt in good
faith with the entryman, relying upon the titles which it had created.
On the other hand, in the case of fraudulent conduct, its sole con-
cern is with the vindication of public policy. In Pan-American Co.,240
after noting that the government did not stand in the position of a
"mere seller or lessor of land," it went on to state:
This suit was brought to vindicate the policy of the Government, to
preserve the integrity of the petroleum reserves and to devote them to
the purposes for which they were created. The petitioners stand as
wrongdoers, and no equity arises in their favor to prevent the granting
of the relief sought by the United States. They may not insist on pay-
ment of the cost to them or the value to the Government of the im-
provements made or fuel oil furnished as all were done without author-
ity. ...
The Court also observed that, "since Congress had not authorized
them, it must be assumed that the United States did not want the im-
234. United States v. Midway No. Oil Co., 232 Fed. 619 (S.D.Cal. 1916).
235. Texas Co. v. State, 267 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), rev'd in part on
other grounds, aff'd in part, 154 Tex. 494, 281 S.W.2d 83 (1955).
236. See also Jacobs v. United States, 239 F.2d 459 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 904 (1957). In a suit by the United States against a contractor who had
terminated the contract in accordance with its terms to require him to turn over
the records and drawings, as a condition to relief, the United States had to satisfy
counterclaims arising from the contract. The court admitted that it could not use
the principle to entertain counterclaims that Congress did not authorize. But this
claim was not prohibited by Congress, and the court drew the analogy to requiring
payment in a suit for specific performance.
237. Pan-American Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 456 (1927); United States v.
Mammoth Oil Co., 275 U.S. 13 (1927). These suits involved the "Teapot Dome"
scandal. The government officials included the Secretary of the Interior and the
Secretary of the Navy.
238. United States v. Howard, supra note 223.
239. United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., supra note 233, at 339-40.
240. Pan-American Co. v. United States, supra note 237, at 509-10.
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provements made or was not ready to bear the cost of making them." 2"
It is submitted that these approaches overlook the practical realities
of the situation and evidence a concern with punitive rather than com-
pensatory results. Thus, a "bad faith" trespasser cannot offset the costs
of improvements while a "good faith" one can. Ordinarily Indian al-
lottees and the government are protected, but when the government
acted "badly" it was punished, although the practical result may have
been to cause the Indian to lose the land. The decree provided that
if the consideration was not returned by the government, the land
would be sold; the consideration paid to the vendee and the balance if
any, used for the benefit of the Indian. Assuming, as the other cases
indicate, that the government could not reimburse the vendee absent
a congressional appropriation and that the Indian did not have the
consideration, the Indian would lose his land: the very result that the
court in the other cases sought to prevent. By punishing the govern-
ment, the court defeated the very purpose of the suit.
The answer must be to formulate an approach by which both the
public interest and the rights of the defendant will be protected; the
government must be able to regain public property on its behalf or that
of its wards, but at the same time should not be unjustly enriched.
The quality of the conduct of the government or the defendant should
be irrelevant. As to return of the consideration, it is not disputed that
the government or the allottee must be able to regain the property
and cannot be barred by failure to return the consideration if they are
unable to do so. This is the basis of the distinction. Where the govern-
ment sues to regain property and it cannot return the consideration,
then, the present approach is sound. What is unsound, however, is to
assume that the government cannot do so. It must also be remembered
that recovery of the consideration against the government in an inde-
pendent action is at best problematical. 242 Even if recovery is possible,
it is inefficient to require a second suit when all rights and liabilities
can be determined in one action. In the first place, where a govern-
ment corporation such as TVA is involved, there is no reason not to
require a return of the consideration. 2 43 The corporation has a sepa-
rate account and can disburse money without the necessity of a treas-
ury appropriation. Moreover, where surplus property is involved, the
agency may deposit in a special account in the treasury such amounts
241. Id. at 510.
242. The Court has stated that restitutionary recovery against the United States
is limited to contracts "implied in fact" and not those "implied in law." United
States v. Minnesota Inv. Co., 271 U.S. 212, 217 (1926). Although the court has strained
the interpretation of "implied in fact" contracts, see e.g., Portsmouth Co. v. United
States, 260 U.S. 327 (1922), and United States v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 234 U.S. 228
(1914), it is doubtful whether one would be found in the case of a wilful trespasser.
243. Research has disclosed no cases involving government corporations.
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as it deems necessary to permit refunds upon rescission.2 44 Other federal
agencies may have similar authorizations. All that is .suggested is that
where there is a separate fund, and return of the consideration can be
made without the need for congressional appropriation, such return
should be required as a condition of relief. The reason for the rule
clearly has ceased in such a case.
As to the Indian allottee or other wards, the same principle should
apply as in the case of minors. If the allottee has the consideration, then
its return should be required as a condition to relief whether he or
the government is the plaintiff. In Taylor v. Grant,245 the court ob-
served that in the federal court action in which suit to recover the land
was brought, the conservator was not a party and it was for that reason
that the court did not issue an order. It also 'observed that in the Heck-
man case 24 the Supreme Court authorized return of the considera-
tion as long as it did not contravene governmental policy, which is
accurate. In that case the Court indicated that had an exchange of lands
been involved, it would have required return of the land received by
the allottee. 247 The court could also consider the general resources of
the allottee and determine whether return of the consideration would
be so burdensome as to render the allottee dependent upon the United
States.248 So long as the allottee obtains the land and return of the
consideration is feasible, there is no reason why the court should not
require this as a condition to relief. Also, the approach in the Debell
case 29 is equally undesirable, since clue to the government's miscon-
duct, the allottee may lose the land. The practicability of conditional
relief and not the conduct of the government should be the criterion.
With respect to recovery for the improvements, a result dependent
upon the good faith of the improver in making the entry is highly im-
proper. The government should not be unjustly enriched even at the
expense of a wrongdoer, since again, the purpose of administering civil
relief is not to punish. On the other hand, the government should
not be burdened with improvements it does not want. In the Pan-
American case the Court observed that "it must be assumed that the
United States did not want the improvements made or was not ready
to bear the cost of making them." 250 Then, the United States should
have no objection to permitting the defendant to remove the improve-
244. 68 Stat. 1O51 (1954), 40 U.S.C. § 485(d) (1958). Generally, of course, all
monies collected by government officials must be turned over to the treasury. 9 Stat.
398 (1849), 31 U.S.C. § 484 (1958).
245. 204 Ore. 1o, 279 P.2d 479 (1955).
246. Heckman v. United States, supra note 227.
247. Ibid.
248. Consider for example an Indian who has become wealthy as a result of oil
being discovered on his land. He could then alienate other land and recover it
without returning the consideration, adding to his wealth.
249. United States v. Debell, supra note 232.
250. Pan-American Co. v. United States, supra note 237, at 510.
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ments if this is feasible, as is permitted in the case of a good faith tres-
pass.251 Moreover, if the government does not want the improvements,
then it may be asked why the government has not required the de-
fendant to remove them, which relief can be ordered against a tres-
passer. The same principles that it was suggested be applicable in the
case of a bad faith improvement to private property are equally ap-
plicable here-indeed, they may be more cogent, since the bad faith
is from the inception of the transaction rather than from the time of
knowledge of conflicting claims. If the government is making use of
the improvements or if they enhance the resale value of the land, then
the defendant should be permitted to set off their value. If an excess
is due, of course, he cannot recover unless there is a separate account
from which payment can be made. If the government does not want
the improvements, then clearly it can have no objection to the de-
fendant's removing them and should even require him to do so. When
it does not permit or seek removal,252 then this would seem to be
conclusive proof that the government wishes to make use of them. Since
it does, then it is unjustly enriched unless the defendant is at least
permitted to set off their value. In summary, it can be said that so long
as there is no interference with the governmental interest-the gov-
ernment must be able to recover public property wrongfully possessed
and cannot be charged with improvements not benefitting the public
-and it is feasible to impose conditional relief in the particular case,
the court should follow the approach it does when the good faith tres-
passer seeks recovery for improvements and grant conditional relief.
The good state of mind of the defendant is as equally irrelevant where
the government is involved as in a suit by a private person.
2. The statute of limitations and presumption of payment
The relationship of the lapse of time to the power of the court to
grant conditional relief must be considered in light of the concept of
a right without a remedy, which exists in our law. Without considering
the soundness of such an approach,2 3 it is simply noted that the court
in administering conditional relief must have regard for it. A true
statute of limitations-one which merely prevents enforceability of
the obligation-is only relevant to defensive relief. It seeks to prevent
suits due to lapse of time for policy reasons-those relating to stale
evidence and to the defendant's peace of mind. It does not mean that
the obligation is destroyed, as evidenced by the fact that the obligation
can be sued on in another jurisdiction with a longer statute. 254 There-
251. See United States v. Midway No. Oil Co., supra note 237.
252. This assumes removal is technically feasible without damage to the land.
253. Apparently this concept is limited to Anglo-American law.
254. This assumes that for purposes of the conflict of laws the statutes of limita-
tion of both the locus and the forum are characterized as "procedural" and that
there are no "borrowing statutes."
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fore, a general statute of limitations does not create a right to a judicial
declaration that the debt no longer exists, because under the substan-
tive law of the state it does exist. It is well-settled that the courts will
not entertain a suit to remove a debt or judgment as a cloud on title
where the sole basis for relief is that enforcement of the debt against
the obligor is barred by the statute of limitations, without requiring
payment of the debt as a condition to relief.25 5 This is merely the
court's method of obtaining payment and removing the cloud; the re-
sult is the same as where the plaintiff has paid previously. The real
basis of the decisions is that a debt unenforceable because of the statute
of limitations is not a cloud on title-unless paid, it is a subsisting obli-
gation, which happens to be unenforceable in the particular jurisdic-
tion. Here the distinction between affirmative and defensive relief is
to the nature of the grounds for relief and the substantive basis of the
claim. There simply is no right to any relief on the ground that the
debt is barred by the statute of limitations; there is a defense in a suit
on the debt, because the legislature has specifically authorized the de-
fense at that time. The heirs of the debtor are in no better position and
cannot obtain relief absent payment. 25 6
However, in Cunningham v. Davidoif,257 it was held that a non-
assuming grantee could have the mortgage removed as a cloud on his
title on the ground that enforcement of the debt against the mortgagor
was barred by the statute of limitations and presumption of payment
without being required to pay the debt. The court stated that the
plaintiff would not be required to "do equity," since he had not as-
sumed the debt and thus was under no "moral obligation" to pay it.
The decision is justifiable on grounds other than the moral nature of
the grantee's duty. Where the debtor is involved, the security is in-
distinguishable from the debt; the debtor's rights against the mort-
gagee are not enlarged by lapse of time. As long as he owes the debt,
the mortgage is an encumberance against his property which he cannot
remove. But when the property is transferred subject to the mortgage,
the property is encumbered, so far as the situs is concerned, only as
long as the debt is enforceable against the debtor there. The debtor no
longer has the property and could never bring an affirmative action to
have the mortgage removed as a cloud on his title; whenever sued at
the situs, he always has the defense of the statute of limitations. As
against the non-assuming grantee, the mortgagee's rights are destroyed
255. Olivero v. Rosano, 42 Cal. App.2d 740, 109 P.2d 976 (Dist Ct. App. 1941);
Hollings v. Hollings, 12 N.J. Super. 57, 78 A.2d 9s 9 (App. Div. ig5); House v. Carr,
185 N.Y. 453, 78 N.E. 17, (19o6); Tracy v. Wheeler & Scott, 15 N.D. 248, 107 N.W. 68(19o6); Nellis v. Minton, 91 Okla. 75, 216 Pac. 147 (1923). See also Larson v. First
State Bank of Vienna, 21 F.2d 936 (8th Cir. 1927); Hutchings v. Geistert, 311 Mich.
24, 18 N.W.2d 263 (1945); Anderson v. Purvis, 211 S.C. 255, 44 S.E.2d 611 (1947).
256. Nellis v. Minton, supra note 255.
257. 187 Md. 134, 46 A.2d 633 (1946).
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when he can no longer enforce the debt against the debtor at the situs.
The outstanding mortgage then constitutes a cloud on the grantee's
title, which he can remove. Whether payment of the debt as a condi-
tion to relief should be required is another question; it might be
argued that although he did not receive the money advanced to the
debtor, the purchase price was reduced because of the outstanding debt
and so, he should be required to pay the creditor. Such a requirement
would be one other than that the grantee was required to perform un-
der his contract with the debtor.25 Under the circumstances of a par-
ticular case, this might be proper. Generally, however, since the credi-
tor could have enforced his right against the debtor and the land
earlier, the case does not seem a proper one for conditional relief. In
any event, the difference in result between the cases involving the
debtor and a non-assuming grantee is due to the fact that the latter has
a substantive right which he is trying to enforce while the former does
not.
The general statute of limitations must be distinguished from a
statute which creates an affirmative right due to lapse of time in enforc-
ing a debt. A state may decide by legislation that the right as well as
the remedy should be extinguished by lapse of time. Under such stat-
utes the debt is destroyed, so the outstanding instrument does consti-
tute a cloud on title which the plaintiff should be permitted to remove.
The imposition of payment of the debt as a condition is improper,
since according to the legislature there is no debt. The court should
not use its power to grant conditional relief to revive an obligation
which the legislature has expressly declared no longer exists. Of course,
the court must interpret the particular statute, but once it decides that
it destroys the debt, then it should be immaterial whether affirmative
or defensive relief is involved. This was the approach followed in Bur-
roughs v. Burroughs.259 The statute provided that the lien was extin-
guished by lapse of time. The court construed this as authorizing an
action to quiet title by the debtor on that ground alone without re-
quiring payment of the mortgage debt, although in the absence of the
statute an action on those grounds could not be maintained. 20
On the same basis it was held in Huggins v. Johnston,261 that where
the statute authorizing contribution among joint tortfeasors barred an
action after a certain time, the right to contribution was destroyed and
the non-paying tortfeasor could enjoin actions by the other attempting
to obtain contribution, without being required to pay his share of the
original judgment as a condition to relief. Since the right was lost by
lapse of time-here was a right not recognized by the common law 262_
258. See discussion at notes 202-22 supra and accompanying text.
259. 196 Okla. 50, 162 P.2d 549 (1945).
26o. Nellis v. Minton, supra note 255.
261. 12o Tex. 21, 35 S.W.2d 688 (1931).
262. Where statutes of limitations affect claims unknown to the common law,
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rather than the right merely being unenforceable, the court would not
use its power to grant conditional relief to thwart the will of the legis-
lature. 263 Here, as in the cases involving general statutes of limitations,
the court's power to grant conditional relief must be considered in re-
lation to the substantive rights involved.
A presumption of payment falls somewhere in between a general
statute of limitations and one destroying the obligation. It represents
the recognition by the legislature that obligations may have been paid,
but the instrument representing the obligation has not been discharged.
Unlike a general statute of limitations it is not concerned with stale
evidence and does not attempt to be a statute of rest, since it does not
bar an action. In accord with the legislature's judgment as to human
experience, it merely says that it is unlikely that a party has been owed
an obligation for a certain time, has received no payment on it and has
taken no action. 264 It is unlike a statute destroying the right in that the
presumption can be rebutted and the right still enforced. It may then
be asked whether a plaintiff can sue to prevent the enforcement of a
debt or remove an instrument as a cloud on title on the basis of the
presumption of payment. Since payment would justify such an action
and under the statute payment is presumed, the existence of such a
statute should authorize the action. If an action on those grounds is
made conditional on the payment of the debt, then the plaintiff is not
given the benefit of the presumption. Such an approach would limit
the statute to a defensive remedy and the affirmative-defensive distinc-
tion would again be made. As indicated above, the presumption of pay-
ment is unlike a general statute of limitations in that it relates to the
right of the creditor to receive payment and not merely to his remedy
to enforce payment.
With this in mind the court in Downs v. Sooy,265 held that a plain-
tiff could enjoin foreclosure of a mortgage on the ground that payment
had not been made for the period prescribed by the statute without
paying the debt as a condition to relief. The court observed that he was
entitled to the presumption; if it was rebutted, then he was entitled
often the right-remedy distinction is not made, that is, lapse of time destroys the
right as well as the remedy. As a result, the claim cannot be enforced in anotherjurisdiction, since the statute of limitations of the locus is substantive for the pur-
pose of conflict of laws. See Hutchinson v. Ward, 192 N.Y. 375, 85 N.E. 390 (1908).
STUMBERG, CONFLICr OF LAWS 150 (2d ed. 1951).
263. But see Lesser v. Lesser, 134 Conn. 418, 58 A.2d 512 (1948). There the
statute authorized suit to quiet title where no payment had been made, but did not
expressly exclude equitable considerations. Although not requiring payment in the
instant case, the court said that it would apply a case-by-case approach. It indicated
that in a commercial transaction, as opposed to the family one involved there, it
might require payment. The burden should not be on the legislature to expressly
prohibit the court's using conditional relief to defeat the purpose of the statute.
264. Partial payment usually prevents operation of the presumption; the period
runs anew after the partial payment.
265. 28 N.J. Eq. 55 (Ch. 1877).
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to no relief substantively (he, of course, could pay the debt), but if not,
then-the mortgage was paid and the defendant would be enjoined from
foreclosing in the same manner as if a prior cash payment had been the
basis of the action.
However, a later case in the same jurisdiction 2 6 refused to enter-
tain an action to quiet title on the ground that the mortgage was pre-
sumed paid by lapse of time. It said that in Downs v. Sooy there were
factors present which were absent in the case at bar, but the court did
not elaborate. The cases seem indistinguishable, so apparently the
former case was overruled sub silentio. Also in Cunningham v. David-
o/f,267 where it was held that neither the general statue of limitations
nor the presumption of payment barred a non-assuming grantee, 26 8 the
court observed that ordinarily payment would be required against the
debtor even if the grounds were presumption of payment.
It is submitted that the reasoning of Downs v. Sooy is correct and
that courts that do not follow it overlook the distinction between the
presumption of payment and the general statute of limitations. The
former creates a substantive right, the latter a defensive remedy. By us-
ing its power to grant conditional relief, the court is really destroying
a right created by the legislature. Moreover, in the area of statutes of
limitations and presumptions of payment, as indicated previously, the
issue is not really one of conditional relief, though the courts talk in
those terms, but one of whether the plaintiff has an affirmative right.
It is hoped that the courts will not treat such problems as involving
conditional relief and not use its power to grant such relief to destroy
legislatively-created rights.
3. Minority and incompetency
The defenses of minority and incompetency are generally treated the
same in actions for affirmative relief as when they are asserted defen-
sively.269 The courts have not used their power to grant conditional re-
lief to defeat the legislative policy protecting such persons. As the court
observed in More v. More,2 70 in setting aside a deed by an incompetent
without requiring return of the consideration:
The court may refuse to exercise the power (to rescind), in certain
cases, for failure of the injured party to avail himself of his right to
rescind, but not in a case like this, where the injured party was unable
266. Hollings v. Hollings, supra note 255.
267. Supra note 257.
a68. See the discussion at note 257 supra and accompanying text.
269. See Wiggins Estate Co. v. Jeffery, 246 Ala. 183, 19 So.2d 769 ('944); Boyd
v. Lancaster, 56 Cal. App.2d 1o3, 132 P.2d 214 (Dist. Ct. App 1942); Sparks v. Sparks,
lO Cal. App.2d 129, 225 P.2d 238 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950); Newton v. Erickson, 73 S.D.
228, 41 N.W.2d 545 (1950) (alternative holding); Branton v. Inks, 149 S.W.2d 667
(Tex. Civ. App. 1941); Cf., Shaw v. Meyer-Kiser Bank, 199 Ind. 687, 156 N.E. 552
(1927).
270. 133 Cal. 489, 65 Pac. 1044, 1O46 (19o).
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to pay back the money, and his inability was the natural, and, as such,
to be anticipated, result of the act of the defendants in advancing
money to a person so irresponsible; where, also, the same influences
that made it practicable to defraud him would deter him from seeking
relief from the fraud.
In this area the court recognizes the substantive basis of protection of
such persons and does not use its power to grant conditional relief to
defeat the underlying policy. Protection is fully afforded whether af-
firmative or defensive relief is sought. As indicated by both past and
subsequent discussion, the courts do not always follow this approach
in other areas.
4. Homestead exemptions
One of those areas is that of homestead exemptions. Whether legis-
lative protection to the homestead is fully afforded by the courts may
well depend on whether the claim of homestead is asserted as a defense
or whether the right must be protected affirmatively, in which case the
benefit is not given. The refusal to give the benefit is based on the
court's power to award conditional relief. States have protected home-
steads in various ways, such as preventing their alienation or encum-
brance either absolutely or only under prescribed procedures, or by
rendering them immune from judgments. Thus, it would be a defense
to any action involving contracts to sell or encumber homestead prop-
erty that such property is protected. The question arises as to whether
the same protection is afforded when the owners seek affirmative relief
from the improvidence against which the legislature sought to protect
them.
Some cases have extended the full protection and have not imposed
the requirement of conditional relief to defeat the homestead claim.
In Young v. Ashley, 271 the husband and wife were permitted to enjoin
the cutting of timber on the land pursuant to a lease given in violation
of the homestead statute without being required to return the consid-
eration given for the contract. In Lucci v. United Credit & Collection
Co.,2 72 where the statute exempted homestead from execution, the court
ordered an execution sale set aside without the requirement that the
plaintiff pay the amount of the judgment, though absent the fact that
a homestead was involved, payment would be required.2 7 3 And in
Moore v. Glasscock27 4 the owners were permitted to have a deed de-
clared a mortgage on a homestead and thus void without tendering the
amount of the debt secured by the mortgage.27 5 The rationale of these
271. 123 Miss. 693, 86 So. 458 (1920).
272. 220 Cal. 492, 31 P.2d 369 (1934).
273. See the discussion at notes 19o-201 supra and accompanying text.
274. 217 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
275. The court assumed that if homestead property were not involved, a tender
would be required, even though the owner was asserting a defense.
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cases is best explained by the following language from Young v. Ash-
ley: 276
It would be a vain and useless thing to require the wife's signature to
a conveyance of the homestead if the husband can by his sole contract
preclude himself and his wife from resorting to equity to protect it.
Against many persons injunction will be the only effectual relief for
the protection of the homestead. The maxim that "he who seeks equity
must do equity" was not designed to overturn the beneficent public
policy of the homestead law or to overturn the settled policy of legisla-
tive enactments in the furtherance of public welfare.
Other courts, however, have assumed the very point which this lan-
guage emphasizes-that the court's power to grant conditional relief
in an "equitable action" supersedes legislative policy, or that legisla-
lative policy was not intended to limit that power. Thus, in Alston v.
Alston,27 7 the court held that the wife could not set aside a contract
made by the husband that assigned homestead rights in violation of
statute without reimbursing the assignees for payments made on the
contract. Also, in Jones v. First Nat'l Bank of Ashland27 8 the husband
and wife were not permitted to cancel a mortgage on homestead prop-
erty due to non-compliance with the statute, without returning any-
thing received on the security of the mortgage.279 It is interesting to
note that the same court refused to require the wife to return monies
advanced on security of the mortgage where she was not a party to the
original transaction and did not receive the benefits. 28 0 Despite lan-
guage indicating high regard for legislative policy, 28' the court is bas-
ing its decision on standard applications of principles of conditional
relief and ignores the underlying purpose of the statute.
It is submitted that in no case should the party be deprived of the
276. Supra note 271, at 702, 86 So. at 459.
277. io6 Neb. 623, 184 N.W. 82 (1921).
278. 236 Ala. 6o6, 184 So. 168 (1938).
279. See also Matthews v. J. S. Caroll Mercantile Co., 195 Ala. 501, 70 So. 143
(1915).
280. Leonard v. Whitman, 249 Ala. 205, 30 So.2d 241 (1947). Had the husband
sued, he would have been required to return the consideration. Grider v. American
F.L.M. Co., 99 Ala. 281, 12 So. 775 (1893). See also Estes v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 232 Ala. 656, 169 So. 316 (1936).
281. In the Leonard case, supra note 28o, the court observed:
The homestead rights are designed to protect helpless women and children
from the improvident acts of an improvident husband. They are founded in a
wise public policy, the State deeming it better that wives and children should
have shelter and a place to live than that a creditor should have his debt, un-
less he secures that debt by obtaining the wife's separate acknowledgement.
We hold that the doctrine that he who seeks equity must do equity has no
application whatever to the case made by the bill filed in this proceeding. To
so hold would be a mockery of the constitutional and statutory provisions
relating to the homestead rights of a wife and would be a perversion of that
equitable maxim.
Id. at 209, 3o So.2d at 244.
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benefits of the homestead statute due to inability to restore the con-
sideration or otherwise furnish conditional relief. Just as in the case of
infants and incompetents and as suggested in cases involving allottees
of governmental land 28 2 if the plaintiff can restore the consideration,
then, of course, this should be required in order to prevent unjust en-
richment, since the legislature has not provided for forfeiture of the
sums advanced. If the other party sued to enforce the contract, the de-
fense of homestead could be asserted without the requirement of return
of the consideration. The other party would be entitled to a judgment
for any sums advanced as restitutionary damages, but would be left to
means of execution other than levying on homestead. In such a case
the parties would retain the homestead as the legislature intended.
The result should be no different, because the parties have to seek
affirmative relief. They must regain full rights in the homestead and
should be required to return the consideration only if they have it. If
they do not, then this is the price that the legislature has determined
the other party must pay due to the need to protect homestead inter-
ests. The owners must retain full homestead rights, because the legis-
lature has so provided and did not make protection of those rights de-
pend on whether the owners resorted to affirmative or defensive relief
to protect them.
5. Usury statutes
Here, probably more so than in any other area, the result according
to many courts, will depend on whether the debtor is seeking affirma-
tive or defensive relief. And the basis of the distinction is that since
affirmative relief is almost always "equitable," and "he who seeks equity
must do equity,"-the maxim these courts believe to furnish the basis
of their power to grant conditional relief-the court can refuse to give
him the benefits of the statute and require him to pay the debt and
legal interest irrespective of the statutory provisions. Usury statutes are
basically of three types: (i) forfeiture only of the usurious interest; (2)
forfeiture of all interest; (3) forfeiture of all interest and all or part of
principal. Since the most a court requires as a condition to relief is
that the plaintiff pay the debt and the legal interest, the result in the
first type of statute will not depend on whether the debtor seeks af-
firmative or defensive relief. The questions presented then are when a
party seeking affirmative relief against a usurious transaction can avoid
payment of the legal interest when the statute provides for its for-
feiture and when he can get the benefit of statutory penalties for usury,
resulting in forfeiture of all or part of principal. It should also be
noted that as a practical matter, whenever the debtor has given se-
282. See the discussion of Indian allottees at note 248 supra and accompanying
text.
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curity for the usurious debt, he will invariably have to seek affirmative
relief to avoid the effect of the transaction. For example, if he has given
a mortgage or other security interest, the outstanding interest will
cloud his title and impair vendibility. It should also be noted that the
plaintiff will always have to pay what is due under the statute as a
condition to relief.2&3
With respect to payment of legal interest, payment has been required
by some courts despite the provisions of the statute declaring that the
lender is not entitled to such interest.28 Other courts have granted re-
lief without requiring payment of that interest, in reliance on the statu-
tory provisions in identical situations. 8 1 The particular type of af-
firmative relief sought does not affect the court's decision as to whether
to apply the statute. The courts are equally divided as to statutory for-
feitures of all or part of principal. 28 6 It is interesting to note that al-
though some courts apply contrary approaches depending on whether
the avoidance of legal interest of the claiming of statutory benefits is
involved,287 the majority of the courts passing on both questions have
283. This is simply an application of the general principle that where something
is owing, the party must pay that in order to obtain relief.
284. Abeloff v. Ohio Fin. Co., 313 Mich. 568, 2 1 N.W.2d 856 (1946); C. D. Kenny
Co. v. Hinton Hotel Co., 2o8 N.C. 295, 18o S.E. 697 (1935); Johnston v. American
Fin. Corp., 182 Okla. 567, 79 P.2d 242 (1938); Crisman v. Corbin, 169 Ore. 332,
128 P.2d 959 (1942); Poff v. Rollinsford Say. Bank, 105 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. Civ. App.
1937); Vanasse v. Esterman, 147 Wash. 3oo, 265 Pac. 738 (1928).
285. Lewis v. Hickman, 2oo Ala. 672, 77 So. 46 (1917); Scott v. Austin, 36 Minn.
460, 32 N.W. 864 (1887); Person v. Mattson, 33 N.D. 49, 156 N.W. 780 (1916); St.
Germain v. Lapp, 72 R.I. 42, 48 A.2d 181 (1946).
286. Plaintiff entitled to benefit of statute: Davis v. Elba Bank & Trust Co., 216
Ala. 632, 114 So. 211 (1927); Richter Jewelry Co. v. Schweinert, 125 Fla. 199, 169
So. 750 (1936); Scott v. Austin, supra note 285; McNish v. General Credit Corp.,
164 Neb. 526, 83 N.W.2d 1 (1957); Yowack v. Emery, 118 Tex. 224, 13 S.W.2d 667
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929). Plaintiff not entitled to benefit of statute: Buchanan v. Caro-
lina Mortgage Co., 213 N.C. 247, 195 S.E. 787 (1938); Kenny v. Hinton Hotel, supra
note 284; Johnston v. American Fin. Corp., supra note 284; Crisman v. Corbin,
supra note 284; St. Germain v. Lapp, supra note 285; Goodwin Co. v. National Dis-
count Corp., 5 Wash.2d 521, 1o5 P.2d 8o5 (1940). Some cases have involved im-
proper results based on automatic extensions of concepts. In the McNish case the
court held that the conditional vendee (lid not have to return the chattel as a
condition to relief, though the statute provided only for forfeiture of principal and
interest on a loan. Since it did not provide for forfeiture of chattels under condi-
tional sales contracts, this aspect of the decision is an unwarranted extension of the
principle. In Patterson v. Wyman, 142 Minn. 70, 17o N.W. 928 (1919), the court
refused to enforce the provisions of the usury statute of a sister state, since penalty
provisions are unenforceable extraterritorially. It also refused to enforce the pro-
visions of its own statute, otherwise applicable, since the note was payable else-
where. Thus, the plaintiff did not get the benefit of statutory penalties provided by
both the statutes of the locus and the forum.
287. St. Germain v. Lapp, supra note 285. See the critical discussion at note 294
infra and accompanying text. The Texas courts may also be following this ap-
proach in the opposite direction-plaintiff can get benefit of penalties, but must
pay interest. Compare Yowack v. Emery, supra note 286, with Poff v. Rollinford
Say. Bank, supra note 284. It may be that the Poff case was incorrectly decided in
view of the precedent of the higher court.
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arrived at the same result: the borrower can take advantage of both
provisions or neither.28
It is submitted that the reason for the split is the particular court's
attitude as to whether legislation dealing with usury was written in
light of the distinction between affirmative and defensive, really legal
and equitable, relief. Moreover, some courts denying the benefits of
the statute still consider themselves "courts of equity" and must then
combine the maxims, "he who seeks equity must do equity" and
"equity abhors a forfeiture" in order to protect the lender against the
command of the legislature, even though the legislation is constitu-
tional. This may also be the device the courts employ to deny full effect
to usury statutes with which they are not in sympathy.
The language and ratio decidendi of the decisions are most illustra-
tive of the contrasting approaches the courts take. Thus, the court in
Vanasse v. Esterman,289 found the statute inapplicable in a proceeding
by the borrower to obtain affirmative relief, observing: "The statute
does not fit this case. It applies where one to whom the usurious con-
tract runs becomes plaintiff in an action on the contract to recover
against the other party to the contract. This is not a proceeding to en-
force an alleged usurious agreement, but a suit by the promissor asking
affirmative aid of equity, which he can only obtain by doing equity."
The court in Johnston v. American Fin. Corp.,290 also observed that
"equity abhorred a forfeiture," and that therefore, the statute was lim-
ited to "legal actions," where the borrower was not seeking affirmative
equitable relief. Another way is to put the burden on the legislature.
This was the approach of the court in Crisman v. Corbin,21 where it
was held that unless the statute expressly prohibited the court from
imposing conditional relief and requiring that the borrower "do
equity," the statute would be construed as authorizing that type of re-
lief. The court also applied the rule of construction that "statutes in
derogation of the common law and penal statutes are to be strictly con-
strued." 292 It must be assumed then that whenever the legislature en-
acts a statute under its police power to regulate economic matters, it
keeps in mind the distinction between legal and equitable relief, even
288. North Carolina: C. D. Kenny Co. v. Hinton Hotel Co., supra note 284;
Buchanan v. Carolina Mortgage Co., supra note 286. Alabama: Lewis v. Hickman,
supra note 285; Davis v. Elba Bank, supra note 286. Oklahoma: Johnston v. Amer-
ican Fin. Corp. supra note 284. Oregon: Crisman v. Corbin, supra note 284. Wash-
ington: Vanasse v. Esterman, supra note 284; Goodwin Co. v. National Discount
Corp., supra note 286.
289. 147 Wash. at 301, 265 Pac. at 738.
'290. 182 Okla. at 569, 79 P.2d at 245.
291. Supra note 284.
292. See also Turner v. Merchant's Bank, 126 Ala. 397, 28 So. 469 (0oo), where
the statute only provided criminal sanctions. Where the. statute provided civil
remedies, the plaintiff was held entitled to them. Lewis v. Hickman, supra note
285; Davis v. Elba Bank, supra note 286. The proper approach was followed under
each statute.
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though law and equity have been mergedl Where the court clearly
ignores the legislative mandate, as in St. Germain v. Lapp,293 the
court differentiates between the requirement to pay legal interest and
forfeiture of all or part of principal. The statute expressly provided
that the lender was to forfeit principal and interest. Since the plaintiff
sought equitable relief, this determination was not found to be bind-
ing on the court, which held that the plaintiff was entitled only to
avoid payment of the interest. The court observed: "A court of equity,
however, ought to differentiate between those two deprivations ...
To require the borrower to return the amount of the money loaned
is unquestionably equitable and is not without a moral base. Such a
rule is consistent with equity's aversion to penalties and especially its
tendency to look with stern disfavor upon forfeitures and to relieve
against them." 294 The court ignores that the legislature as well as the
courts may decide what is "equitable" and what is "moral." The court
should not refuse to enforce a legislative policy that it considers "in-
equitable." The legislative determination that protection of certain
interests justifies "inequitable results" and "forfeitures" must be re-
spected so long as that determination is constitutional.
The language and reasoning of the court in Richter Jewelry Co. v.
Schweinert,2 5 where the court did apply the statutory provisions pro-
viding for non-payment of interest and forfeiture of principal, al-
though the borrower sought "affirmative equitable relief," is far more
persuasive, as it recognizes the proper relationship between the courts
and the legislature and does not make application of legislative policy
dependent upon the nature of the relief sought. The court emphasized
that it could not ignore legislative policy so long as the statute was
constitutional. It also noted that the legislature could limit the court's
power to impose conditional relief just as it could limit its power to
grant any other type of relief. The court observed:
Therefore, when a suit is brought by the borrower to cancel such a con-
tract and require the surrender of the security, there is no legal or equi-
table duty resting upon the borrower to offer to return any part of the
money loaned. It must be conceded that this statute is a harsh and
rigorous statute, but the legislature was dealing with a harsh and some-
times unscrupulous business . . . and evidently resorted to these meas-
ures to protect unfortunate and necessitous borrowers.2 96
Basically, then, the result in such cases depends on whether the court
will recognize that when the legislature is concerned with regulating
economic interests, it is not concerned with distinctions relating to the
type of relief sought. Unless the legislature expressly makes the dis-
293. Supra note 285.
294. Id. at 52, 48 A.2d at i86.
295. Supra note 286.
296. Id. at 220-21, 169 So. at 759.
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tinction, the court should not. The borrower should always receive the
benefits given by the usury statute irrespective of the type of relief he
seeks. Otherwise, the lender can completely frustrate the policy of the
statute by requiring the giving of security, since the borrower must re-
sort to affirmative relief in "the court of equity" to obtain its return.
It is hoped that the courts will realize that here, as elsewhere, its power
to grant conditional relief should not be used to frustrate legislative
policy. The implementation of such policy should not depend on the
type of remedy to which, under the circumstances, the borrower must
resort. When the courts realize this essential fact, they will give the
borrower the full benefit of the usury statutes. The legislature as well
as the courts may decide what constitutes a "just result," and when that
determination is constitutional, the courts must honor it. Justice is not
accomplished by thwarting constitutional legislative policy.
6. Improper conduct of the defendant
The question presented in this area is when the defendant's own
conduct bars him from obtaining conditional relief, though absent
such conduct the case would be a proper one for its imposition. The
court will not permit the defendant to obtain the benefits of a transac-
tion where his improper conduct would bar him from maintaining an
independent action for them. It is interesting to note that where legis-
lative policy is not involved, the courts will not permit their power to
grant conditional relief to be used- to enable the defendant to obtain
illegal benefits.
This principle has often been applied against breaching fiduciaries
such as attorneys and corporate directors. In Warner v. Flack,29 7 a cli-
ent sued to set aside a deed given to his attorney in partial payment
for services. Originally the parties had entered into a type of contingent
fee relationship that was illegal. As a condition to recission the client,
of course, was required to return the actual consideration received for
the property, but was not required to abide by the contingent fee ar-
rangement, though it formed the basis for part of the transfer. Since the
attorney could not have recovered the contingent fee in an independent
action due to its illegality, the court would not give him the benefits
of the illegal agreement under its power to condition relief. So too, in
Sullivan v. Morey,298 where the plaintiff sued to cancel notes and mort-
gages given to an attorney who had defended him in criminal pro-
ceedings as security for payment for services, relief was conditioned
on payment for legitimate services, but no restitution was required to
the extent that it would reimburse the attorney for hypothecating bail
bonds.
297. 278 Ill. 303, 116 N.E. 197 (1917).
298. 326 Ill. App. 553, 62 N.E.2d 483 (1945).
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Moreover, the court will not hesitate to effect a forfeiture of even
the reasonable value of the services, where under the substantive law
the attorneys are not entitled to any compensation because of their
wrongful conduct. In East T. & W.N.C. Ry. v. Robinson,2 99 the at-
torneys, who were also officers of the railroad, entered into an illegal
agreement to represent it in seeking fare increases. The fees were to be
divided with other officers who were not lawyers. Although the increase
was granted, the new management refused to pay the fees. The attor-
neys sued to recover the fees in the law court-the state was still under
a separate system-and the railroad sued in the chancery court to en-
join the action. The injunction was granted unconditionally; the court
refused to condition relief upon payment to the attorneys of the rea-
sonable value of their services. Since the agreement was unlawful, and
further, they had engaged in fee-splitting with a layman, under the
substantive law they were not entitled to any compensation. In effect
they were barred by their conduct from seeking conditional relief just
as they would have been barred from seeking affirmative relief.300 The
main thrust of the decision, however, was that the contract was unen-
forceable on policy grounds, and, therefore, could not be made the
basis of conditional relief. The court stated: "We prefer to plant our
decision upon the ground that the contract, having been obtained by
fraud and concealment of material facts, is void; and that the defend-
ants, having violated the trust and confidence reposed in them . . .
are in equity'and good conscience entitled to nothing for their serv-
ices." 301
On the same reasoning it was held in Evans v. Ideal Brick & Brick-
crete Mfg. Co., 302 that a corporation seeking to cancel a sale of stock
to a director for less than a par value, which sales were prohibited by
constitutional provision, was not required to return the consideration
received as a condition to relief. Since the transaction was completely
void, the director could not have recovered the consideration in an
independent action. Note that the improper conduct as such does not
bar the defendant from obtaining conditional relief; he is not being
"punished" in that sense. Rather, there is no substantive right to the
return of the consideration because of the nature of the transaction and
the defendant's fiduciary character. Although it has been submitted
that good faith-bad faith distinctions should not be used except where
absolutely necessary to determine the propriety of conditional re-
lief,303 there can be no objection to requiring a different standard of
299. 19 Tenn. App. 265, 86 S.W.2d 433 (935).
3oo. The court observed that the result would have been the same if the de-
fendants had been the plaintiff in the equity suit-the doctrine was inapplicable to
enforce a non-existent right.
301. East T. & W.N.C. Ry., supra note 299, at 277, 86 S.W.2d at 440.
302. 287 P.2d 454 (Okla. 1955).
303. See the previous discussion on recovery for improvements.
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conduct on the part of fiduciaries than of others in order to protect
certain policies. Without considering the soundness of the substantive
rule, the important consideration is that the substantive rule is not
altered merely because relief can be given under the guise of a condi-
tional decree.304
However, in some instances the court has seized upon the fiduciary
relationship as such to refuse to grant conditional relief despite the
absence of conflicting policies and a substantive rule denying relief to
fiduciaries. For example, in Cawthon v. Cockell,305 the court held that
an agent who procured a deed from the principal by fraudulent repre-
sentations was not entitled to reimbursement for the payment of taxes
and the making of valuable improvements in a suit by the principal
to recover the property. Such a decision seems erroneous, since here
the agent is in no different position than any other party who obtained
property by fraud. The grounds of relief do not relate to the breach
of the fiduciary relationship as such-even though what constitutes
fraud may vary because of the relationship. This is simply a case of
rescission for fraud and no policy is adversely affected by the granting
of conditional relief. It is hoped that the courts will realize the dis-
tinction between the cases where the breach of the fiduciary relation-
ship destroys the substantive right of the fiduciary to any relief and
those where, although the defendant happens to be a fiduciary, the
transaction would be equally voidable if a non-fiduciary were involved.
The result in a case such as Stephenson v. Golden,30 may be more
justifiable, though there, interestingly enough, the court required re-
turn of the consideration while denying reimbursement for improve-
ments. Here the grounds of recission involved conduct that would
render the transaction voidable only as to a fiduciary, namely that he
acquired property he was to purchase for the principal for his own
use. The result depended on the substantive law of agency, which pro-
vides that a defaulting agent can only recover the purchase price paid.
While the soundness of such a rule may be questioned, particularly
since the principal gets the value of the improvements,07 nonetheless,
the court may have believed that such a result was necessary in order
to protect against improper conduct by fiduciaries. In any event, the
case was not one where the fiduciary was in no different position than
another wrongful party-there was a wrong only because he was a
fiduciary. The court should always be careful so as not to deny condi-
304. See also Mortgage Land Inv. Co. v. McMains, 172 Minn. 110, 215 N.W. 192(1927), where a corporation was not required to return the consideration to direc-
tors who wrongfully issued stock to themselves or to compensate them for legal
services for which the stock was purportedly payment.
305. 121 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938).
306. 279 Mich. 710, 276 N.W. 849 (1937).
307. Again unjust enrichment results because of the character of the denfendant's
action.
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tional relief to a fiduciary where the same conduct by a non-fiduciary
would be equally improper.
Another class of cases involves conduct by the individual defendant
with respect to the transaction which will cause the court to refuse
conditional relief. Again, since a court administering civil relief should
not "punish" improper conduct, a strong public interest should have
to be adversely affected by the granting of relief before a court should
refuse it on those grounds. On the other hand, there may be circum-
stances where a party by his conduct chooses to "waive" certain bene-
fits in hopes of gaining still greater ones, and when he fails to obtain
them, seeks the former as a condition to relief granted against him.
Where a party has chosen not to take certain benefits in hopes of gain-
ing others by improper conduct, it seems proper on policy grounds to
deny him conditional relief securing the former benefits; otherwise he
has a guarantee that he will gain something from the very conduct that
is improper. This factor must be weighed against the possibility of the
plaintiff's being unjustly enriched if conditional relief is denied.
One of the best examples of improper conduct having an adverse
effect on a strong public interest and justifying a denial of conditional
relief would be an abuse of corporate power. Thus, in Thompson v.
Davis,308 a corporation which executed an unauthorized mortgage, pur-
chased the property at foreclosure and sold the property to a stranger
prior to the court's reversal of the foreclosure decree, was not entitled
to reimbursement of the proceeds from the sale in a suit by the mort-
gagee. The need to insure that corporations complied with limitations
on their power justified the court's refusal to impose conditional relief
against the mortgagee. It must be remembered that at times unjust
enrichment must be necessary to enable the state to accomplish a par-
ticular policy. It is one thing for the courts to "punish" by refusing
conditional relief: it is another to determine that it is in the public in-
terest that no benefits, even compensable ones, be derived from certain
illegal transactions.30 9 Another strong interest would be the preserva-
tion of the integrity of the marital relationship. On that basis, in Pat-
terson v. Patterson,310 where the wife conveyed property to the husband
on his representation that he would abandon a paramour, but, with the
intent to violate the agreement, he continued to live with the paramour
and conveyed the property to her, the wife was not required to reim-
burse the paramour for the monies she paid to the husband in the
wife's suit to regain the property. The court could have based its de-
cision on the ground that the plaintiff did not receive any of the con-
sideration, but instead took the position that since the paramour and
3o8. 297 Ill. 11, 130 N.E. 455 (1921).
3o9. This is what the court does when it refuses enforcement of contracts as to
expectancy interests on grounds of illegality. The parties are left to adjust differ-
ences among themselves.
31o. 47 Cal. App. 362, igo Pac. 483 (Dist. Ct. App. 192o).
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husband were both parties to the fraud, they would have to adjust ac-
counts among themselves.
The difficulty of drawing the line as to when the injury to the public
interest is such as to justify the refusal of conditional relief despite
the resulting unjust enrichment is indicated by a comparison of two
cases involving services rendered in connection with an improper trans-
action. In Tuttle v. Wyman,311 it was held that where a client dis-
missed the claim in violation of his agreement with an attorney in
order to defeat the latter's right to a legitimate contingent fee, in the
attorney's suit to enforce a constructive trust in the promised realty,
he was not required as a condition to relief, to reimburse the defendant
for services rendered on behalf of the property. But in East & West
Coast Serv. Corp. v. Papahagis,312 where the manager of plaintiff's
checking concession in a hotel obtained the concession for himself in
violation of an agreement to renew it for the plaintiff, in the plaintiff's
suit for an accounting, the manager was entitled to deduct the ex-
penses made in procuring and maintaining the concession and a reason-
able allowance for his managerial services during that time. In neither
case does the injury to the public interest seem so great as to justify a
denial of conditional relief. The party who settled a case in order to
defraud his attorney seems no different from the ordinary wrongdoer
and should not be denied conditional relief because of his conduct.
The most interesting cases are those where the defendant can be
said to have waived his right to conditional relief by choosing to gain
greater benefits from improper conduct. It seems unjust to give the
defendant reimbursement for actions taken pursuant to an improper
scheme, or where he has spurned the same benefits he is now seeking
when proffered previously, in an effort to obtain more. On the other
hand, the fact does remain that the plaintiff may be unjustly enriched
by the failure to order conditional relief.
An example of "spurned benefits" occurred in Nugent v. Stofella.313
The plaintiff purchased mortgaged property and attempted to pay the
debt to the mortgagee. The mortgagee avoided him and procured title
himself under an improper foreclosure sale. The plaintiff was per-
mitted to quiet title in himself and was not required to pay the mort-
gage as a condition to relief. The court stated that it would not protect
a fraudulent party where he fared badly in his venture. It also ob-
served that if it required payment, the defendant might even be better
off than he would have been if he had successfully obtained the prop-
erty. The case is difficult, since as the court admitted, the plaintiff was
unjustly enriched. Still, unjust enrichment is not a universal vice if
other policies are fostered by permitting it in certain instances. It does
311. 149 Neb. 769, 32 N.W.2d 742 (1948).
312. 344 Pa. 183, 25 A.2d 339 (1942).
313. o Ariz. 151, 84 Pac. 91o (19o6).
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not seem wise to allow a party to refuse a benefit, fraudulently attempt
to get more, and when he has been unsuccessful, seek to regain the
original benefit. It-is proper to say that the mortgagee waived his right
to payment of the mortgage when he rejected it. He chose to rely on
his ability to obtain the land; when that failed, there was nothing left
to be given to him. Here, unjust enrichment must be balanced against
the harm in giving a guarantee to a party perpetuating a wrong that
he will receive some benefit even if unsuccessful. When that is con-
sidered, the result seems correct.
In Sketchley v. Lipkin, 14 the plaintiff developed a device for clean-
ing sewers and communicated the knowledge to the defendant, his son-
in-law, who in turn promised to reduce their agreement, to manufacture
and sell the machine, to writing and to carry it out. Instead, he proceeded
to manufacture and market the machine himself. In the plaintiff's suit
to enjoin him from doing so, it was held that the defendant was not
entitled to reimbursement for money invested in the construction of
the machine, even though the machine was taken by the plaintiff. Here,
the defendant chose not to rely on the agreement, but rather attempted
to gain the benefits through independent action, ignoring the agree-
ment. The plaintiff's action was not to rescind an agreement that was
being carried out by the defendant. Moreover, the plaintiff had to
take the machine to prevent its use by the defendant. With respect to
the defendant's claim for reimbursement the court observed:
Such reasoning involves the erroneous notion that if a wrongdoer were
apprehended in the act of stealing his neighbor's herds after he had
driven them 5oo miles toward the market he would be liable for their
restoration only on condition that the neighbor reimburse him for the
amounts expended on the long journey.315
The same principle was applied in Peoples First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. v. Ratajski. 16 The decedent's niece had taken care of him for some
time with the intention, as the court found, of obtaining all his prop-
erty. She succeeded in doing so through fraudulent representations
and undue influence. In an action by the administrator to set aside the
inter vivos transfers, the court held that the niece was not entitled to
reimbursement as a condition to relief. The services were in further-
ance of a scheme to enrich herself and were undertaken on a gamble-
if she were successful, she would obtain his property. There was no
implied promise on the decedent's part to pay for the services; for all
he knew she intended them as a gift. The unjust enrichment does not
appear improper, since an opposite result would be to change the na-
ture of the services from those rendered in the hopes of obtaining
property to those rendered under an implied obligation to pay.
314. 99 Cal. App.2d 849, 222 P.2d 927 (Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
315. Id. at 856, 222 P.2d at 932.
316. 399 Pa. 419, 16o A.2d 451 (196o).
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In this area, the only concern is that the courts not use the defend-
ant's conduct to justify a refusal to grant conditional relief unless such
conduct adversely affects some substantial public interest or was part
of an improper plan to obtain future benefits. The court should be
certain that either of these situations is present before refusing con-
ditional relief due to the conduct of the defendant.
7. Inability to restore the status quo upon rescission
The general rule is that a party cannot rescind if he is unable .or un-
willing to restore the status quo by returning the consideration received;
but in certain instances the plaintiff may obtain relief despite such in-
ability.
Assuming that the consideration was received by the plaintiff and
was of benefit to him, that is, restoration is affirmatively required, 17
he will be excused if the restoration was rendered impossible due to
the defendant's conduct. These cases are fairly obvious. In Brown v.
Norman,318 for example, where the plaintiff exchanged land for the
defendant's interest in a partnership and the transaction forced dissolu-
tion of the partnership under the original articles, the plaintiff could
obtain rescission, though the defendant could not be restored to the
partnership, which had ceased to exist. The defendant's own act, as he
knew, rendered restoration impossible. He must bear the loss rather
than that the plaintiff be denied the opportunity to rescind. In Merri-
field v. McClay,319 where the seller refused to take back the horse upon
the buyer's justifiable offer to rescind and the buyer left it at a livery
stable at the seller's expense, where it was sold for the feed bill, the
buyer was entitled to rescission. The same principle may be applicable
where the defendant is not necessarily guilty of any act rendering
restoration impossible, but the inability to restore is not the fault of
the plaintiff. This was evidenced in Long v. Calloway,3 20 where the
defendant exchanged his interest in a mineral lease for the plaintiff's
land. Upon plaintiff's accession to the interest, the other lessees sued
for partition, to which the defendant was a party. The interest was sold
by judicial decree and the defendant received his share of the proceeds.
The court held that the plaintiff could rescind, although the defendant
could not get back the oil and gas lease in specie.
Where the inability to restore the status quo is due to the plaintiff's
actions-generally, disposing of the consideration he received-whether
317. This also assumes that restoration is not excused on policy grounds, e.g.,
usury.
Pi8. 65 Miss. 369, 4 So. 293 (1888).
319. 72 Ore. 9o , 142 Pac. 587 (1914).
320. 220 S.W. 414 (Tex. Civ. App. 19i2o).
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the plaintiff can obtain rescission is dependent on whether he can fur-
nish substituted redress; if this is feasible, rescission is permitted,
though the status quo cannot be restored in specie. The easiest situation
is where the payment of money will adequately compensate the defend-
ant. On that basis rescission of the purchase of an oil lease was per-
mitted, even though the plaintiff had disposed of some of the oil, upon
payment of its value.321 Also, a purchaser of a business could rescind,
though he had sold some of the goods and others had been damaged,
since the court could deduct the value of the goods from the purchase
price ordered to be returned.3 22 Where the only consideration flowing
to the plaintiff was money and he has transferred goods in exchange,
he can obtain rescission, though he cannot return the money; the goods
will be sold, the price deducted, and the balance given to the plain-
tiff.3 23 By the same token, where different property of the kind disposed
of can be returned in specie, this is permitted. The best example is
corporate stock; where a party seeks to rescind a sale of stock, but has
disposed of the stock, he can obtain rescission by returning the equiva-
lent class of stock in the same corporation, since shares represent only
an aliquot interest in the corporation. 324
In some cases, however, the court must issue a more complex decree
in order to substantially restore the status quo and will do so when-
ever possible. Even if there is some doubt as to the efficacy of the decree,
it should be resolved against the defendant, since he is the wrongdoer.
In situations such as this that fact becomes most relevant.325
In William Whitman Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co.,3 26 the plain-
tiff sued to rescind settlement of a suit on the ground that he had been
induced to settle because of a court judgment affirming the validity of
the defendant's patent, which judgment was later vacated, because the
defendant had bribed the judge. The plaintiff did receive certain
benefits because of the settlement, which were the discontinuance of
an existing infringement suit against it by the defendant, settlement
of another suit by a third party against the plaintiff, and the use of
the defendant's services and patents for a number of years. The court
ordered rescission despite the defendant's claim that restoration of the
status quo was impossible. Under the terms of the decree the plaintiff
was entitled to recover the difference between the amount it paid to
the defendant as royalties under the settlement agreement and the
321. Basye v. Paola Ref. Co., 79 Kan. 755, ioi Pac. 658 (1909).
322. Bellefeuille v. Medeiros, 335 Mass. 262, 139 N.E.2d 413 (1957). This is also
applicable where the plaintiff received a negotiable instrument. Harnden v. Had-
field, 113 Kan. 525, 215 Pac. 441 (1923).
323. Thackrach v. Haas, 119 U.S. 499 (1886).
324. Belle Isle Corp. v. MacBean, 29 Del. Ch. 261, 49 A.2d 5 (Ch. 1946).
325. Distinctions based on culpability are not improper in the absence of an-
other alternative.
326. 125 F. Supp. 137 (D.Del. 1954).
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amount expended in defense of the suits less the value of the services
it received from the defendant. The value of the services was the roy-
alties less the defendant's profit, which was set as twenty-five per cent.
In Hammond v. Pennock, 27 the plaintiff had transferred real and
personal property to the defendant in exchange for certain real prop-
erty. He had also agreed to pay the encumbrances on the land he
transferred. Meanwhile, the defendant sold the personalty and con-
tracted to sell some of the realty, covenanting to remove the encum-
brances if the plaintiff had not done so. In the plaintiff's suit to rescind
for fraud the court granted relief upon the following terms: (i) the
defendant would reconvey the unsold portion of the property; (2) he
would assign the contract of sale to the plaintiff; (3) he would pay the
plaintiff the proceeds he had received from the sales he made; (4) the
plaintiff would have to indemnify the defendant for any loss he might
suffer due to outstanding encumbrances.
These cases indicate the measures the court will take to avoid per-
mitting the defendant's preventing rescission due to the plaintiff's in-
ability to restore the status quo. Moreover, the plaintiff may probably
avoid the requirement of restoration by setting off monies due him
from the defendant.3 28
In summary, failure to return the situation to the status quo will be
excused if it was due to the defendant's conduct or if substituted re-
dress can be given. The courts have been most liberal in this respect,
which is proper, since the plaintiff is the party entitled to rescind.
D. Conditional Relief in Actions Denominated as "Legal"
Having considered the extent of the court's power to grant condi-
tional relief, we may now inquire as to whether such relief is or should
be appropriate where the theory of the action was historically con-
sidered "legal." As indicated, conditional relief is most efficaciously
administered where specific or declaratory relief is sought.82 Where
damages are sought, the result will usually be achieved by allowing
counterclaims or set-offs. If all specific relief 330 formerly had been ad-
ministered by the courts of chancery, then the problems discussed in
this section would not arise. We could refer to what was formerly a
remedy at law as damages and what was formerly a remedy in equity as
specific relief. Alas, history does not operate so smoothly. For the law
327. 61 N.Y. 145 (1874).
328. This was permitted in Marietta Realty & Dev. Co. v. Reynolds, 189 Ga.
147, 5 S.E.2d 347 (1939); and in Stott v. Head, 316 Ill. App. 29, 43 N.E.2d 844
(1942). Contra, Rigdon v. Walcott, 141 Ill. 649, 31 N.E. 158 (1892).
329. But see Kundel v. Portz, 30 Mich. 195, 3 N.W.2d 61 (1942). In the vendee's
action to recover money paid under the contract, relief was conditioned upon the
buyer's returning what he had received. The suit was characterized as one for
rescission, so conditional relief was applicable.
33o. I mean to include, of course, declaratory relief as well.
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courts did grant specific relief of some sort, namely actions for re-
plevin and ejectment; they also developed the extraordinary legal
remedies, which, however, were administered generally in the same
manner as equitable relief. The distinction between legal specific relief
and equitable specific relief is still meaningful today insofar as it relates
to the right to trial by jury-assuming, as in most states, that the right
is guaranteed "as heretofore." So, when the theory of the action is re-
plevin or ejectment, there is a jury trial; also many states have special
procedures as to those actions, particularly with respect to possession
of the property pending disposition of the case. Since distinctions be-
tween legal and equitable remedies are necessary so long as jury trials
are not authorized in equitable actions,33' when that issue is involved,
they must be made. But, should it be necessary to make them in any
other situation, where law and equity are merged into a single system?
The type of relief awarded should not depend on whether the theory
of the action is legal or equitable except as required by constitutional
mandate.
Unfortunately, however, that distinction is still being made in the
matter of conditional relief. Too many courts are reluctant to abandon
distinctions between law and equity and preserve them wherever pos-
sible, as if it would be "immoral" not to do so. Also, when a court be-
lieves that its power to grant conditional relief is based on the maxim,
"he who seeks equity must do equity," it mechanically refuses to apply
the principle to a "legal" action. As indicated previously,332 this is not
the basis of the court's power. Such a power was exercised by the court
of chancery long before the maxim came into existence, and it would
seem that any court could condition relief in order to achieve a just
result.383 Despite such an analysis the courts have not generally granted
conditional relief where ejectment and replevin are involved.
As to replevin, the distinction is graphically illustrated by Mac-
Donald v. Leverington Const. Co.,334 which represents the general view
as to the nature of a replevin action. The defendant contended that in
good faith he had made improvements on the shovel, which had en-
hanced its value. The court refused to order reimbursement for this
amount as a condition to relief, since it held that the only issue in a
replevin action is which party is entitled to possession. The court ob-
served that if the plaintiff had elected to recover on the counterbond,
then the defendant could offset the value of the improvements, since
the plaintiff was entitled only to the unimproved value of the chattel.
This distinction was also recognized in John V. Farwell Co. v. Hil-
331. For a suggestion that this distinction be abolished by legislation see Van
Hecke, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases, P' N.C.L. REV. 157 (1953).
332. See the discussion at notes 11-12 supra and accompanying text.
333. This would include a law court under a separate system,
334. 531 Pa. 381, 2oo At. 8 (195 8).
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ton.335 In that case the vendor was permitted to replevy goods obtained
by fraud without returning the consideration, since the sole issue was
the right to possession. Here, the vendor could obviously recover this
amount in an independent action, necessitating two suits. The court
did not consider whether it could have conditioned relief upon the
return. Had the vendee brought suit to rescind and recover the prop-
erty, the entire controversy could have been adjudicated in a single
action .336
The distinction is likewise demonstrated by the holding in Sartain v.
Dixie Coal & Iron Co.,337 where under a separate system of law and
equity the chancery court had jurisdiction over replevin actions. Since
the suit was brought in the chancery court, the court required return
of the consideration received as a condition to replevying the property.
The court observed that the "maxim" was applicable whenever the
plaintiff came into the chancery court either under its original or statu-
tory "jurisdiction." 33s The result here depended on the court in which
suit was brought.
In ejectment actions the distinction is equally sharp, causing an
absurd result. The question here arises as to the defendant's right to be
reimbursed for the enhanced value of the land due to his improve-
ments, as a condition to relief. Whenever the plaintiff seeks equitable
relief as to his interest in land, e.g., an action to quiet title, reimburse-
ment for improvements is generally a condition to relief.339 But if the
plaintiff is out of possession so that he must bring ejectment, an entirely
different rule applies.
In the first place, some states recognize an independent action for
recovery of improvements by certain occupiers either under their com-
mon law 340 or under so-called "betterment" statutes.3 1 Where such is
recognized, no problem arises, since the defendant can counterclaim for
the value of the improvements in the ejectment action. However, some
states do not recognize an independent right of recovery; recovery, if
any, can be had only when the owner as plaintiff seeks relief with re-
spect to the land. Without considering the merits of a distinction based
335- 84 Fed. 293 (E.D.Wis. 1897).
336. The view also is that statutes authorizing counterclaims are inapplicable to
replevin actions, as indicated in the MacDonald case, supra note 334.
337. 15o Tenn. 633, 266 S.W. 313 (1924).
338. Cf., Sisson v. Hill, 18 R.I. 212, 26 At. 196 (1893).
339. Subject to the exceptions previously discussed.
340. Soper v. Foster, 256 Ky. 157, 75 S.W.2d io8o (1934); Hardy v. Burroughs,
251 Mich. 578, 232 N.W. 200 (1930); Jensen v. Probert, 174 Ore. 143, 148 P.2d 248
(1944); Murphy v. Benson, 245 S.W. 249 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922). See also Bright v.
Boyd, 4 Fed. Cas. 127 (No. 1875) (D.Me. 1841). These actions are generally considered
equitable, so there is no right to a jury trial.
341. Griswold v. Bragg, 6 Fed. 342 (D.Conn. 188o); State v. Jones, 335 S.W.2d
468 (Mo. App. 196o). In Griswold, a federal court upheld their constitutionality;
in Jones the court held that there was a right to a jury trial.
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on whether the owner seeks relief,342 it is submitted that the right to
conditional relief should not depend on whether the theory of the
plaintiff's action is legal or equitable. This is not the position, however,
that the courts have taken. Although they will under traditional prin-
ciples of conditional relief order reimbursement when the theory of
the plaintiff's claim is equitable, they deny any relief to the defendant
if the plaintiff brings ejectment.3 43 If the plaintiff seeks mesne profits,
then the defendant can set off the value of the improvements, but can-
not recover any excess as a condition to relief.344 Therefore, whether
the improver is entitled to recover depends on the form of the relief
that the plaintiff seeks.
The basis for this distinction is purely historical and has no place in
a merged system. The common law rule was that the improver forfeited
all improvements. The court of chancery, however, adopted the rule of
the civil law, which permitted restitution. Since actions for mesne
profits were originally commenced in the chancery court, as the plain-
tiff needed the remedy of an accounting, such an action was considered
equitable in nature and when it was recognized by the law courts, re-
covery was permitted. But since the law court could not enter a condi-
tional decree, the defendant could not recover any excess.3 45 Therefore,
today courts do not permit recovery in actions for ejectment, since they
are "legal" actions, even though such recovery would be allowed if
the plaintiff could not bring ejectment, since then his action would be
"equitable." Reimbursement is also said to be permitted in those states
where ejectment is considered to be an "equitable" action.3 46
This historical explanation of the distinction demonstrates the fal-
lacy of recognizing it today. 347 Under a merged system the court has
342. Such a distinction is difficult to justify, at least where the owner is now in
possession.
343. See, e.g., Buswell v. Hadfield, 202 Ark. 2oo, 149 S.W.2d 555 (1941); Wake-
field v. Van Tassell, 218 Ill. 572, 75 N.E. 1058 (1905); Putnam v. Tyler, 117 Pa.
570, 12 At. 43 (1888). In Fricke v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 183 Pa. 271, 38 At.
6oi (1897), the court refused to allow an accounting action in equity after the
ejectment proceedings. See also the discussion at notes 28-30 supra and accompany-
ing text, as to betterment statutes affording an exclusive remedy.
344. Kester v. Bostwick, 153 Fla. 437, 15 So.2d 201 (1943). For a full discussion
of the general rule see RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 42 (937). The illustrations
indicate the absurdity of the present approach.
345. In Kester v. Bostwick, supra note 344, the court observed as follows:
Equity adopted the rule of the civil law. When the legal owner comes into
court seeking an accounting for mesne profits after a judgment in ejectment,
relief may be granted on condition of compensation to the bona fide holder
for improvements made by him. This on the principle that he who seeks
equity must do equity. From the rule thus adopted, the action of trespass to
recover mesne profits was developed. Many states have incorporated the
principle of the rule into betterment acts providing compensation for per-
manent improvements. Id. at 446, 15 So.2d at 2o6.
346. See RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 42, illustration 2 (1937).
347. Justice Holmes' observation that "it is revolting to have no better reason
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succeeded to both the "legal" common law rule and the "equitable"
civil law rule and can apply either, irrespective of the type of remedy
sought. The courts should allow or prohibit recovery for improvements
as a condition to relief as it deems proper, but without reference to the
theory of the plaintiff's case. As has been stated, the power to grant
conditional relief inheres to any court, but if further justification be
needed, it can be said that the merged court has now succeeded to the
powers of the former court of chancery and can use those powers in any
case. Courts have many remedies that they can give, and it is immaterial
whether the remedy was historically denominated as "legal" or "equi-
table" except as the constitution requires, e.g., the right to a jury
trial.348 The court from which the power was inherited does not affect
the ability of the court presently to employ it. It is hoped that the
courts will recognize the true basis of their power to grant conditional
relief and will do so in every proper case.3 49
It is on this note then that we conclude the discussion of conditional
relief. It is a remedy calculated to adjust all rights between the parties
and achieve a fully just result. It should be employed where feasible in
any kind of action, with the limitation only that the court should not
use this power to destroy valid legislative policies. In the final analysis,
most of the problems relating to the administration of conditional re-
lief can find their source in the historical distinction between law and
equity. Where that distinction has been abolished in actuality as well
as in name, the courts are not likely to refuse conditional relief in a
proper case, nor grant it in an improper one. Remedies exist only to
give meaning to the interests and expectations of persons and to effectu-
ate the policies of the society in which we live. They have no signifi-
cance for their own sake and when such significance is attached to them,
the values and purposes of our legal order are appreciably injured. As
in any other type of relief, the court must keep in mind this basic
function of a remedy when administering conditional relief.
for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV," and that
"it is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have van-
ished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past,"
The Path of the Law, io HARV. L. Rav. 457, 469 (1897), though perhaps trite due
to repeated citation (which may really be because so many such rules still persist),
is most applicable here. The reason for the rule, if ever sound, has ceased to exist
upon a merger of law and equity.
348. In the area of criminal law, the court feels no need to adopt different sub-
stantive rules of criminal law, because some crimes come within the guarantee and
others do not. There is no reason why courts administering civil relief should do
so either. The historical basis of the trial by jury guarantee does not necessitate an
historical approach to the substantive issues in a case where a question of jury trial
is involved.
349. Of course, the court may not do so if the betterment statute is construed
as providing the exclusive remedy. See discussion at notes 28-3o supra and ac-
companying text. Cf., Buswell v. Hadfield, supra note 343; Wakefield v. Van Tas-
sell, supra note 343.
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1I. EXPERIMENTAL RELIEF
The power of a court to issue a decree flexible in its terms can insure
the proper adjustment of conflicting interests that should be made.
Both parties may have legitimate claims, which, nonetheless, conflict.
Often, where damages are sought, one claim must be found to be more
legitimate, and relief will be granted or refused on that basisA °50 But
where the relief is specific in nature, the court may well be able to give
proper protection to both sets of interests as well as that of the public.
Practical considerations may militate against giving full or immediate
protection to the plaintiff's interest. When a court attempts to make
this adjustment, it is said that it is administering experimental relief-
it attempts to secure the interests of both parties, realizing that it may
have to make further modifications if the results do not accord with
the prediction; in some instances the results cannot be fully predicted
at the time of the decree. Experimental relief benefits both the plaintiff
and the defendant. It enables the defendant to satisfy the duty the court
finds owing, but at the same time to minimize the adverse effect on
his interests. It enables the plaintiff to obtain some measure of relief,
when otherwise any relief might have to be refused due to hardship,
impracticality or the like.
The leading modern case involving this aspect of the court's power
is usually not thought of in these terms because of the substantive basis
of the court's decision and the social problems it has engendered. But
in Brown v. Board of Educ.,351 the court's power to issue an experi-
mental decree was used in an attempt to recognize the interests of
southern and border states in cushioning the impact of a fundamental
change in their social system. Had all these states acted in good faith-
which they have not 352-the transition might have been comparatively
smooth; there would not have been the need for federal marshals, or
ultimately troops in one instance.353 In many respects this experiment
has failed; however, it does not appear that there is any movement
toward changing the court's decree. On balance, it would seem that
even now this method of relief, if properly administered and the requi-
site assistance given by the executive branch of the federal government,
would accomplish its purpose.
For our discussion, the point to be noted is that in ordering integra-
tion "with all deliberate speed," the Court was not applying any novel
doctrine nor fashioning a unique remedy because of the case's social
35o . For example, the "one of two" rule in agency law.
351. 349 U.S.. 294 (1955). There the court decided what remedy to give. For the
substantive holding see 347 U.S. 483 (1954). At 347 U.S. 495-96 n.13 the court
propounded questions to be discussed by counsel to enable the court to frame the
decree.
352. At the time of this writing no schools have been integrated in some southern
states and there has been only token integration in others.
353. As occurred in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957.
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implications, but was granting an experimental decree in the tradition
of any court administering specific relief. As the Court observed:
In fashioning and effectuating the decrees the courts will be guided
by equitable principles. Traditionally, equity has been characterized
by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for
adjusting and reconciling public and private needs. These cases call
for the exercise of these traditional attributes of equity power. At stake
is the personal interests of the plaintiffs in admission to public schools
as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis. To effectuate this
interest may call for elimination of a variety of obstacles in making
the transition to school systems operated in accordance with the con-
stitutional principles set forth in our May 17, 1954, decision. Courts
of equity may properly. take into account the public interest in the
elimination of such obstacles in a systematic and effective manner. But
it should go without saying that the vitality of these constitutional
principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement
with them. 354
The Court observed that primary responsibility rested with the school
authorities. The lower courts were directed to retain jurisdiction of
the cases and to determine whether the school authorities were acting
in good faith. The defendant school boards were ordered to make a
"prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance." 355 The courts
were authorized to grant additional time, with the burden on the de-
fendants to show necessity. The boards were also to propose integration
plans. Among the factors to be considered in determining the adequacy
of the plans were administrative problems arising from the physical
conditions of the schools, transportation, personnel and attendance
areas, as well as the revision of local laws and regulations.
In the Brown case the Court employed the device of the experi-
mental decree to meet the problems arising from a clash of constitu-
tional rights with long standing social traditions. Although the con-
flicting interests in other areas may be less monumental, there are,
nonetheless, a number of well-defined techniques that the courts em-
ploy in order to adjust them. We will now proceed to consider some
applications of this mode of relief.
A. Discretionary Means of Performance
Ordinarily an injunction is framed in specific terms; the defendant
is ordered not to do certain definite acts, or, when the court issues a
mandatory decree, to carry out designated acts. Since violation of the
decree is punishable by contempt, the decree cannot be vague in that it
fails to give the defendant fair notice of what is required, analogous
to the void for vagueness rule as applied to penal statutes. 35 6 However,
354. Brown v. Board of Educ., supra note 351, at 300 (Footnotes omitted.).
355. Ibid.
356. See, e.g., Collins v. Wayne Iron Works, 227 Pa. 326, 76 Atl. 24 (igio). But
see, Northwood v. Barber Asphalt & Paving Co., 126 Mich. 284, 85 N.W. 724 (191o),
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the court is not bound to issue such a decree, but rather it can leave the
means of performance to the defendant's discretion, reserving the power
to modify the decree as it may become necessary. So long as the defend-
ant acts in good faith, he will not be held in contempt, even though the
means employed fail to eliminate the harm. When the court issues such
a decree, it assumes that the plaintiff and the defendant will work to-
gether to eliminate the injury with the minimal interference upon the
defendant's operations. In this circumstance such a decree enables the
defendant to avoid closing down his activity. By the same token this
type of decree should always be issued where there is a possibility that
experiments can remedy the harm before refusing relief to the plain-
tiff on grounds of hardship.357 These decrees have the greatest prac-
ticability in the area of nuisances, though they are available whenever
specific relief is sought. The underlying basis for such a decree was
well explained by the court in Five Oaks Corp. v. Gathmann.35s In com-
menting on the Tennessee Copper case, 3 9 the court observed as fol-
lows:
That case was retained for further action with a right to either party
to apply later for appropriate relief. It was in the nature of an experi-
mental decree, justifiable on the assumption that on the one hand spe-
cific relief might be burdensome and unnecessary and on the other
hand that any specific prohibitions laid down by the court might not
produce the result desired. ... [I]t shows the advisability of not be-
ing too explicit in the prohibitions first decreed. In harmony with this
point of view, we think that in a nuisance case such as the one before
us general decrees should be passed with only such specific prohibitions
as appear to provide the only remedies. In other respects the offending
party should be allowed to take such measures as in its opinion will
reach the desired result. If these measures are not adequate or sufficient,
further application can be made to the court . . . appropriate action
can be taken and the decree made more specific where it appears to be
necessary.
One of the earliest cases to grant such relief was Babcock v. New
Jersey Stock Yard Co.,360 where the operation of the defendant's slaugh-
terhouse was held to constitute a nuisance.361 The decree was not com-
where the defendant was held in contempt for not taking other action to eliminate
the nuisance after the methods prescribed by the court had failed.
357. See RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 941, comment e. (1939).
358. 19o Md. 348, 360, 58 A.2d 656, 662 (1948).
359. Georgia v. Tennesseee Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915).
36o. 2o N.J. Eq. 296 (E.&A. 1869).
361. In determining whether to issue an injunction against a nuisance, the court
balances twice. First it decides whether the defendant's conduct constitutes a
nuisance, that is, whether he has made an unreasonable use of his property inter-
fering with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his property. This can be referred
to as balancing the relative interests. In doing so, it considers factors such as (i)
the locality; (2) the social utility of the respective operations; (3) which party
bears the risk of change; (4) whether the injury could be avoided by more rea-
sonable use; (5) the applicability of zoning ordinances (if the activity is prohibited
by the zoning ordinance it constitutes a nuisance per se, but if it is permitted, it
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pletely experimental, as some definite requirements were imposed; this
is often the case-the court will impose some minimum conditions and
leave the remaining performance to the defendant's discretion. Here
the defendant was ordered not to keep the hogs in a place where the
stench would reach the plaintiff for more than three hours daily; the
plaintiff was given leave to apply for modification if the time turned
out to be too long for comfort. Since the defendant had introduced
expert scientific testimony to show that the slaughtering operations
could be improved and had made some changes, the court appointed
commissioners to examine the premises and propose remedial measures.
By this decree the court avoided the undesirable alternatives of deny-
ing injunctive relief to the plaintiff or forcing the defendant to remove
his plant.
The use of such a decree and the consequent scientific experiments
may also benefit the public as a whole because of the discoveries made
through such court-ordered experiments, as happened with sulphuric
acid. In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.,3 6 2 the operation of defend-
ant's copper plant caused huge quantities of sulphur to be emitted in
the atmosphere, which severely injured forests and crops. After an in-
junction had been denied in an earlier suit by private persons upon
a balancing of the relative hardships, 368 the State of Georgia sued in
the United States Supreme Court in its sovereign capacity to enjoin
the operation. The Court granted an injunction, but ordered experi-
ments made to determine if the spread of sulphur could be eliminated.
Under the terms of the decree the defendants were permitted to op-
may still be a nuisance, e.g., a non-conforming use). If the injury will occur in the
future it considers whether the activity is a nuisance per se or whether the danger is
imminent. If it finds that the conduct does not constitute a nuisance, then it dis-
misses the complaint, and the plaintiff must seek damages at law, since the defend-
ant is entitled to a jury trial. Krummenacher v. Western Auto Supply Co., 358 Mo.
757, 217 S.W.2d 473 (1949).
However,' merely because it finds that the conduct constitutes a nuisance, it does
not mean the court will issue the injunction. It now balances the relative hardships
to the defendant and the public against that to the plaintiff that will accrue upon
the issuance of an injunction. Here it considers factors such as (i) the economic
interest of the community in the carrying on of the respective operations; (2) again,
the social utility of the competing operations; (3) the legality of the defendant's
activity-if illegal, the injunction will issue; (4) negligence; (5) reasonable alterna-
tives in operation; (6) delay in bringing suit, though insufficient to constitute
laches; (7) the character of the injury, i.e., does it affect health or safety; (8) again,
the locality; (9) the injury to the public service from the injunction, e.g., a utility;
(io) plaintiff's conduct; (ii) coming to the nuisance; (12) the injury to the public
from the denial of an injunction. If it decides, upon a weighing and balancing of
these factors, to refuse the injunction, since the plaintiff was affirmatively entitled
to equitable relief, the court may award damages without a jury. See the discussion
of the power of the court to award in lieu of damages where the plaintiff is
affirmatively entitled to relief in Lewis v. North Kingstown, 16 R.I. 15, ii Atd. 173(1887).
362. 237 U.S. 474 (1915) •
363. Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W.
658 (1904).
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erate their plants, provided they (i) kept daily records of their opera-
tions, (2) prevented the escape of fumes carrying more than forty-five
per cent of sulphur contained in the ore used for smelting and (3)
prevented the escape of gases whose sulphur content exceeded twenty
tons daily for April to October and forty tons daily thereafter. The
Court also appointed an inspector to observe conditions every two
weeks during a six month period and make recommendations at that
time. The inspectors ordered experiments conducted, which produced
new processes that regulated the sulphur content to take account of
seasonal variations in wind, humidity, temperature and pressure. As
a result the fumes were fifty per cent less harmful. Moreover, in the
course of these experiments sulphuric acid, which is now a valuable
by-product, was developed. 364
Such decrees have been very effective in protecting water rights. In
Arizona Copper Co. v. Gillespie,361 the defendant was engaged in min-
ing copper, and tailings and waste from the reduction works were de-
posited into streams, causing pollution. The plaintiff was a lower ri-
parian owner who needed the water for irrigation purposes. The lower
court enjoined the defendant from depositing any waste into the
stream; this might have had the effect of forcing the defendant to cease
operations. On appeal the decree was modified by the lower court and
affirmed by the Supreme Court to permit the defendant to construct
at its own expense settling basins near the heads of the canals by which
the waste products would be arrested. If these canals succeeded in elimi-
nating the deposits or other experimental methods accomplished the
result, the defendant could continue operations; if not, the original in-
junction would be reinstated.
The use of construction to prevent the harm was also involved in
The Salton Sea Cases.66 The plaintiff operated a salt manufacturing
plant and owned salt deposits in a basin substantially below the level
of the Colorado River. The defendant was developing a valley and
used water from the Colorado. It constructed a diversion canal, which
was the only source of supply of water for the arid valley, and some
20,ooo persons were wholly dependent on the canal for water. In order
to meet emergencies such as hot winds, it was necessary to run through
the canal an amount of water in excess of that amount normally used.
The excess flowed into the lake at a point about forty miles from the
plaintiff's land. Moreover, when the river was flooded, it would break
364. See the discussion of this point in VAN HECKE, EQUITABLE REMEDIES 384(1959). See also i HAYNES, AMERICAN CHEMICAL INDUSTRY, A HISTORY 263 (1954).
365. 230 U.S. 46 (1913).
366. California Dev. Co. v. New Liverpool Salt Co., 172 Fed. 792 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 215 U.S. 6o3 (1909); New Liverpool Salt Co. v. California Dev. Co., 172
Fed. 820 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 215 U.S. 603 (1909).
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through the canal and made the lake larger. Eventually, the lake cov-
ered the basin.
The decree ordered the defendant to cease diverting some of the
excess amounts of water from the river. It also ordered it to take meas-
ures to insure that water would not flow upon the plaintiff's land 307
and to prevent waste water from accumulating there. The means of
performance were in the defendant's discretion, and it was held that
he was not in contempt, even though, as it turned out, some of the
waste water did enter the lake.
A recent case involved the conflicting needs of a water supplier to
obtain new sources and that of the users to enjoy an uninterrupted
supply. In Crane v. Essex Fells,368 users sued to enjoin the borough,
which was supplying water to them, from running a seventy-two hour
test to obtain a new source of water. The court permitted the borough
to conduct the test conditional upon its giving adequate notice to the
users and supplying them potable water from some other source while
the tests were being conducted.
The other main area in which the means of performance have been
left to the defendant has been cases involving nuisances due to noise
and odors. In Five Oaks Corp. v. Gathmann,6 9 the plaintiff sued to
enjoin the operation of a restaurant, which furnished curb-side serv-
ice, as a nuisance. The decree prohibited curb-side service only after
midnight and required the defendant to see that car lights were
dimmed. It also prohibited the playing of all music after midnight.
On the latter point the decree was reversed, since music could be
played inside in such a way as not to disturb adjoining landowners,
and the defendant was given that opportunity. A drive-in theater was
involved in Payne v. Johnson,3 T7 where due to wartime shortages it was
impossible to obtain in-a-car speakers, and the defendant used loud-
speakers, which annoyed neighboring residents. The plaintiff sought
to enjoin the operation of the drive-in completely, but instead the
court ordered the defendant to take measures to eliminate the annoy-
ance. The decree provided that prior to ii: oo P.M. the speakers were
to be operated in such a way that the words would be inaudible; after
that time they were to be operated in such a way that there would be no
sounds. Prior to 11:OO P.M.-which the court found to be a normal
hour of repose-the plaintiff's only legitimate interest was in not hav-
ing conversation and concentration disturbed by hearing motion pic-
ture dialogue; after that time he was entitled not to have sleep dis-
turbed. The defendant was permitted to operate his activity so long as
he employed means to accomplish that result. The same principle was
367. As a result the defendant had to do acts in a foreign state. See the discus-
sion at note 24 supra.
368. 67 N.J. Super. 83, 169 A.2d 845 (Ch. Div. 1961).
369. Supra note 358.
370. 2o Wash.2d 24, 145 P.2d 552 (1944).
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applied in Bishop Processing Co. v. Davis,3 1 where the decree simply
ordered the defendant to cease operating his processing plant in such
a way as to cause offensive odors. The defendant had appealed on the
ground that the court should have refused the injunction upon a bal-
ancing of the relative hardships. The court stated that it would not
do so as long as there was a possibility that corrective action could be
taken through experiments and the like. As these cases indicate, the
interests of both parties can be fully protected by leaving the means
of eliminating the harm to the defendant's discretion under court su-
pervision. In such a situation the court may avoid imposing the defense
of balance of hardship while at the same time preserving the intended
benefits of that doctrine.
B. Delay or Time Limitation as to Operation of Decree
Often the interests of both parties can adequately be secured by time
adjustments. One method is to limit the life of the decree to the pe-
riod before the defendant's conflicting interests has arisen, despite a
claim of future hardship, which, on balance, would justify a denial of
the injunction. In this manner the plaintiff can obtain the benefits
of the decree until that time arises. In Merrian v. 352 W. 4 2nd Street
Corp.,37 2 the defendant was using the adjoining land as a parking lot.
The plaintiff's building contained an iron stairway and gate, which
provided a fire exit. This stairway protruded onto the defendant's lot.
The plaintiff's building would constitute a fire hazard if the stairway
and gate were removed, unless he built another exit. In answer to the
plaintiff's claim that the defendant was interfering with an easement,
it was contended that injunctive protection of the easement would pre-
vent the use of the land for building purposes. Admitting that there
was a need for building expansion in the area, and that an injunction
would be refused upon a balancing of the relative hardships, the court,
nonetheless, granted the injunction against interference until such time
as the defendant actually sought to use the land for building purposes.
The interest of the plaintiff was thus protected until it tangibly in-
terfered with the defendant's.
The court can also delay the operation of an injunction so that the
defendant can take action to mitigate or eliminate its adverse effects.
In Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore Coal Co.,373 the court enjoined the
defendant's drainage of waters from an acid mine into a stream used
by the plaintiff. However, it delayed operation for a period of six
months so that the defendant could find another way to dispose of the
waters with the least possible expense. The delay will also be granted,
even though the result may be to render the court's decree ineffective.
371. 213 Md. 465, 132 A.2d 445 (1957).
372. 15 Misc.2d 1o23, x83 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Sup. Ct. 1959).
373. 281 Pa. 233, 126 At. 386 (1924).
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In Sammons v. City of Gloversville,874 the city's pollution of a stream
with sewage was held to constitute a nuisance. The court suspended
operation of the decree for a year so that the city could either change
its methods of sewage disposal or obtain legislation authorizing the
very conduct the court prohibited. 7 5 Another ground for delay is to
permit the defendant to institute condemnation proceedings. In Minto
v. Salem Water Co., 376 suit was brought against a water company to en-
join excessive use of an easement on plaintiff's land, which defendant
had the power to condemn. The court delayed the effect of the decree
for sixty days to give the defendant the opportunity to institute such
proceedings. 7 7 It also allowed the defendant a reasonable time to
change the nature of its operation to conform to the deed of easement
if it wished.
The court may decide that certain specified methods may eliminate
the harm, and delay the decree to give the defendant the opportunity
to attempt such methods. In Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v.
Gault,378 where the defendant was a public utility and the plaintiff
sued to enjoin the operation of a compressor gas station which caused
excessive noise and vibrations, the court adopted such an approach. It
suspended the injunction for a certain period of time and gave the
defendant the option to make certain improvements at its expense. If
the harm was still not eliminated, then the court would consider va-
cating the injunction; if the defendant chose not to make the improve-
ments within that time, the injunction would be reinstated. These
cases recognize the effect of time in determining what kind of relief,
if any, will ultimately be given. This is a particularly effective device
to give full play to the public interest-as is indicated by the cases
authorizing condemnation proceedings or requests for legislative au-
thorization-for often a municipality or public utility is involved. Here
the court also recognizes the interest of the legislature in determining
the scope of permissible conduct.
C. Protection Against Contingencies
Where the giving of the requested relief might result in a future
loss to the defendant that he should not be required to suffer, the court
will refuse relief unless the interests of the defendant can be protected
374. 175 N.Y. 346, 67 N.E. 622 (1903).
375. Where the legislature specifically authorizes the prohibited conduct, it can-
not constitute a nuisance. Thus, if the court has issued an injunction against it,
the injunction will be dissolved. Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge, 59
U.S. (s8 How.) 421 (1855); Sawyer v. Davis, 136 Mass. 239 (1884); Marcus Sayre
Co. v. Newark, 6o N.J. Eq. 361, 45 Atl. 985 (E.&A. 19oo); Dudding v. Automatic
Gas Co., 145 Tex. 1, 193 S.W.2d 517 (1946). The fact that the conduct is not pro-
hibited by the zoning ordinances does not have this effect.
376. 12o Ore. 202, 250 Pac. 722 (1926).
377. In the Sammons case, supra note 374, it was suggested that the city might
have the power to condemn. If not, then it could seek such power in the legisla-
ture as well as authorization to maintain the nuisance.
378. 198 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1952).
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by the decree. In order to safeguard those interests it imposes conditions
to meet the contingencies. In some instances the threatened event will
clearly occur, but its effects may vary; in others the occurrence itself
is the contingency.
A recent case involved an injunction against a strike, the legality
of which had to be determined by an administrative agency in the first
instance. In Locomotive Engrs v. Missouri-K.-T. Ry., 7 9 the railroad
had changed its method of operations, eliminating the jobs of some
employees. The union, claiming a violation of the collective bargain-
ing agreement, struck and the railroad submitted the dispute to the
National Railroad Adjustment Board. It also sued in the federal dis-
trict court to enjoin the strike. The Supreme Court held that the rail-
road was entitled to an injunction, but that the rights of the employ-
ees had to be preserved pending the outcome of the litigation, since
if the board found a violation of the agreement, the strike would be
justifiable. The injunction was conditioned on the plaintiff's either re-
storing the prior situation or paying the adversely affected employees
the wages they would have received if the changes had not been
made.380
A question of protection against contingent liability was involved in
Southern Sur. Co. v. Maney.3 s A workmen's compensation insurer sued
employers to enforce a judgment lien for unpaid premiums. Since the
insurer was a corporation going through dissolution proceedings, the
defense was that the insurer would be unable to pay future compensa-
tion claims that might arise. The court allowed the insurer to enforce
the lien for the full amount of the arrearages, but ordered the proceeds
to be impounded for a five year period. Any sums that the defendants
would be required to pay in compensation proceedings, including at-
torneys fees, would be repaid from those funds. Moreover, the plain-
tiff could obtain the funds presently by giving a bond equal to the
amount. By issuing such a decree, the court enforced the judgment
while at the same time guaranteeing the defendants the benefit of the
insurance protection for which they paid.
Such a decree can be used to protect an apprehensive party who
doubts reasonably the ability of the other to perform, though the time
for performance has not yet arrived. In Fitchner v. Walling,3s2 the
vendee of a land contract sought rescission on the grounds that the
vendor could not convey good title because of an outstanding mortgage.
379. 363 U.S. 528 (1960).
38o. The lower court had held that under the statute only the board could grant
such relief. The statute was construed as not interfering with the power of the court
to grant conditional relief. Statutes authorizing the courts to enforce administra-
tive rules have generally been construed as not limiting the court's traditional
powers with respect to granting relief. See, e.g., Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321
(1944).
381. 19o Okla. 129, 121 P.2d 295 (1941).
382. 225 Iowa 8, 279 N.W. 417 (1938).
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He had previously given a negotiable instrument in partial payment.
The court would not grant rescission, since the vendor might have been
able to clear the encumbrance by the time performance was due. But
it did enjoin the vendor from negotiating the note unless he either
made provision for release of the mortgage or offered security for pay-
ment from the proceeds of the note upon transfer. Thus, the vendor
could negotiate the note, but the vendee would be assured of receiving
the agreed exchange.
These cases are illustrative of how an experimental decree can be
used to prevent against contingencies and contingent liability. The
flexible nature of such decrees enables the court to adequately protect
the interests of all parties despite the contingencies.
D. Adjustment of Conflicting Equities
Here we are not concerned with experimental relief in the technical
sense; no "experiments" are conducted and no attempt is made to
protect against contingencies. Rather the court attempts to secure to
both parties whatever benefits they are entitled to receive under a par-
ticular transaction. The decrees in these cases are referred to as ex-
perimental because of their underlying purpose-to secure benefits to
one party without destroying the legitimate interests of the other. In
some instances the decree may also have to be modified if the antici-
pated results are not achieved.38 The cases are varied, but the same
purpose is present in all-to secure to each party the protection of his
legitimate interest.
One situation is where both parties are in default, but the decree
can keep the contract in effect. In Derr v. Hitchman, 84 the vendor
sought foreclosure of a mortgage upon acceleration of the debt due to
the missing of some payments; the vendee sought cancellation, since
the vendor breached his contractual duty to pay an outstanding mort-
gage on the property. The court gave the vendor ninety days to re-
deem the outstanding mortgage. If he did, he could obtain foreclosure
unless the vendee paid the full amount of the debt within sixty days.
If the plaintiff performed, but the defendant did not, foreclosure would
be granted. If the plaintiff defaulted, then the court would grant can-
cellation and order an accounting. If both parties performed, each
would get the full benefit of the transaction, though both were pres-
ently in default.
In Brasher v. Grayson,3 Z the court attempted to protect a creditor,
a disaffirming infant and the latter's father, who was a co-obligor. The
creditor paid the amount owed on the price of a lot which was pur-
383. Underlying purpose rather than technical form has been used in classifica-
tion here. Of the three basic subdivisions this seems the most logical for these cases.
384. 26o Mich. 179, 244 N.W. 440 (1932).
385. 217 Ala. 674, 117 So. 301 (1928).
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chased by the father and the infant jointly, and for the cost of con-
structing a house. Under the agreement the father would convey his
interest to the infant, who, in turn, would execute a mortgage to the
creditor. The infant disaffirmed. The creditor was ordered to pay into
court any amount the father and son paid on the purchase price and
for construction. The property was then sold to reimburse the creditor
for all sums expended and any balance was to be paid to the infant.
The infant and creditor were fully protected by the decree, and the
father did not have to bear the entire obligation originally given by
him and the son.
This type of decree can also be used efficaciously in the "lifetime
care" situation. In Eriksen v. Schiller,380 the court assured that a daugh-
ter who could no longer care for her mother due to the latter's physi-
cal condition would have the benefit of the property, and that the
mother would get the care that the daughter agreed to give. The
daughter had performed her agreement to care for the mother in ex-
change for a conveyance of the latter's home, but due to the mother's
physical condition-she was confined to a wheelchair and needed con-
stant nursing-could no longer do so. She placed the mother in a
nursing home, but could not afford to pay the entire cost. The court
denied rescission in suit by the mother, but ordered the daughter to
make weekly payments in an amount equivalent to the value of the
room and board the mother would have received if the agreement
could have been performed. The court refused to require payment of
the nursing home bills, since this was not what the daughter had prom-
ised to do.
Finally, in Pitts v. Highland Constr. Co.,8s 7 the court prevented un-
just enrichment by refusing cancellation of a trust deed for construc-
tion, even though the underlying contract, partially guaranteed by
the Veterans' Administration, was illegal as a cost plus contract. In-
stead, the court reduced the obligation to the reasonable cost and al-
lowable extras, but not exceeding the amount by which the maximum
building cost, as determined by the Veterans' Administration, exceeded
the amount of the loan. These cases demonstrate that a court need
not be faced with the choice of either rescinding and giving neither
party anticipated benefits, or denying one party his legitimate claims
in order to protect the other. By a flexible decree adjustment of all
competing interests can often be made.
In this portion of the article I have tried to review the circumstances
in which an experimental decree can be used to fully protect both
parties. Such use will become more prevalent as courts realize the
power to mold a decree in recognition of conflicting interests. The
court need not grant relief by ignoring the defendant's interests nor
386. 27 Misc.2d 794, 21o N.Y.S.2d 71 (Sup. Ct. 196o).
387. 115 Cal. App.2d 2o6, 252 P.2d 14 (Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
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refuse relief because those interests or those of the public outweigh the
plaintiff's. Often an experimental decree will enable the court to avoid
that dilemma. This kind of decree may also be used to adjust con-
flicting equities and protect against contingencies. An experimental
decree should always be tried, if feasible, before a court decides to
protect only one party when both have legitimate interests.
III. SUBSTITUTIONAL RELIEF
In this portion of the article we are concerned with when the court
will give relief different in kind than that which the plaintiff sought,
it view of the countervailing interests of the defendant or the public.
Where the court finds that the plaintiff is affirmatively entitled to equi-
table relief, but refuses it as a matter of defense, then it may award
"in lieu of" damages without impaneling a jury.3 88 By the same token,
it will refuse to grant rescission due to fraud or mistake where it can
insure the intended benefits of the transaction to the plaintiff by or-
dering the payment of money 389 or reformation of an instrument. 90
The three areas where such relief is presently most common involve
(i) substitutes for condemnation proceedings, (2) substituted perform-
ance and (3) building by mistake. Although these areas are the ones
that will be discussed in detail, it should be remembered that the court
has the power to do this in any situation, if feasible, where the alterna-
tives would be either to refuse relief because of the competing in-
terests of the defendant or the public or to grant relief despite such
conflict. Since the courts have succeeded to the ancient power of the
chancellor to give affirmative relief against the plaintiff, the plaintiff
may be compelled to take substitutional relief and a decree can be
entered accordingly.891
A. Substitute for Condemnation Proceedings
The New York courts have long held that where injunctive relief is
sought against a municipality or public utility having the power to
condemn the property with which there is the interference, relief will
be refused conditional upon payment of past and permanent damages,
and the plaintiff will be required to quitclaim his interest. 92 This is
388. See the discussion at note 361 supra.
389. See, e.g., O'Shea v. Morris, 112 Neb. 102, 198 N.W. 866 (1924).
39o. See, e.g., Hugo v. Erickson, i1o Neb. 602, 194 N.W. 723 (1923).
391. Note the contrast with a true conditional relief situation. If the plaintiff
does not accede to the conditions, the complaint is dismissed. In the absence of a
counterclaim, the defendant has no right to performance. See the discussion at
note 9 supra, and accompanying text.
392. This is the present method of relief. Cox v. City of New York, 265 N.Y.
411, 193 N.E. 251 (1934). In Westphal v. City of New York, 177 N.Y. 14o, 69 N.E.
369 (1904), the plaintiff was given the option under traditional principles of con-
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the equivalent of condemnation proceedings. The court then deter-
mines the fair value of the property; this is what it means by future
damages. If the defendant refuses to pay, the injunction is granted if
affirmatively proper.
This has been required in situations where a municipality has af-
fected the natural flow of underground water by the establishment of
pumping stations, 393 a railroad has destroyed an easement by removing
a bridge,394 a railroad has by mistake run tracks over land it has the
power to condemn,395 and a municipality has diverted water from a
riparian owner.3 96
The question is presented as to whether such a decree can be en-
forced against an unwilling plaintiff by requiring him to execute a re-
lease. This is related to the right to trial by jury. However, if the state
constitution is interpreted as requiring a jury trial where the effect of
the decree would be to force a condemnation, the court can impanel
a jury to pass on the reasonable value of the plaintiff's property right;
this presents no obstacle to substitutional relief. The same is true if ap-
praisers must be appointed under state law. Apparently, however, most
states have not employed this device, but in such a case would merely
balance the hardships and generally refuse relief.39 7 Such an approach
works to the plaintiff's disadvantage, since lie can recover only for past
damages and would have to bring repeated actions in the future, as
the defendant may never institute proceedings on the grounds that
there is an actual taking, if this is permitted. Another alternative is to
grant the injunction unless the defendant institutes condemnation pro-
ceedings, which is certainly more desirable than refusing any relief to
the plaintiff. The latter course may be more feasible, particularly if
there is a right to a jury trial. In any event, the New York courts have
achieved a sound practical result, which benefits both parties, and
which is in the public interest. It is hoped that other courts will exer-
cise their power to accomplish this result in a proper case.
ditional relief; the mode of relief in the Cox case indicates the distinction between
conditional and substitutional relief.
393. Westphal v. City of New York, supra note 392.
394. Cox v. City of New York, supra note 392.
395. Henderson v. New York Cent. Ry., 78 N.Y. 423 (1879). Here the defendant
was objecting. He argued that the injunction should be denied upon a balancing of
the relative hardships. He also argued that the court could not order him to pay
money. The court emphasized that he had the option to pay the money or submit
to the injunction, since the plaintiff was affirmatively entitled to relief.
396. Ferguson v. Village of Hamburg, 272 N.Y. 234, r N.E.2d 8oi (1936).
397. In Mississippi St. Hwy. Comm'n v. Spenser, 233 Miss. 155, 101 So.2d 499(1958), where the court denied an injunction conditional on the commission fur-
nishing substituted access to the plaintiff, it also remanded the case for a deter-
mination of past and future damages in the event the state did not furnish the
access. This indicates that it would apply the approach taken by the New York
courts and order the plaintiff to quitclaim his interest upon payment of past and
future damages. Cf., Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 340(1933).
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B. Substituted Performance
Here the court requires the plaintiff to take something other than
that to which he is legally entitled because of the hardship on the de-
fendant or the public if he was given that exact performance. He is
not denied relief on these grounds, but given a substitute. In any event
such relief is better from his standpoint than his being relegated to
damages.
The public interest in substituted performance was involved in
Gulf, M.&N.R.R. v. Illinois Cent. Ry.3 9 8 Under the contract
one railroad agreed to allow another to operate over its tracks pursuant
to an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission. Under the agree-
ment the plaintiff's employees were to operate the trains. When the
defendant's employees threatened to strike unless they operated those
trains, the defendant sought modification of the contract to permit this
and offered to bear any additional expense. The plaintiff refused and
sought specific performance. The court refused to grant relief unless
the plaintiff would permit the defendant's employees to operate the
trains. It observed that the public had an interest in preventing strikes,
and specific performance would not be granted to the injury of the
public. Since modified performance was possible, the plaintiff had the
option of taking it or being refused specific relief.
The commonest application of this principle involves substituted
access where the plaintiff is entitled to specified access, but the de-
fendant can furnish another, equally convenient for the plaintiff but
substantially less burdensome to him. In Cookston v. Box, 99 the plain-
tiff had acquired an easement by implication and necessity over the
defendant's lot, but had not been using it. It was not, however, ex-
tinguished by non-user. Instead he was currently using a pathway over
another lot, which was equally convenient and more desirable for the
defendant. In a suit to enjoin the interference with the easement over
the first lot, the court issued a declaratory judgment that the plaintiff
had an easement over that lot, but refused to order the defendant to
permit him to use it as long as he permitted the plaintiff to use the
second lot. Here the plaintiff received all that he needed-a declara-
tion of his rights and the access he actually was using-while the bur-
den on the defendant was lessened.
The same principle is applicable, even though the plaintiff's rights
may be based on contract or reservation. In Lindsey v. Clark,4°° the
owner of the servient tenement sued to enjoin the holder of a reserved
right of way from using a driveway along the north side of the prop-
erty. The latter sought a declaration that he was entitled to use the
398. 21 F. Supp. 282 (W.D.Tenn. 1937).
399. 109 Ohio App. 531, 16o N.E.2d 327 (1959).
400. 193 Va. 522, 69 S.E.2d 342 (1952).
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south side, where he had actually reserved the right of way. He had,
however, been using the north side. Since the owner of the servient
tenement sought to enjoin the use on the north side, which the defend-
ant admitted he had no right to use, he sought protection of his right
to use the south side. The plaintiff's house encroached on the south-
ernly right of way, and the defendant sought a mandatory injunction
compelling removal of that portion. With both parties standing on
their "legal rights," the court wisely applied a practical solution. It
denied the defendant the use of the right of way on the south side
so long as the plaintiff permitted him to use the one on the north side.
The parties were in the same position as they were before each in-
sisted on his "rights," and access was maintained without undue hard-
ship on the holder of the servient tenement.
Substituted access may be required, even though the plaintiff has a
constitutional right to the specified access. In Mississippi St. Hwy.
Comm'n v. Spenser,40 1 property owners sued to require the state com-
mission to allow them access to the highway from a portion of their
property. Access had been denied on the ground that it would con-
stitute a traffic hazard. The court found that the plaintiff had a right
of access, which could not constitutionally be taken without compensa-
tion. However, the court permitted the commission to furnish a satis-
factory substitute means of access. 40 2 The interest in public safety justi-
fied the substituted access, even though it was not equally convenient
to the highway. The basic concern was that the plaintiff have some
access, which was insured by the decree.403 In view of the willingness
of other courts to grant such relief the result in Richard Paul, Inc. v.
Union Improvement Co., 40 4 is most unfortunate and indicates confu-
sion as to the difference between conditional and substitutional relief
as well as a misunderstanding of the court's power as to the latter. Un-
der a lease the plaintiff was entitled to unobstructed use of an alley.
The defendant had erected a gate across the entrance to the alley, but
offered an equally convenient means of access to the leased building-
the use of a parking lot adjacent to the premises. On appeal a decree
requiring him to accept substituted access was reversed, and the de-
fendant was ordered to remove the gate.
The court referred to its power to grant conditional relief as a de-
vice to force the plaintiff to concede to his adversary's "equities" in
order to obtain relief. Since the defendant knew of the plaintiff's claim
when it constructed the gate, it had no "equities." The court observed
that: "Conditions may not be imposed to deprive a plaintiff of his full
401. Supra note 397.
402. The court refused to order the commission to construct a bridge in order
to furnish substituted access.
403. As to the possibility of the decree as a substitute for condemnation pro-
ceedings, see the discussion at note 397 supra.
404. 33 Del. Ch. i13, 91 A.2d 49 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
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legal rights unless they secure an equitable right belonging to the'
defendant, or unless they secure to the defendant some matter which
the plaintiff is estopped to deny him." 405 Even assuming this to be a
correct statement of the basis of conditional relief, which is doubtful,
since it ignores the court's power to impose additional conditions,40 6
nonetheless, it fails to consider the court's power to impose substitu-
tional relief. The court did not require the defendant to restore bar-
riers that formerly ran along the westernly and southwesternly sides
of the alley, since the plaintiff had always left them open in the past.
This merely illustrates that the court will not give any relief that the
plaintiff does not actually need. But the absence of need is also the
basis for the requirement that the plaintiff, accept substituted access.
Since such access is all that he needs, the court should not require that
he have the specified access, even though he has a "legA right" to it.407
Had the court realized that it requires the plaintiff to accept substitu-
tional relief whenever it refuses an injunction against a nuisance or
trespass on balancing the hardships and that the same -principle was
involved in the case before it, it might have avoided this result. Since
substituted access adequately protects any legitimate interest of the
plaintiff while mitigating the burden on the defendant, the court
should require the plaintiff to accept it when available.
C. Building by Mistake
This involves the defendant who has built on the plaintiff's property
by mistake; thinking it was his own. Often the parties are adjoining
landowners. These cases differ from the ones discussed in the section
on conditional relief,408 since here the defendant was not occupying
the land under a pre-existing relationship with the plaintiff, nor was
he claiming title to the land against the plaintiff. Rather he thought
he had title to the land on which he built. Generally, the relief given
when the plaintiff seeks to require removal of the structure is to order
the plaintiff to quitclaim the portion of the land on which improve-
ments have been made-which is usually a small portion or unim-
proved land-upon payment of reasonable value.
The principle is demonstrated by the Canadian case of Delorme v.
Cusson.40 9 As a result of mutual error respecting the division line the
405. Id. at 124, 91 A.2d at 55.
406. We must distinguish between rights such as to title to property, which can-
not be taken away by a conditional decree and rights to performance and the like.
When we use the term, "right," we must be conscious of its varied qualitative
meanings.
407. The court's emphasis on "legal" rights would indicate a substantive dis-
tinction between "legal" and "equitable" rights. It is difficult to see the relevance
of this, insofar as a particular remedy is concerned.
408. Where reimbursement for improvements is required as a condition to relief
with respect to the land.
409. [1897] 28 Can. Sup. Ct. 66.
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defendant had in good faith erected a building which encroached on
a small portion of the plaintiff's property, and the plaintiff sought a
mandatory injunction compelling removal. The court refused the in-
junction, but instead required the plaintiff to accept compensation
for the reasonable value of the land and quitclaim that portion.
Interestingly enough, in this country, most of the cases appear to
involve independent actions by the good faith improver to obtain such
relief, and such a cause of action, based on the power of the court
to order substitutional relief if the improver had been the defendant,
has long been recognized.410 One case involving the defensive aspect
of substitutional relief, however, was Sequatchie Coal Co. v. Sunshine
Coal & Coke Co., 41 1 where the defendant, believing its boundary on
land it had leased extended to land actually owned by the plaintiff,
mined the land and made valuable improvements. In an action to en-
join the continuous trespass the court required, as a condition to re-
lief, that the plaintiff reimburse the defendant for the value of the
improvements to the extent that they enhanced the value of the land.
This was applying traditional principles of conditional relief, but since
the enhanced value was probably worth more than the land itself, the
court gave the plaintiff the option of leasing the improved land to the
defendants at reasonable rent-a specialized form of substitutional re-
lief. As a practical matter, it will almost always be to the plaintiff's
advantage to accept substitutional relief rather than conditional relief
under these circumstances. Courts often do not even consider the al-
ternative of the owner's paying the value of the improvements when
the improver is plaintiff, indicating that substitutional relief is the
more efficacious remedy here.412 It should also be noted that the alter-
native to release the land upon payment of the value of improvements
may be given in any case where the plaintiff is required to pay for
the value of the improvements as a condition to relief.41
An interesting adjustment based on the court's power to grant sub-
stitutional relief, analogous to the cases involving building by mistake,
was made in McCreary v. Shields.414 There the plaintiff, the defendant,
who was the purchaser from the state at a tax sale, and the state all
assumed that the sale was of an unimproved lot actually owned by the
41o. The earliest case apparently was McKelway v. Armour, io N.J. Eq. 115
(Ch. 1854). See also Voss v. Forgue, 84 SO.2d 563 (Fla. 1956); Olin v. Reinecke, 336 Ill.
530, 168 N.E. 676 (1929); Hardy v. Burroughs, 251 Mich. 578, 232 N.W. 200 (1930);
Toalson v. Madison, 307 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. App. 1957); Magnolia Constr. Co. v.
McQuillan, 94 N.J. Eq. 736, 121 Atd. 734 (E.&A. 1923); Rhyne v. Sheppard, 224
N.C. 734, 32 S.E.2d P6 (1944).
411. 25 Tenn. App. 6o4, 166 S.W.2d 402 (1942).
412. The alternative was offered in Hardy v. Burroughs, supra note 41o, and
Alamance Lumber Co. v. Edwards, 217 N.C. 251, 7 S.E.2d 497 (1940). It may have
been in Olin v. Reinecke, supra note 410.
43. This was done in Johnson v. Schwarz, 349 S.W.2d 56 (Mo. 1961).
414. 333 Mich. 290, 52 N.W.2d 853 (1952).
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plaintiff, but, in fact, was the sale of an improved lot not owned by
the plaintiff, on which he had mistakenly paid taxes. The court
awarded the improved lot to the plaintiff, and the defendant was given
the option of taking either the sum paid or obtaining from the plain-
tiff a quitclaim deed to the lot owned by him. This would have been
the result had the purchaser sued to quiet its title to the improved lot
against the plaintiff, who had paid taxes on it.
These cases indicate the power of the court to grant substitutional
relief in lieu of damages. The court sometimes confuses this power
with its power to grant conditional relief, which evolves from the same
underlying principles, but which is analytically different. The power
can be used to give the plaintiff all the relief he actually needs without
imposing undue hardship on the defendant or interfering with the
public interest. It is hoped that other courts will not adopt the ap-
proach taken in the Richard Paul case and will not give the plain-
tiff something he does not really need, imposing great hardship on the
defendant, despite the plaintiff's "legal right" to it.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this article an attempt has been made to explore the power of a
court to fully protect the rights of all parties when granting specific
and declaratory relief. Traditionally, this power has been thought to
be limited to the situations where the relief was equitable in nature,
that is, it had formerly been administered by courts of chancery. But
it is submitted that under a merged system the court can exercise this
power in any case. The power is also based on the responsibility of a
court to do complete justice between the parties. It can be employed
in a great variety of factual situations, as the cases indicate. However,
the courts should be cautious in its use so as not to defeat other policies
or legislative determinations.
Two obstacles remain to full implementation of this power. The first
is the failure to always recognize that there does not have to be a
"winner" and a "loser" in a lawsuit. Both parties may have legitimate
interests, and the court should avoid preferring one party over another,
though the issue of substantive liability is resolved in one's favor.
Whenever possible, the interests of both should be accommodated, and
this can often be done by granting conditional, experimental or sub-
stitutional relief.
The second obstacle is the persistent refusal of courts in many in-
stances to realize that the distinction between law and equity has been
abolished except insofar as is constitutionally necessary. 415 This refusal
415. Such as the trial by jury guarantee. This would appear to be the only area
where such distinctions have any validity. Naturally relief that was administered
historically by the chancery court has come down differently than that which was
formerly administered by the law court, but this is due to the nature of the relief,
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results in ignoring other policies and legislative determinations when
the plaintiff seeks "equitable relief," which it would recognize if the
relief sought were denominated as "legal." It also results in refusing
to accommodate the interests of both parties when the theory of the
plaintiff's claim is "legal." These are highly undesirable results and
have no place in a merged system.
In conclusion, it can be said that when the court is administering
specific and declaratory relief, it often possesses the power to secure
the legitimate interests of both parties in a single action. When a court
employs this power wisely, it is truly dispensing justice.
i.e., specific relief as opposed to damages, rather than the nature of the court. So
called equitable principles have been incorporated into our law where appropriate,
but this does not mean that equity exists as a separate body of law. Our concern
with equity today, except insofar as related to the trial by jury guarantee, should
be with whether specific or declaratory relief is available instead of damages. Even
if law and equity had not historically been administered by separate courts, it is
doubtful if specific and declaratory relief would be ordered where damages would
be an adequate remedy. As our law develops further, replevin, ejectment and the
extraordinary legal remedies should be incorporated in their operation with his-
torically equitable remedies such as injunctions and decrees for specific perfor-
mance. Eventually, the remedial question may simply be whether the plaintiff is
entitled to specific or declaratory relief of some sort. If he is, then the court can
fashion the remedy to the needs of the particular case.
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